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Central Asian Trade Unions Call For Economic Alliance

LD0408183793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1814 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By KYRGYZKAVAR-TASS correspondent Albert Bogdanov]

[Text] Bishkek August 4 TASS—Delegations of trade union centers from the Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which gathered at a meeting of the Coordination Council in Bishkek, urged heads of states and governments on Wednesday to restore economic ties among the former Soviet republics.

A statement adopted by the Coordination Council says that the disregarding of the present economic realities has resulted in the impoverishment of the peoples, created unemployment and makes it impossible for the new states to overcome the crisis independently.

In this situation it is absolutely essential to create an economic alliance between the Commonwealth states which should act in a single economic space and coordinate their financial and price policies. Trade union centers are prepared to give them any assistance in achieving this aim, the document says.

Turkmenistan did not send its delegates to the meeting of the Coordination Council.

Economic Union, Referendum Idea Viewed

MK0508092093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Aug 93 p 1

[Artemiy Moskvich article under the "Cooperation?" rubric: "Yeltsin Has Things to Discuss With Nazarbayev, But Do They Speak the Same Language Today?]

[Text] To all appearances, the idea voiced by Nikolay Gonchar, Moscow Soviet chairman and leader of the Moscow branch of Civic Union, on holding a simultaneous referendum in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia on the creation of an economic union of the four republics has fallen on fertile soil. This is not to say that this soil completely coincides with the geographic and political territories of the abovementioned republics, but that it does partially is without doubt. According to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's information, influential forces not only in Moscow, Minsk, Kiev, and Almaty, but also in Yerevan are ready to support the referendum idea. The stumbling block (in addition to many other snags) is, however, the lack of clarity in Russia's, and particularly Boris Yeltsin's, position regarding the alternative: a Slavic union or a Eurasian union? The developments in Tajikistan, which have no direct underlying economic motivations, urged Moscow toward a resumption of dialogue with Almaty. President Nazarbayev, who was very much hurt by the Russian Government's deliberate steps toward a Slavic union, does not want to find himself for a second time in, or rather excluded from, the Belovezhskaya Forest. He will certainly not believe any protestations of love and friendship and desire to preserve the economic space without weighty guarantees from Yeltsin. It is not ruled out that the simultaneous referendum idea will be broached when Yeltsin and Nazarbayev meet, even if in the most oblique form. What will Nazarbayev say? How will Yeltsin respond? Answers to these questions are not only dependent upon whether there still remains a strand of trust between Nazarbayev and Yeltsin, but also upon who finally comes out on top in the current political fracas in Moscow.

Collective Security Treaty's Impact on Russia Examined

PM0508104793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Aug 93 p 1

[Vitaliy Strugovets report: "Russia in Charge of Collective Security? Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Ratifies Treaty on Collective Security"]

[Text] Let us recall that the Treaty on Collective Security was signed in Tashkent 15 May 1992 by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan joined the treaty 25 November of that year, and Belarus joined it 9 April 1993 on condition that this decision would subsequently be approved at a referendum. As of today the treaty has been ratified by all the states. The gist of the treaty can be briefly summed up in one sentence: Rendering every possible assistance, including military assistance, to any member state in the event of aggression against it. This is a noble aim. Nevertheless, Russia was the last to ratify the treaty. Why? There are many reasons.

The idea of the treaty, as was repeatedly declared, was primarily to strengthen the CIS. But in fact it is turning out that a new commonwealth—a military one—has been formed within the CIS. Emphatically a military one, because the text of the treaty does not contain any political justification of the need for it. In this connection, at least two problems arise immediately. Whose interests are represented by the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command on the Collective Security Council—of all eleven countries, or only of the seven which concluded the treaty? And the second question—what is the mechanism for implementing the treaty should a conflict arise between two CIS states, one of which is not a party to the agreement on collective security?

But the main point, which deputies and specialists repeatedly raised during the discussion of the treaty in the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet commissions and committees, was its "unequal" nature [neravnoznachnost]. Of the five states which signed the treaty originally, only Russia has fully-fledged Armed Forces. Consequently, it is the only one capable of performing the main point of the treaty—rendering effective military assistance to member states. Thus, Russia has assumed another obligation—to ensure the

security of parties to the treaty—and, following its ratification, found itself, at least legally, immediately involved in two armed conflicts—the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. and the Tajik-Afghan conflict. Incidentally it is the latter, in the opinion of a number of specialists, which prompted the ratification of the treaty. And there is almost no doubt that Tajikistan will request Russia and the other states to implement the treaty. It is no coincidence that the question of measures to stabilize the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border will be the foremost quetsion to be put to the meeting of CIS heads of states scheduled to open 7 August in Moscow.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 5 Aug

LD0508062293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0532 GMT 5 Aug 93

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow August 5 ITAR-TASS—Central newspapers highlight various subjects today. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA carries an interview with Russian Finance Minister Boris Fedorov, who said he was dreaming of becoming a banker again. "With our harsh political situation one can hardly hope for holding one and the same post for ten years," the minister believes.

The newspaper reports that Russian schools in Ukraine in the Lvov region, western Ukraine, are quickly being Ukrainized. "Now there are about three times less Russian schools there than three years ago," NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA stresses.

It carries an article about the situation in the Chechen republic, which says that the developments there are following the same pattern as in Azerbaijan. "Many people believe here that this situation has been masterminded by Ruslan Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian parliament," NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA points out.

The newspaper comes up with the sensational forecast that Russia is facing the threat of a "government coup." "According to reliable sources, an attempt to radically change the economic policy of the Russian Government may be made at tomorrow's session of the council of ministers," it writes.

"We have already got the result which is not yet final, but definitely clear: this is the draft constitution which has taken many problems into consideration," Anatoliy Sliva, head of the expert group of the constituent conference and deputy head of the state law department at the Russian president's office, said in an interview with the ROSSIYSKYIE VESTI newspaper.

He pointed out that the Constitutional Conference "produced a lot of novel things in various spheres, including the consolidation of the real federal setup, which is a difficult problem." Now several issues remain on which agreement should be reached. In his opinion, "what is needed in the first place is to find a coordinated formula of the federation and a mechanism of recording it in the constitution." "This is the most difficult thing to do. The situation is such that unless we ensure a constitutional way to federalism, we shall continually be confronted with the attempts to strengthen excessively the role of the state and shall never reach the unity of the federation," he said.

TRUD carries an interview with Chairman of the Moscow City Council Nikolay Gonchar about the common economic space. "One should realise clearly today that there is neither Russian economy, nor Ukrainian economy, nor Kazakh economy. There exists a single system, which was created as such. It is necessary to connect the ends of the disrupted chain," he stresses.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA carries an article by Leonid Shebarshin, former head of the Soviet intelligence service. According to the editors, the article is the result of almost two years of pondering over the destiny and the role of the USSR State Security Committee (KGB). Shebarshin stresses that "new Russia's statehood cannot be achieved without a strong state security system."

PRAVDA publishes an interview with Uzbek President Islam Karimov. "The interests of the CIS nations require today the economic integration and the preservation of direct economic ties, which proved to be effective. However, there should be no diktat from anybody... We are working for tomorrow, without rejecting what we had yesterday," Karimov stressed.

SANKT-PETERBURGSKIE VEDOMOSTI writes about the response of owners of commercial kiosks to the tough measures taken against those who do not have cash registers. They closed their kiosks, while buyers began to queue at those kiosks, which remained open. The price of goods that were on sale—cigarettes, alcoholic drinks and cigarette-lighters—went up by several times.

A scandal is developing over the contract signed by the Pulkovo air company and the Turkish firm Sultan Air. SANKT-PETERBURGSKIE VEDOMOSTI described the deal as shady. The St. Petersburg air company suffered losses as a result of it. The labour collective council of the Pulkovo air company decided to create a special working group for examining the facts, mentioned by the newspaper. The group intends, among other things, to find out the reasons for signing the contract under which Russian planes were working for the Turkish firm.

Shearson Lehman Brothers Buys Into 'Inkombank'

PM0408125593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Aug 93 First Edition p 4

[Ivan Zhagel report: "Foreign Company Buys Major Block of Shares in Russian Bank for First Time"]

[Text] Shearson Lehman Brothers, the world-famous U.S. investment house, has acquired a $40 million block of shares in "Inkombank."

As far as is known, this is the first comparatively large deal of its kind. Prior to this, Western finance houses had been in no hurry to buy shares in Russian commercial banks. Not only because of the poor economic situation in the country as a whole, but also because of the insufficiently high professional standard of the management at our new banks, the unreliability of their lending, and sometimes even a complete lack of banking information that is generally accepted around the world.

Incidentally, while noting the success of "Inkombank," we should not overestimate it. It is obvious that Shearson Lehman Brothers is, as it were, testing the water with this operation and feeling its way into our financial market. But if "Inkombank" succeeds in paying dividends on time—and the yield is relatively high at 10.5 percent—then in a couple of years its shares could be marketed by Shearson Lehman Brothers.

Incidentally, this company sells shares in the West—above all, the United States—in very large blocks. And becoming one of these blocks is very prestigious in itself. But if "Inkombank" shares are eventually marketed by Shearson Lehman Brothers, it would mark a breakthrough into the Western financial market. A breakthrough not only for "Inkombank" but for all Russian commercial banks.

U.S. Government To Aid Amur Shipyard Conversion

PM0408095593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Aug 93 First Edition p 1

[Boris Reznik report: "Far East Conversion With U.S. Government Participation"]

[Text] Komsomolsk-na-Amure—The Amur Shipyard, formerly the biggest defense enterprise in the Far East—has entered a new stage of its development. Its collective, having become a joint-stock company, has signed a cooperation contract with the U.S. Government.

Together with the McDermott International company, the government has expressed a willingness to finance conversion at the enterprise.

Company representatives have arrived in Komsomolsk-na-Amure to do a feasibility study. It is planned that in the future the enterprise will engage in civil shipbuilding and also produce equipment for oil extraction on the coastal shelf. All its output will probably be sold in the foreign market. In this connection it will be necessary to certificate it in line with international standards. The Americans are promising to handle this aspect, along with the reorganization of production management.

U.S. Humanitarian Aid Delivered to Kamchatka

PM0508102993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Aug 93 First Edition p 1

[Report from the "ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA/ITAR-TASS" column: "Gift For Kamchatka Anniversary"]

[Text] A U.S. World Airways A-300 Airbus has landed at Yelizovo Airport.

It carried 50 tonnes of humanitarian cargo that the Americans had collected for the people of Kamchatka. The goods are primarily earmarked for children's and medical institutions on the peninsula. This gift is timed to coincide with the festivities scheduled to begin here 8 August to mark the 250th anniversary of the opening up of Russian America for hunting and fishing operations by Russian merchants and cossacks.

Trade Ties With DPRK Deteriorate 'Sharply'

OW0408094793 Vladivostok Radiostantsiya Tikhiy Okean Maritime Network in Russian 0715 GMT 30 Jul 93

[From the "Pacific Ocean" Program]

[Text] Trade and economic ties between Khabarovsk Kray and partners in the DPRK have deteriorated sharply as a result of nonpayment of accounts by the latter. The amount owed to the Kray already exceeds $6 million. The Korean side is not reacting to warnings and continues to breach agreements. Still (?hoping) for other possibilities, Yuriy Matveyev, deputy head of the Khabarovsk Kray administration, signed a directive on protection of economic interests. The Korean side is invited to settle the debt by 15 August. The Russian Government will be informed of the situation and be asked to forward an official note to the DPRK Government. A recommendation was sent to the Far East Railway Department suggesting that rolling stock be allotted only when cargoes destined for North Korea have been cleared by the Khabarovsk Customs.

'Vesti' Denies Lobov's Arrival in Iraq

LD0408113493 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 4 Aug 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Yesterday we reported the arrival of the Russian delegation, led by Deputy Prime Minister Lobov, in Iraq, citing INA. This information turned out to be untrue. According to verified information, our government delegation never left for Bagdhad.

Delegation in Baghdad

LD0408130593 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1230 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] A Russian economic delegation, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Lobov, paid a visit to Baghdad. The delegation was received by Iraqi Trade Minister Muhammad Mahdi Salih yesterday. The head of the Russian delegation said in the course of talks that Russia is interested in broadening its trade links with Iraq and emphasized that it is necessary to elaborate a document on economic trade and technical cooperation between the two countries to underpin their economic ties with a legal foundation.

Government Statement Slams Ukrainian Nuclear Policy

LD0408163593 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1530 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] We have just received via ITAR-TASS a statement of the Russian Federation Government. It says that recently, Kiev adopted a series of steps to take control of nuclear weapons located on Ukrainian territory. It recalls that on 2 July the Ukrainian Parliament approved a document on the main aspects of Ukraine's nuclear policy, in which Ukraine declares that such weapons are its property. This parliamentary act was supported by the subsequent public statements of the Ukrainian leadership. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry has decided to make the troops responsible for keeping and using nuclear ammunition part of the 43d Missile Army under the Ministry. In this way, Ukraine has taken direct control of the nuclear weapons.

In this connection, the Russian Government declares, among other things, the following:

This line being taken by Kiev is causing concern throughout the world and is leading to very serious consequences for international stability and security, and for the entire system of international relations. The statement of the Russian Federation Government stresses that Kiev blatantly violates a number of agreements concluded within the framework of the CIS. It also violates the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty, under which Ukraine promised to join as soon as possible the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state.

In conclusion, the document says: The Russian Federation, as the sole legal successor to the USSR with regard to possessing nuclear arms, and as a depositary of the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear arms, cannot accept as justified any claims or actions running contrary to international agreements on maintaining and strengthening the regime of nuclear nonproliferation. We call on Ukraine to take every measure to ensure that its non-nuclear status envisaged in international agreements is observed without fail, and to reconsider the aforementioned decisions of the Ukrainian Parliament and Defense Ministry on taking control of the nuclear weapons. At the same time, says the Russian Government statement, the Russian Federation declares its readiness to continue cooperation with Ukraine in ensuring the nuclear and ecological safety of nuclear weapons on the basis of the principles formulated by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in his letter to the president of Ukraine, dated 30 April 1993.

Such is, briefly, the content of the Russian Government statement.

'Text' of Statement

LD0408193393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1810 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Moscow, 4 Aug ITAR-TASS—The text of the Russian Federation Government's statement has been published on the series of steps taken by Kiev to establish control over nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory.

The statement says that on 2 July the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the document "Main Directions in Ukraine's Foreign Policy" in which Ukraine declares that the weapons were its' property. Parliament's act was supported by subsequent public statements of the Ukrainian leadership. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry made the decision to make the troops responsible for keeping and using nuclear armaments part of the 43rd Missile Army under the ministry's command. In this way Ukraine has taken nuclear weapons under its direct control.

In this connection the Russian Government thinks it necessary to make the following statement:

This policy by Kiev is causing concern in the world and leading to very serious consequences for international stability and security, and the whole system of international relations. In declaring herself in possession of nuclear arms, Ukraine is moving toward breaching the international obligations which she had accepted regarding her non-nuclear status, at the same time throwing down an open challenge to international law and order, sowing legal nihilism in international relations.

Kiev is directly breaching a number of agreements concluded within the framework of the CIS, in particular the 6 July 1992 decision by CIS heads of state under which the Russian Federation is the state, out of all those states which inherited the rights and obligations of the USSR, which possesses nuclear weapons.

The Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty, under which Ukraine undertook to join the nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty as a non-nuclear state without delay, is also being breached.

Kiev's line is also incompatible with the obligation accepted by Ukraine regarding the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from its territory in order that they be dismantled and destroyed by the end of 1994.

The existing nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime, based on the 1968 treaty, is being undermined, and the treaty itself, whose fate is to be decided at a conference in 1995, is threatened. A dangerous precedent is being set, which could be followed by countries on the threshold of possession of nuclear weapons.

The results of many years of effort by the international community to achieve nuclear disarmament, first and foremost the START I and START II Treaties, are being torpedoed.

Since Ukraine does not have the necessary material, technical, and technological base, the fact that she is taking control of nuclear weapons considerably increases the nuclear risk and the threat to ecological safety, for which all responsibility lies, obviously, with Ukraine.

As the only successor to the Soviet Union as owner of nuclear weapons, and as the depository of the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Russian Federation cannot recognize as lawful any claims or actions that go against international agreements on maintaining and strengthening the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We call on Ukraine to take all measures to strictly observe her non-nuclear status, envisaged in international accords, and to reappraise the abovementioned decisions by parliament and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense on establishing control over nuclear weapons.

Zhirinovskiy Explains Attitude Toward Ukraine

AU0508131693 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 4 Aug 93 p 5

[Interview with Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party, by Vasyl Zhukivskyy in Sofia; date not given: "We and Ukrainians Are a Single People—Russian"]

[Text] **"We and Ukrainians are a single people—Russian." Just like that. This was stated by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party. He recently visited Sofia and predicted an apocalypse for the Slavic peoples, unless they unite, of course, around Russia. "In 10 years, Bulgaria will be conquered by Turkey and, in 20 years, Czechia will become German," he said. In order to interrupt the future Russian president's geopolitical excursion ("our party will take advantage of the differences between Communists and Democrats and will soon come to power," Zhirinovskiy assured Bulgarian journalists. "Russians are used to having a leader, and I will be such a leader"), your correspondent asked him three earthly questions.**

[Zhukivskyy] Recently, Yeltsin and Kravchuk agreed to divide the Black Sea Fleet into two equal parts. However, the situation there is very difficult. How would you comment on it?

[Zhirinovskiy] With regard to the fleet, this is true—it must be left alone. The fleet must be united. Today, it must not be divided because the situation in Ukraine is not clear and it is not clear in Russia either.

[Zhukivskyy] In one of the "Ostankino" programs for young people, Russian Vice President Rutskoy stated that he was in favor of restoring the USSR, but in a somewhat different form....

[Zhirinovskiy] Our party is opposed to the restoration of the Union. We are in favor of restoring Russia as a fatherland for all. It is not worthwhile to create an artificial state. It will split up again. As soon as Russia ceases its relations with Ukraine, the latter will collapse, because such was our economy. However, what for? We and Ukrainians are a single people—Russian.

[Zhukivskyy] Therefore, you are opposed to Ukraine's status as an independent state maintaining good-neighborly relations with Russia?

[Zhirinovskiy] Ukraine cannot be independent, try to understand this. This already happened in the past. It is late to create an independent Ukraine. If by sovereignty you understand the closing down of Russian schools, the isolation of Ukrainian Russians, forced oaths of allegiance to Ukraine by Russian officers, then, I assure you, the fleet will rebel, and some military units will also rebel, and young people will rebel. What then is the use of this independent state? What is the use of it?!

[Zhukivskyy] Mr. Zhirinovskiy was hardly interested in my reply to his question. He has this answer just like those Great Russians for whom independent Ukraine is a nuisance. He gave a few autographs, said that his book "The Last Leap Southwards" would soon come off the press, made himself comfortable in a Mercedes and left for the provinces.

Adamishin Completes Tour of Central Asia

PM0408155993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Aug 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Boris Pilyatskin: "Russia Proposes a Meeting of Five Central Asian Countries in Moscow"]

[Excerpts] First Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin, the Russian president's special representative, has completed his tour of the five CIS Central Asian republics. In the capitals of these countries—Dushanbe, Tashkent, Almaty, Bishkek, and Ashgabat—he handed to their leaders messages from Russian President B. Yeltsin concerning the dangerous situation on the Tajik-Afghan border and the search for ways of settling the conflict. [passage omitted]

B. Yeltsin's messages state forthrightly and resolutely that it is a question of defending, in effect, our common borders, and therefore the fraternal states must stand side by side with Russia, not only for the sake of their ally Tajikistan, but also their own security and prosperity. At the present time Russian border guard forces

are operating together with Kazakh and Kyrgyz battalions. The head of the Russian state raised the question of immediately increasing the military contingents of the countries of the region.

Kyrgyzstan's President A. Akayev told me that this problem will be examined most attentively in his republic.

Despite the existing nuances in the positions of the sovereign republics (the president of Turkmenistan, for example, stated that he will not send soldiers to the Tajik-Afghan border), there are considerable chances that the special conference with the participation of Russia and the five Central Asian countries proposed by B. Yeltsin for 7 August in Moscow will manage to elaborate constructive decisions for normalizing the situation in this region.

Comments on Tajik Conflict

LD0308150893 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1242 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] In reply to journalists' questions, concerning the results of the visit to the countries of the Central Asian region and Russia's position on the situation that has arisen on the Tajik-Afghan border, Russian envoy Anatoliy Adamishin said:

[Begin recording] [Adamishin] I would say that the problem is a very acute one. In my opinion, the primary problem is the Tajik-Tajik issue first and foremost. There is an acute conflict between the legal government of Tajikistan and the opposition, which is using arms to overthrow this government—not the democratic, civilized methods of a political struggle, so to speak, but armed methods. At the same time, what is worse is that the opposition is resorting to armed assistance from the Afghan mojahedin, because the detachments which, let us say, are trying to cross the border, consist to a large extent, of Afghan mercenaries. The problem is an acute one. Russia is involved in this problem—even though it would seem to be a Tajik problem—for the simple reason that, along with other states of the CIS, Russia guards this border. As I have already said, Russia does not have any other border: the borders of the CIS states are open and transparent. Thus, if one were now to leave this border, this would mean the whole territory of the CIS, including the vast expanse of Russia, would be open for smuggling, which is not that bad, and for drugs, which is much worse, and for terrorist activity and subversive activity to create a significant destabilizing factor here. Because this is a Tajik- Tajik conflict with the involvement of Afghan mercenaries, we are exerting a major effort to make the Tajiks agree with each other. I think there are possibilities to do this: The conditions are complex for such an accord because a lot of events have occurred simultaneously. There is simply no other way. Thus, I have the impression that the problem is one that can be solved. It is very difficult, but can be solved. It is difficult to say how much time is needed for solving it. We are probably at the start of the process of political settlement. There is still a lot to be done. The military repulse at the border is necessary—it is not our choice. We would not like to use force. I think that the summit meeting of the leaders of the Central Asian republics, scheduled for Moscow in a few days, will be extremely important for finding a solution to this problem. [end recording]

[Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian at 1253 GMT on 3 August adds the following:

["In reply to the question about how the action of government troops of Tajikistan against Gorno-Badakhshan could be assessed, Anatoliy Adamishin said that he had no accurate information about this and that his information was from the press. However, he said that the Tajik foreign minister denied this information in a telephone conversation with him. For his part, Anatoliy Adamishin said it was impossible to use force for solving internal problems."]

Yeltsin Directive on FRY Sanction Enforcement

PM0308120193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 5

[Russian Federation Presidential Directive No. 516-rp dated 23 July 1993 and signed by President B. Yeltsin "On Measures Linked With the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 820 of 17 April 1993"]

[Text] In accordance with the introduction by the UN Security Council, in accordance with its Resolution 820 of 17 April 1993, of compulsory sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), from 26 April 1993 and until the Council adopts a decision rescinding them:

1. All state institutions, industrial, trading, financial, and transportation enterprises, firms, banks, organizations, and private individuals under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation are to unswervingly comply with the measures set forth in Russian Federation Presidential Directive No. 362-rp of 14 July 1992 "On Measures Linked With the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 757 of 30 May 1992" and are also to proceed on the basis that, pending a special directive:

a) imports into areas under United Nations protection in the Republic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina which are under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, and also exports from and transit shipments through the said areas—with the exception of goods to satisfy basic humanitarian requirements, including products for medical purposes and food products, distributed by international humanitarian institutions—are authorized only provided there is appropriate authorization from the Government of the Republic of Croatia or the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina respectively;

b) transit shipments of goods and products through FRY territory via the Danube are authorized only if the said

shipments have been specifically authorized by the committee established in accordance with Security Council Resolution 724 (1991); all ships obtaining such authorization will have to be subjected to effective monitoring while traveling along the Danube between Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs;

c) it is prohibited to offer services of either a financial or a nonfinancial nature to any persons or bodies for the purposes of any business activity conducted in the FRY, with the exception of services in the sphere of electronic communications, postal services, and legal services in accordance with Security Council Resolution 757 (1992) or after the approval in each individual instance by the committee established in accordance with Security Council Resolution 724 (1991) of services the offering of which can be used for humanitarian or other exceptional purposes;

d) all sea-going merchant ships are prohibited from entering FRY territorial waters except when this is authorized in each specific instance by the committee established in accordance with Security Council Resolution 724 (1991) or in the event of unforeseen circumstances.

2. All state institutions, industrial, trading, financial, and transportation enterprises, firms, banks, organizations, and private individuals under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation are to ensure compliance with the restrictions on imports of goods from the FRY and exports thereto and also on transit shipments enumerated in paragraphs a, b, c, and d of Clause 1 and are to prevent the redirection to FRY territory of goods and products produced on Russian Federation territory which are ostensibly destined for other localities, particularly the areas under United Nations protection in the Republic of Croatia and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina which are under the control of Bosnian Serbs.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to provide the said organizations and individuals with explanations as to which territories are covered by the system of restrictions established by this directive.

3. The Russian Agency for International Cooperation and Development and the Russian Ministry of Transport are to prepare and submit to the Foreign Ministry within two weeks a list of ships, trucks, rolling stock, aircraft, and also commercial organizations registered in Russia in which the main or controlling interest belongs to individuals or enterprises located in or operating from FRY territory, with a view to subsequently forwarding the said list to the committee established by Security Council Resolution 724 (1991).

4. The following are tasked with preparing relevant regulatory documents:

The Russian Ministry of Security and the Russian State Customs Committee—pursuant to Clause 16 of Resolution 820 (1993), which stipulates that no ship (a) which is registered in the FRY; (b) in which the main or controlling interest belongs to an individual or corporate body located in or operating from FRY territory; or (c) which is suspected of past or current violations of UN Security Council Resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992), or 820 (1993) will be authorized to pass through installations, including river locks or canals, within the territorial borders of the Russian Federation;

The Russian Ministry of Finance and the Russian Ministry of Justice—pursuant to Clause 21 of Resolution 820 (1993), which stipulates that states in which there are funds, including funds obtained from property, which (a) belong to authorities in the FRY; (b) belong to trading, industrial, or public enterprises in the FRY; or (c) are directly or indirectly controlled by such authorities or enterprises, or by entities belonging to or controlled by such authorities or enterprises, irrespective of where the said entities are located or how they are organized, must require all individuals and entities located on the said states' territories who have possession of such funds to block the said funds in order to ensure that they do not become available by direct or indirect means for disposal or utilization by the authorities in the FRY or any trading, industrial, or public enterprises in the FRY and to inform the committee established by Resolution 724 (1991) of actions taken to implement Clause 21 of Resolution 820 (1993);

The Russian Ministry of Transport, the Russian State Customs Committee, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and the Russian Ministry of Justice—pursuant to Clause 22 of Resolution 820 (1993), which decrees a ban on the shipment of all goods and products across the land borders of the FRY or into or out of FRY ports, with the exception of (a) imports into the FRY of goods for medical purposes and food products as envisaged by Resolution 757 (1992), in connection with which the committee established by Resolution 724 (1991) formulates rules for monitoring complete compliance with this and other resolutions; (b) imports into the FRY of other goods to meet basic humanitarian requirements approved by the committee established by Resolution 724 (1991) in each specific instance in accordance with the "no objection" principle; or (c) strictly limited transit shipments across FRY territory in instances when they are authorized on an exceptional basis by the committee established by Resolution 724 (1991);

The Russian Ministry of Transport, the Russian Ministry of Security, the Russian State Customs Committee, and the Russian Ministry of Justice—pursuant to Clauses 24, 25, and 26 of Resolution 820 (1993), which stipulate:

a) that all states must place under arrest all ships, trucks, rolling stock, and aircraft located on their territory in which the main or controlling interest belongs to individuals or enterprises located in or operating from FRY territory and that the said ships, trucks, rolling stock, and aircraft can be confiscated by the arresting state in the

event that a violation by them of Resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992), or 820 (1993) is established;

b) that, pending an investigation, all states must detain all ships, trucks, rolling stock, aircraft, and freight discovered on their territory and suspected of having been or being in violation of Resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992), or 820 (1993); in the event that a violation is established the said states must place the said ships, trucks, rolling stock, and aircraft under arrest; and in corresponding instances they and their cargoes can be confiscated by the detaining state;

c) that states can recover expenditure linked with the arresting of ships, trucks, rolling stock, or aircraft from their owners.

Drafts of these regulatory documents are to be submitted within one month in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

5. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Russian Ministry of Economy, the Russian Ministry of Transport, and the Russian Ministry of Finance are to prepare documented assessments of the damage and losses incurred by the Russian Federation in connection with the introduction of measures of compulsion against the FRY and submit them to the Russian Foreign Ministry for subsequent forwarding to the UN Security Council and the initiation in accordance with Article 50 of the UN Charter of the consultative procedure for resolving the special economic problems arising for the Russian Federation from the implementation of such measures.

6. The Russian Foreign Ministry and the Russian Ministry of Justice are to elaborate in conjunction with interested ministries and departments and submit within a three-month period in accordance with the prescribed procedure a draft law to be submitted to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet determining the procedure for the implementation by the Russian Federation, in accordance with its commitments under the UN Charter, of measures of compulsion, a decision to apply which is adopted by the UN Security Council to restore or maintain international peace and security.

7. All the ministries and departments specified in this directive are to submit to the Russian Foreign Ministry within a three-week period information on the measures which they have adopted or are adopting to implement UN Security Council Resolution 820 of 17 April 1993 for forwarding to the committee established in accordance with Resolution 724 (1991).

8. In accordance with Resolution 820 (1993), as the conditions specified in Clause 31 of the said resolution are met the Russian Foreign Ministry is to take the necessary steps to secure the review by the UN Security Council of the measures stipulated by Resolution 820 (1993) and other relevant resolutions and their subsequent rescindment.

Churkin Talks With Milosevic, Tudjman

LD0408184393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1805 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Geneva, 4 Aug (ITAR-TASS)—The Russian Federation president's special envoy, Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin, has held a meeting here with President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. They discussed the situation in the talks continuing in Geneva on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Cease-Fire Headquarters Begins Operating in Sochi

LD0408174193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1658 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Irina Shchegoleva]

[Text] Sochi August 4 TASS—A large group of officials of the Russian State Committee for Emergency Situations arrived in the Black Sea resort of Sochi on Wednesday [4 August]. The group also includes representatives from the Russian Foreign, Defence and Security ministries, the Federal Migration Service and other services and agencies. They came here with an aim to arrange work on the implementation of the July 27 cease-fire agreement in Georgia's rebel province of Abkhazia, as well as to forge a mechanism for overseeing its observance. Today, operational headquarters got down to work in Sochi, which is later to be transferred to the regional capital of Sukhumi.

"Russia is fulfilling its commitments under the said agreement", Sergey Shoygu, head of the Committee for Emergency situations, told reporters on arriving at the Sochi Airport. "A joint commission was set up in due time, a procedure for the disengagement of armed formations were worked out, places of observers' deployment and their number were determined", he reported.

According to Shoygu, the work of the tripartite commission is complicated by the fact that an international group of U.N. and CSCE observers is being formed too slowly. "So far we do not have exact information either about the number of these observers, or the date of their arrival", he complained. "We applied to the U.N. and CSCE leaders asking them to speed up the settlement of those problems, since each day of delay is, to our mind, fraught with reopening of hostilities".

The head of the Committee for Emergency Situation also stressed that the Georgian and Abkhazian sides are displaying interest in settling the months-long conflict. As for repeated violations of the cease-fire, which still take place, they may be averted by strengthening control groups and providing them with reliable means of communications and supervision.

Delegation Works To Halt Abkhaz Conflict

LD0408202393 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By correspondent A. Melkonyan from Sochi, including recording of remarks by S. Shoygu, chairman of the Russian State Committee for Emergency Situations; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Melkonyan] An operational group of the Russian State Committee for Emergency Situations arrived in Sochi today, together with representatives of various ministries and departments, who are due to leave for Abkhazia soon to seek a point of contact between the opposing sides.

[Shoygu] We did a certain amount of work in Sukhumi yesterday and the first stage was completed on time, a joint commission has been set up, and the principles of the separation of the sides and the withdrawal of troops have been defined. The number of deployment areas for observers and monitoring groups was defined. In our opinion, the biggest problem at the moment is the fact that the process of making up the groups of UN and CSCE observers is very arduous and slow.

[Melkonyan] In the opinion of all the interested sides, the main thing now is not to lose time and to rule out any possible provocations by destructive forces which might lead to a breakdown of the cease-fire agreement in Abkhazia.

[Shoygu] Both sides have an interest in ending this conflict, and that is why the cease-fire situation has been observed up to now, although there has been sporadic firing. You will be aware that there were violations of the cease-fire in the Shroma region and Akhalsheni, but in our view they are insignificant, and I believe that with the reinforcement of the observers of this group which arrived today, and with links with them being assured, I believe that we will also be able to put a stop to these violations.

Troop Withdrawal From Baltics Still 'Complicated'

LD0408204793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1908 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunaiskiy]

[Text] Moscow August 4 TASS—As a result of numerous talks at different levels, Russia and Lithuania managed to agree to sending Russian entrucking [as received] teams to the Baltic Republic, which are to stay there until August 31, 1993, ensuring the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuanian territory, a spokesman for the Russian Defence Ministry told TASS.

On the whole, the situation about the regular pullout of the Russian North-west Army from the Baltic States remains rather complicated. At the start of 1992, the governments of the Baltic States imposed a ban on personnel replacement of Russian troops deployed on their territory. As a result, the Defence Ministry spokesman reported, the manning status of Russian troops in Lithuania this July made up 48.2 per cent, in Estonia—27.7 per cent, and in Latvia—40.6 per cent. While Russia managed to reach understanding with Lithuania on sending its entrucking teams to withdraw troops and military equipment from the republic, Latvian and Estinian authorities have not agreed so far even to this emergency measure. In this connection, the North-west Army is now facing great difficulties: Shortly it will have no manpower to guard military equipment, weapons and combat material, which may aggravate the criminological situation in the Baltic States.

The Russian West Army is being withdrawn from Germany in full accordance with the schedule. The difficulties caused by Poland's reluctance to render assistance in solving urgent problems related to the pullout of Russian troops from Germany through Polish territory are presently being investigated and settled, TASS was told at the Russian Defence Ministry.

As for other regions, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev pointed out not long ago that the situation in Moldova had considerably improved, although the main differences between Chisinau and the Dniester region had not yet been settled and the question about a prompt withdrawal of the 14th Army still remained unsolved.

All Russian troops have been pulled out from Azerbaijan, except for one military-space supervising group, which is still functioning there under a mutual agreement.

The defence minister also noted that under the Elchibey rule in Azerbaijan, military ties between this former Soviet republic and Russia were practically severed, but at present they are being re-established.

Commo Brigade's Withdrawal From Rembertow Viewed

PM0508092193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Aug 93 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Leonid Kornilov report: "Incident Over Departure of Russian Military From Poland"]

[Text] Warsaw—A special communications brigade of the Russian Army has been stationed on a 20-hectare plot of land in Rembertow, situated practically on the outskirts of Warsaw. It has ensured government communications, including servicing the "hot line" between B. Yeltsin and L. Walesa.

According to claims made in the Polish press, the radar and special equipment here have made it possible to carry out "full monitoring every time the Polish president drove past or flew past."

The brigade was to leave Rembertow in the evening of 3 August (or the next day at the very latest, according to

local press reservations). The Warsaw voivoda [provisional governor] decided not to organize any meetings in connection with the departure "because this event does not deserve any solemn ceremony." Well, if someone does not want to do something, this is not a tragedy.

The officers and men cleaned the official premises and billets, loaded their belongings into their vehicles, and then onto railcars. But the 28 loaded railcars stood on the siding throughout the whole of Tuesday.

Only a group of 30 officers remained, who were specifically providing backup for the transit of Russian troops from Germany. It should remain in Poland until the end of 1994. A categorical demand was suddenly made by the Polish side: "You have to leave as well." "Where to?" "To the Russian Embassy building."

Our servicemen refused to be "stationed" in the embassy. This was announced by Russian Government Plenipotentiary General L. Kovalev, following his decision to suspend the brigade's withdrawal; he had earlier proposed that the group should be provided with premises in a street in the Praga district of Warsaw. As you might have guessed, Russian diplomats have not welcomed the Polish option either. After all, in actual fact a state's diplomatic mission cannot be turned into a semi-barrack, where there are more servicemen than actual staffers. In that case, as Embassy Counselor V. Voronkov noted when speaking on Warsaw Television Tuesday, it would simply lose its diplomatic nature.

Toward evening the situation remained tense. The Polish authorities, including the government, declared that this was a wilful outburst by Gen. Kovalev in contravention of international law, and expressed hope that the Russians will leave Rembertow as scheduled 3 August—and indeed each and every one of them. By 2300 hours this had not yet happened, however.

Meanwhile the Polish Government Press Bureau officially declared that the "transit mission" would receive separate premises only after the Russian Embassy explains why it is "leasing to commercial firms" some of the premises in its building. As we know, diplomatic mission status does not allow this. Russian Counselor-Envoy L. Klepatskiy naturally rejected the claim that there are any commercial firms at all on the embassy's territory.

The "next day" in question has arrived... How will it end? While I am transmitting this report to the editorial office, the situation is unclear. It is a pity that such petty incidents can muddy the process of the withdrawal of the Russian military from Poland, which, as Polish Defense Minister J. Onyszkiewicz recently stressed, is going according to schedule, and even ahead of schedule.

In accordance with the treaty signed by Presidents Yeltsin and Walesa, the former Soviet Army is to fully withdraw from Poland by the end of this year. The last soldiers will leave the country already in November.

Mafia Blackmails German Companies in Moscow

AU0408151093 Berlin DIE WELT in German 4 Aug 93 p 1

[Karl-Ludwig Guensche: "German Fear in Moscow"]

[Text] Moscow—The mafia has started taking aim at German companies in Russia. They are being threatened and extorted for protection money. "The tendency is increasing," said a spokesman for the German Embassy in Moscow. There are "also prominent firms" among the victims. No line of business is spared. None of the company representatives wants to speak in public and under his own name about this hot topic. They are afraid.

The pattern of the extortions is always the same. In early May, a convoy drove up in front of a German representation. The leader, a young man adorned with chains and tattoos, worked his way through to the managing director with about 15 thugs as his bodyguard. They wanted protection money. The German refused. They withdrew. Two weeks later, they came again and negotiated again. Again they left empty-handed. The manager of the company told DIE WELT: "We will finally pay, if only to avoid endangering our employees."

In another case the blackmailers became more formidable. The leader, who was about 30 years old, appeared in fine cashmere. He introduced himself to the chief of the company as the "security commissioner for your district." When he was rejected, he threatened: "You will see that you will need our protection." Since that time, the chief of the company has only permitted his daughter to go out with armed bodyguards, and his wife is accompanied by bodyguards when she goes shopping. He himself is constantly watched over.

In that case, it was interesting that the trail led to a Russian bank because the blackmailers had calmed the Germans: "We will handle your payments completely correctly as far as bookkeeping is concerned. For this purpose we have a bank to hand."

A bank was also involved in another case: The representative of a German company, whose contract had expired in Moscow, got a call: "You and your family have availed yourselves of our protection during your entire stay. We are waiting for our payment." They were briefed precisely on every bank transaction of the representative and his private financial situation. Colonel Sergey Ilyin from the Russian authorities that combat the mafia openly admits: "The mafia's information network extends to all firms and banks."

The mafia war in Moscow is becoming increasingly brutal. Those who get in its way are bombed away. This week alone, three arson attacks were committed on companies in Moscow in the style of Chicago in the thirties; 10 people died.

The blackmailers' demands are usually about 10 percent of the turnover of the business. Prices are negotiable.

Some German firms pay, others do not. So far, nothing has happened to the German companies in Moscow. But the fear is increasing.

Pros, Cons of Joining Council of Europe Eyed

PM0408141193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Aug 93 First Edition p 7

[Article by Vladimir Katin, RIA-Novosti own correspondent, for ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA: "When We Are Invited, We Will Join. Why We Want Membership of the Council of Europe"]

[Excerpts] Strasbourg—During his recent visit to Strasbourg, Ruslan Khasbulatov detailed his talks with Catherine Lalumiere, secretary general of the Council of Europe, on the subject of Russia's place in Europe. One curious fact emerged during the exchange of opinions... All previous Russian interlocutors had advocated their country's urgent admission to the Council of Europe whereas the chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet thinks that there should be no hurry with this. Evidently it is necessary to grasp and have a clear idea of what the Council of Europe is and what the rights and obligations of its member states are. [passage omitted]

There are 31 members of the Council of Europe. Recent admissions have included the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, and Estonia—the latter being a country where, as you know, flagrant violations of the rights of ethnic minorities are taking place despite energetic representations by the Russian Foreign Ministry and Minister Andrey Kozyrev personally.

What is the Council of Europe's attitude to Russia and why has the latter still not become a full-fledged member?

A kind of stalemate situation is developing—with neither a specific "Yes" nor a categorical "No." Council of Europe leaders are playing a wait-and-see game with regards to Russia. Meanwhile the Council of Europe is coming under pressure—both directly from the Russian foreign minister's office and via certain representatives of the Supreme Soviet corps of deputies. The Council of Europe views these methods with bewilderment and has indicated that the effect will be the opposite of what is wanted.

The behavior of the delegation led by Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, which recently visited Strasbourg, was particularly striking. Catherine Lalumiere, secretary general of the Council of Europe, noted during her conversation with Ruslan Khasbulatov: "I was surprised by Mr. Ambartsumov's press conference during which Russian deputies demonstrated their arrogance as regards our procedure for admissions to the Council of Europe. None of us are opposed to admitting Russia. There is a certain procedure and no one is allowed to disregard it." The procedure on which the secretary general is insisting boils down to the provision of guarantees that Russia will not abandon the democratic reforms it has begun. But at the moment it is considered a predemocratic country as it were. By and large they are demanding that we pass a test in political maturity.

In that situation Ruslan Khasbulatov made a sensational statement:

"I personally am not in favor of Russia's hasty promotion to being a member of the Council of Europe. We are not asking for anything. We must cooperate and get to know one another in the most natural way. And when the Council of Europe expresses a desire and readiness to invite us to be a member, we will join. Our desire to accede to the Council of Europe is dictated by the natural processes taking place within the country. However, membership is not an aim in itself for us. Russia's interests are the main thing."

Which of the two trends is the most sensible—joining the Council of Europe more quickly or waiting a while? The answer must evidently be sought in the elementary question: What can we gain from this?

Membership of the Council of Europe means that the state receives a kind of certification that it is truly democratic and that this is a universally recognized fact. In today's world this certification is an important moral factor. The second imprtant factor is that this represents a down payment on subsequent admission to the EEC. Although this idea has never been formally enshrined anywhere, everyone is perfectly well aware that no country will ever be admitted to the EEC if it is not a member of the Council of Europe.

Now let us move onto the obligations. Every newly-admitted state must ratify the European Convention on Human Rights within a reasonable timeframe (around a year) and thus accede to it. Thereafter any citizen of that country, group, or whole category of citizens is fully entitled to lodge complaints or claims with the Council of Europe, the Commission on Human Rights, and the European Court regarding his government or its institutions. This is what Hans-Christian Krueger, head of the Commission on Human Rights, told RIA-Novosti's correspondent.

"The procedure for lodging complaints is as follows. First the action is taken to the country's supreme national legal body. If a refusal is forthcoming or the petitioner is unhappy with the ruling, he sends his complaint to the Council of Europe and we examine it. Complaints can only be made against a state and its organs, not against private enterprises. Our commission's task is to protect and defend a person against infringements of his rights by the authorities. We are now considering 2,500 complaints of all kinds. For instance, the peasants of Luxembourg consider that government milk production quotas are unjustifiably

low. The Austrians are complaining that radio and television are in state hands and thus the right to freedom of speech and opinion is being violated.

"There are a host of complaints that a person's right to work and to religious freedom is being violated. The European Court recently obliged the Greek Government to pay a fine of 3 million drachmas to one Milos Kokkinakis for violating freedom of conscience. This man was unfairly sentenced to three months in jail for professing views at variance with the canons of the Greek Orthodox Church. There are many cases of illegal dismissal from state service. Incidentally, once Estonia accedes to the European Convention on Human Rights, national minorities will be able to appeal directly to the Council of Europe's legal bodies, and we are obliged to take steps."

Estonian membership in the Council of Europe seems to be more to the benefit of the oppressed Russian-speaking population than to the government. That shift and the prospects should be taken into consideration by Russia, which is seeking admission to the Council of Europe so keenly. After all, apart from the impressive membership dues that the Russian state will have to pay regularly in proportion to the size of its territory and economy, it will be the object of interminable inquiries in the European Commission and the Court of Human Rights. Is it not the case that we ourselves are voluntarily putting our head on the block? It is clear now that hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens who have been deceived, robbed, and demeaned by the state are dying to seek justice and protection from Strasbourg's Palais d'Europe. Therefore when the Europeans delay Russia's admission to their exclusive political organization, they are not only doing so because of our democracy's imperfections. They are afraid of the huge avalanche of Russian problems that will hit the Council of Europe, which will end up utterly swamped. The Council of Europe's structures are not designed to bear such a load.

The following conclusion suggests itself as a result: On the one hand, Russia is not yet entirely ready to join the Council of Europe, and accelerating this process may only cause it fresh problems, effort, and headaches. On the other hand, the Council of Europe is also unwilling to take to its bosom the largest country in Europe and Asia in a state of profound socioeconomic crisis. Therefore why not go easy with this and wait until better times? After all, if all these committees and courts start delving into our problems and investigating complaints, some people will obviously be no better off. The Council of Europe does, moreover, have the power to apply sanctions against a country that violates human rights and can even deprive it of membership and expel such a country. And that is far worse than not being a member of the organization at all.

Political Issues

Yeltsin Opens Corruption Investigation Session

LD0508103793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0810 GMT 5 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Aug—The work of the commission on corruption among high-ranking officials that was created by Russian presidential decree is on the agenda of the session of the Russian Federation's Security Council's interdepartmental commission on the fight against crime and corruption that opened in the Kremlin today. Opening the session, President Boris Yeltsin stated that the commission will work on a weekly basis beginning today.

According to the head of state, acting Justice Minister Yuriy Kalmykov and Procurator General Valentin Stepankov will give reports at the session. Yeltsin noted that "work on this problem is continuing and will continue since the issue is too serious and too many affairs have mounted up."

Participants in the session were presented with the results of Ministry of Internal Affairs bodies on the fight against crime in Russia for the first six months of the year. The documents presented show that 648,462 crimes were discovered in the country over this period, which is 13.3 percent more than during the first six months of 1992.

Taking part in the interdepartmental commission session are Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, secretary of the Security Council, Yevgeniy Primakov, director of the Foreign Intelligence Service, and Russian Interior Affairs Minister Viktor Yerin.

Yeltsin Statement Noted

LD0508125093 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1100 GMT 5 Aug 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] A session of the interdepartmental commission on combating crime and corruption under the Russian Federation Security Council was held in the Kremlin today. On the agenda was a highly acute issue which has been the basis of many rumors and conjectures in circulation concerning corruption among top officials. Opening the session, the country's President Boris Yeltsin said that as of today the commission will be working:

[Begin Yeltsin recording] "On a weekly basis, i.e. the commission will be sitting every week. Today we intend to discuss only one issue: the work of the commission on corruption of former officials, set up by presidential decree. There are only two reports, from Kalmykov and Stepankov. What we will have today is an information report, since the work is continuing and will continue, as the issue is too serious and too many affairs have built up here." [end recording]

The session then continued behind closed doors.

Further on Yeltsin Statement

LD0508135293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1257 GMT 5 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Aug—A planning meeting of the Russian Federation Security Council interdepartmental commission for combating crime and corruption was held today in the Kremlin with Boris Yeltsin in the chair, says a statement issued here today by the Russian Federation president's press service.

At the proposal of President Boris Yeltsin, it was decided that commission meetings will be held weekly due to the increased volume of work. The session discussed the problem of the fight against corruption among high-ranking Russian Federation officials. Reports were delivered by Russian Federation Justice Minister Yuriy Kalmykov and Russian Procurator General Valentin Stepankov. A discussion ensued. The Russian Federation president spoke at the session.

The interdepartmental commission draws attention to the fact that the main condition for its work is the depoliticization of the fight against corruption; there is no political undercurrent in the commission's work and there will not be a selective approach to the information it has. The appropriate conclusions will be drawn for high-ranking officials regardless of which branch of power they are in.

The commission members express the hope that the mass media will restrain from hasty evaluations of the information which is made public. The commission's work continues, and when it is finished, information will be published.

Yeltsin Decree Confirms Kalmykov as Justice Minister

LD0508125893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1220 GMT 5 Aug 93

[By KRIM-PRESS correspondent Nikolay Semenenko]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 5 Aug—Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree today on the appointment of Yuriy Kalmykov as minister of justice of the Russian Federation. [passage omitted]

Kalmykov has been acting justice minister since April 1993. During this time, he has carried out a substantial restructuring of the ministry. A number of new departments have been created as a result of efficiency measures. They were instructed to work on the drafting of new labor and pensions legislation and on the drafting of

legal foundations for entrepreneurship and protection of Russia's (including citizens') interests abroad. The Directorate for Legal Information and Public Relations was reestablished.

Shumeyko for Stronger Social Orientation of Reform

LD0408180593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1732 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow August 4 TASS—Russian First Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeyko has called for stronger social orientation of reform in Russia.

At a news conference in Moscow on Wednesday [4 August], Shumeyko said this problem will be specially emphasised in his report to the Council of Ministers at its upcoming session on August 6.

The Russian Government intends to take active measures concerning both the social welfare system and rouble stabilisation, including bringing inflation down to five to seven per cent a month by the end of the year. At the same time, "we have come to the conclusion that social protection of the population cannot be postponed" because "there is no point in carrying out reform for the sake of reform. Reforms are being implemented for people," Shumeyko stressed.

Commenting on the political situation in the country, Shumeyko said that the current "confrontation may end in new elections." He believes the confrontation is caused by the struggle between "the new old and new systems" of social development in Russia. He also stressed that the current crisis can be resolved only by "normal political methods," not by forcible ruinous means in the state which has nuclear weapons and dangerous industries.

'Collective Rasputin' Has 'Plenty To Lose'

PM0408192593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Aug 93 p 1

[Boris Slavin article: "They Are Already Dividing Up the President's Inheritance"]

[Text] The well-known refrain "Something is going to happen" from the once-popular ditty from the motion picture "Ali-Baba and the Forty Thieves" is applicable today as never before to the current political situation in the country. Indeed, people close to the president of the Burbulis and Shakhray type are publicly announcing the formation of their own parties and distancing themselves from B.N. Yeltsin. The most ambitious and highly-strung politicians from Yeltsin's team got him to end his vacation prematurely and forced him to make the decision to dismiss the security minister as soon as the latter tried to open the head of state's eyes to the crimes going on in the higher echelons of power.

In recent times, despite official denials, more and more rumors about a deterioration in the president's health have been circulating, and those who already see themselves on the presidential throne are trying to take advantage of them. Was it not on their initiative that American medics were invited to Moscow to get Boris Nikolayevich in the "necessary" condition to celebrate the anniversary of the Battle of Kursk? Have they not transferred the command of the special-purpose forces from the Ministry of Security to their own jurisdiction, and are they not frequenting the Dzerzhinskiy division near Moscow? What are they afraid of? Maybe the denunciations of the vice president, who cited sensational facts on television recently about the millions transferred abroad with the aid of Yakubovskiy; about the dacha-castles which Burbulis, Ryabov, and others have built themselves? Very likely. The fact of Yakubovskiy's strictly secret (bypassing the border guards) visit to Moscow to try to compromise the vice president and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet confirms this.

All this is certainly happening. But it is not the main point. The main thing worrying the "collective Rasputin" is the vice president's constitutional accession to power in the event that B. Yeltsin's health deteriorates sharply and he becomes ill. In that hypothetical and yet likely event they will be forced not only to quit the country's leadership but also, possibly, to answer before the law for all the accusations that Rutskoy is carrying around in his celebrated baggage. So they have plenty to lose and plenty to fear. We may well hear of new facts exposing top officials at the Supreme Soviet sessions on 6 August, when the question of Barannikov's ouster from the post of security minister is examined. Not for nothing is the president "worried" about the Supreme Soviet.

In the very near future I do not rule out the harshest outcome, whereby a mafia dictatorship is established in the country by means of the dissolution of parliament and the isolation and arrest of opposition leaders. Nor can we exclude a milder development for society implemented, it seems to us, by Sergey Shakhray, who as far we know is not noted for any criminal connections. This is the version which involves promulgating the presidential draft constitution, sewn together by Sergey Mikhaylovich not solely on Boris Nikolayevich's terms. It is the version which involves the unconstitutional adoption of a draft new constitution either through the early election of a constituent assembly or by means of a referendum.

Before flying to Orel the president appealed to us to love and cherish Russia. Let us hope that the president's wisdom wins out over the ambitions of those who surround him, and that as a result we avoid both dictatorship and the unconstitutional adoption of a constitution.

Shumeyko on Efficiency in Implementing Decisions

LD0408220093 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2015 GMT 4 Aug 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Today, at the request of a POSTFACTUM correspondent, First Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko commented on the efficiency with which decisions made by the Russian Government and the president are being implemented. In his words, there is not a single presidential decree or decision made by the Government that has been fully implemented.

The low level of efficiency in implementing decisions is explained, first of all, by the fact that too many are being adopted. According to Shumeyko, in just seven months of this year, the Government has issued 725 resolutions and 1,336 instructions. The vice premiers have issued 26,373 orders. During this time Shumeyko himself has signed 3,045 instructions—172 in June alone. One of the reasons for such a flood of documents, says Shumeyko, is that many ministries and departments do not want to take responsibility themselves.

Cabinet of Minister To View Stabilization

LD0508122593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1101 GMT 5 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow August 5 TASS—A meeting of the Council of Ministers of Russia is due to be held in the Kremlin on Friday. The meeting will consider social and economic situation in the Russian Federation and measures to stabilise it.

Taking part in the meeting are expected Russian President Boris Yeltsin, members of the government, presidents and chairmen of the supreme soviets of the republics within the Russian Federation, heads of the central bodies of the federal executive power, heads of administrations and chairmen of soviets of territories, regions and autonomies.

Reform Opponents Rally Meeting

MK0508093693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Aug 93 p 1

[Andrey Podorozhanksiy report in "Perspective" rubric: "Russia Threatened with 'Government Coup.' Tomorrow Lobov Will Propose Radical Change in Relations Between State and Economy"]

[Text] According to informed sources, an attempt could be made at tomorrow's Council of Ministers session to drastically revise the Russian Government's economic policy.

The Program of Urgent Measures Until 1995, worked out under Lobov's guidance in the spirit of stagnation-era economic programs, envisions a fundamental expansion of state intervention in the economy, including price controls and centralized investments.

Sources note that the interests of the Economy Ministry and other structures engaged in distributing state investments and centralized credits coincide with the interests of the Central Bank, whose influence to a large extent also depends on the volume of centralized credits that are distributed.

Sources point out that this community of interests will inevitably lead the advocates of the command system inside the government and Central Bank leadership to conclude a kind of alliance and coordinate their political actions.

Chernomyrdin's support of the Central Bank's highly unpopular move to withdraw banknotes from circulation points to an increased influence of those calling for a return to a state-controlled economy. Finance Minister Fedorov remains their sole firm opponent in the government.

Noting the concurrence of the basic points in the Lobov program and the budget adopted by the Supreme Soviet, observers predict the possibility of a tripartite alliance being formed by opponents of reform, including the anti-market elements in the government, parliament, and the Central Bank. They also note that there is no force capable of standing up to this union.

Republic Party Divided on Election Campaign

MK0408114993 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 4 Aug 93 p 3

[Yekaterina Deynego report: "Republic Party Press Conference. Republicans Intend to Create Their Own Election Block"]

[Text] Igor Yakovenko, cochairman of the Republic Party of Russia, told journalists yesterday about the situation in the camp of democrats as election blocks are being formed. "We will be making serious preparations for the coming elections, but they can hardly take place before 1994," Yakovenko stated. In his words, the most likely Republic Party allies in the election campaign would be the all-Russia Association Entrepreneurs for a New Russia led by Konstantin Zatulin and Aleksandr Vladislavlev's All-Russia Renewal union.

Despite all the efforts by members of the government and the president's administration to bring together all democratic parties and movements in a Reformist Forces Block, their attempt is not likely to be crowned with success. Refusing to attach itself to the "president's nomenklatura" block is the Republic Party of Russia, which is evidently going to wage its own election campaign designed by its leaders primarily to capture votes in the provinces. The party's ruling board, most of whose

members speak against "being subsumed" within the ranks of the Democratic Russia movement, has drawn up a draft statement presenting the main political principles of the new election block called "Freedom, Law, Property" pertaining to the problems of state system and the economy. The majority of the party's regional organizations, however, in reality gravitate toward the Democratic Russia and intend to work in the president's Reformist Forces Block after all. At any rate, that is what the party cochairman Petr Filippov stated in a recent party plenum.

Government Toughens Regulation of Foreigners' Residence

MK0408144093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 4 Aug 93 p 2

[Semen Furman report: "Commission for Control Over Foreigners Set Up. Increasing Number of Foreigners Arouses Cabinet's Concern"]

[Text] Yesterday, a government decree "On the Creation of the Interdepartmental Commission To Streamline the Rules of Entry and Stay of Foreign Citizens and Persons Without Citizenship in the Territory of the Russian Federation" was distributed. This measure appears to have been prompted by the increasing number of foreign citizens staying in Russia. The related increase in crimes has evidently aroused the authorities' particular concern. The new organization's functions will not be specified, however, until after a month's time, when Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Pastukhov, appointed its chief, is to present to the government a draft regulation on the interdepartmental commission and proposals as to its makeup.

The establishment of the interdepartmental commission was apparently sponsored by the law-enforcement agencies, for whom the collapse of the "iron curtain" is proving to be a particular headache. According to reports from Security Ministry specialists, Russia has become a transshipment point for illegal immigration by citizens from Asian and African countries, primarily from Afghanistan, Iran, India, Somalia, Bangladesh, and Ethiopia, to West Europe and America. Many of them are trying to reach their final destination with forged documents, but as they fail to pass border control, they are sent back to where their last visas were issued: that is to Moscow.

The incidents of illegal entry into Russia itself are increasing on an unpredictable scale. While in 1991 there were only seven foreigners without entry visas, in the second half of last year, as many as 242,000 such violators were detained. There are also legal ways to enter Russia, however—as students of institutions of higher learning or joint-venture workers, who, once in this country, disappear among its 150 million population. Many "illegal immigrants" engage in criminal activities as members of ethnic gangs.

Under the government decree, the interdepartmental commission will coordinate efforts by various agencies dealing with foreigners "in the area of the enforcement of organizational and legal measures." Tentative areas of the commission's operation can be seen from its makeup. It will include representatives of the ministries of internal and foreign affairs, security, and labor, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Federal Migration Service, and the Committee for Tourism.

Since many state structures have already proved incapable of operating efficiently within a universally-acknowledged, democratic legal environment and in conditions of economic competition, the commission, by issuing its own regulations, may try to bend the provisions of the Law on Entry and Departure in its own interests.

The participation of power ministries in the commission is a sign that an attempt may be made to revert to regulating the stay of foreigners in Russia to what was practiced in the Soviet Union—from restricting their freedom of travel around the country without militia permits to reserving specialized number plates for their cars and settling them in separate houses. The Committee for Tourism will apparently attempt to exploit its seat on the commission to strengthen control over tourist firms and agencies.

Nonetheless, the fact that a representative of the Foreign Ministry will also sit on the commission still inspires hopes that "the streamlining of the rules of entry and residence" will proceed within a more or less civilized framework without substantially restricting the rights of foreigners and Russian citizens.

Government Members' Activities Reported

PM0408155393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 4 Aug 93 p 1

[Unattributed feature "Executive Branch: Monitoring"]

[Text] **Meetings, Trips, Sessions**

Today Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin flies to Orel and Orel Oblast, where he will take part in events to mark the 50th anniversary of the Orel-Kursk battle. Boris Yeltsin intends to meet with veterans and familiarize himself with the state of the oblast's agriculture.

Viktor Chernomyrdin, head of the Russian Government, met with Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin. The president and the premier discussed a wide range of questions concerning the forthcoming expanded session of the Council of Ministers-Government of Russia.

First Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko held a session of the Russian Federation Government control and oversight council. On the agenda were questions connected with the progress in implementing a single federal policy

for the use of the state mineral resources fund and in fulfilling the Russian Federation president's edicts and directives on social issues.

First Vice Premier Oleg Lobov met with representatives of the UN Industrial Development Organization. In the evening he received Greek Ambassador Konstandinos Lymberopoulos.

First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets set off for Belgorod as head of a government delegation to take part in the celebrations to mark the 50th anniversary of the Orel-Kursk battle.

Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray is on a trip to the emergency situation zone on the territory of North Ossetia and Ingushetia. In Vladikavkaz the vice premier and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev attended a ceremony of farewell to the dead Viktor Polyanichko, head of the provisional administration, Corps Commander Major General Anatoliy Koretskiy, and Senior Lieutenant Viktor Kravhcuk.

Vice Premier Yuriy Yarov, on his return from a tour of regions of the Far North, held a session of the Russian Federation Committee for the Social and Economic Development of the North task force on the results of this trip. In the evening the vice premier left for Kursk.

Vice Premiers Anatoliy Chubays and Aleksandr Shokhin are on vacation.

Statements

"Russia's further headway without adopting a new Constitution is impossible." The dyarchy which has taken shape in the country is no longer tolerable," stated Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko at the opening of the Congress of young compatriots in Moscow. The sovereignty of the republics is a historical fait accompli and therefore the creation of a unitary state on Russian territory is impossible, the first vice premier noted.

Vice Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha, addressing a press conference for Russian and foreign journalists, announced that in the second half of the year the first signs of stabilization appeared in livestock raising in Russia. There has been an increase in the production of milk and eggs and the weight gains of livestock have increased. In the vice premier's opinion there should be no problems either with supplying granulated sugar to the population. About 3 million tonnes will be produced from the sugar beet of the new harvest. Contracts for the supply of the same volume of sugar from abroad have been concluded.

Appointment

By a directive of Viktor Chernomyrdin, the head of the Russian Government, Colonel General Yuriy Shatalin has been appointed acting head of the provisional administration in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.

Colonel General Yuriy Shatalin has already headed the provisional administration in the emergency situation zone in North Ossetia and Ingushetia in March through May this year. Yuriy Shatalin was also once commander of the Russian Federation Internal Affairs Ministry internal troops.

Documents

By an edict of the Russian Federation president, with a view to coordinating the activity to elaborate scientific and technical projects for defense and conversion and also with a view to preparing conclusions and other materials on scientific and technical questions of the defense industry an interdepartmental commission of the Russian Federation Security Ministry for scientific and technical questions of the defense industry has been formed.

Viktor Chernomyrdin has signed the directive of the Russian Federation Council on earmarking funds for eliminating the consequences of the natural disaster which occurred in May on the territory of the North Ossetian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Social Protection

Lyudmila Bezlepkina, first deputy Russian Federation minister for the social protection of the population and director of the department for problems of the family, women, and children, told your ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent that the ministry is now performing work to obtain interest-free loans for families with many children. There is an edict, there is the agreement between the Ministry of Finances and the Savings Bank, but so far no mechanism has been elaborated showing the territories how to fulfill this program.

But the problem of creating territorial services for helping families and children has been resolved. But a great and substantial achievement is the "Russia's children" program, which is already at the government and has been coordinated with all ministries and departments responsible for the social sphere. The program provides for financing, including hard-currency financing.

Motives of 'KGB Conference' Organizers Questioned

PM0408122393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Aug 93 First Edition p 5

[Aleksandr Miroshnikov article: "Special Services: Monitoring of State Security...With Soros's Money"]

[Text] This year there have already been two rounds of the conference entitled "The KGB: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow." Preparations are currently under way for a third.

It has become clear that the conference organizers are not at all concerned with the state of Russia's security. Their aim is different—to destabilize the situation with

regard to the Russian Federation Ministry of Security, set up in January 1992. Thus, in order to give the event a touch of respectability, Sergey Grigoryants, chairman of the conference organizating committee, thanked the "wonderful men of the 'Cultural Initiative' international foundation and Mr. George Soros personally" for funding the conference. Presumably, Grigoryants's public gratitude was of doubtful benefit to Soros. After all, it is said in our country: "He who pays the piper calls the tune." The speeches made by most of the participants and the documents adopted at the conference confirm this popular adage.

Strictly speaking, Russian citizens learned of the conference and its "international scope" following the appearance at the plenary session of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who was not part of a strictly regulated program. As it is, the speakers, who through habit extrapolated all the crimes of the totalitarian regime onto current Security Ministry personnel, were reminiscent of the Japanese samurai: Some of them are still "fighting" the Americans on islands in the Pacific.

It is sad that a number of deputies (S. Kovalev, N. Arzhannikov), who were directly involved in drafting and adopting the laws "On Operational-Investigative Activity" (13 March 1992) and "On Federal Organs of State Security" (8 July 1992) regulating the activity of the Russian Federation Security Ministry and all kinds of monitoring and oversight of legality, pretended that "they do not entirely know and cannot answer the question of what guarantees there are that political investigation [politicheskiy sysk] will not be resumed." Naturally, these speeches resulted in resolutions to introduce forms of monitoring not envisaged by law and designed to combat the specialism of rather than the absence of control over Russia's security organs.

Most of the speakers at the first and second conferences sensibly directed the cutting edge of their criticism at agents' functions [agenturnyye otnosheniya] in Security Ministry activity. The speakers tried to suggest the immorality of "informing" and "denunciation," confusing these terms with the concept of agents' functions as legalized by the state. It is no secret that the strength of any special service lies in the professionalism of its personnel and a high-quality agent apparatus.

Whereas G. Starovoytova had prepared a draft law on vetting procedures [zakon o lyustratsiyakh] in respect of security staffers, the conference participants propose to achieve the elimination of agents from the country's security affairs via threats of exposure [rasshifrovka] and persecution and disparaging attacks in the mass media. Of course, it is easy to accuse organs operating via agents of creating an atmosphere of out-and-out informing. However, for the sake of objectivity journalists must look at the newspapers of the thirties and see for themselves that it was the mass media that acted as collective recruiting agency and creater of the atmosphere of informing. "Every working person in our country is an NKVD agent"—the newspapers circulated A.I. Mikoyan's catchphrase. And on the pages of the newspapers workers and peasants throughout the Union reported back to "sharp-eyed custodian of the Soviet people's happiness" N. Yezhov: "We are on the alert. Every citizen of our great Motherland will joyously help the NKVD unmask the enemies of the people," "We will be your prime assistants," "You are guaranteed our help in the fight against the enemies of the people." Regrettably, the conference has been unable to deviate from "standing orders" and delve into the repressive mechanism of those years.

The conference's decisions have been of differing calibers and disproportionate significance.

The third and final conference will be held in the fall. It is still too early to talk about its decisions. But Grigoryants is threatening to set up an independent permanent center for public monitoring of the security organs' activity. There has never been one of these anywhere. But we are not accustomed to amazing the world.

Law on Parties Needs 'Additional Work'

PM0408124593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Aug 93 First Edition p 2

["Topical Interview" with former USSR People's Deputy Andrey Sebentsov by Vyacheslav Shchepotkin, editor of the Political Parties and Movements Department; place and date not given: "Parties and the Law"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet is elaborating the law "On Political Parties." What should it be like?

Andrey Sebentsov, a former USSR people's deputy and leader of the group of specialists taking part in preparing this legal act, who also took an active part in creating the analogous Union law, talks about one of the final drafts of the law in conversation with the editor of the Political Parties and Movements Department.

[Shchepotkin] Those who insistently contend to society that the present Supreme Soviet is bankrupt more often than not cite the following argument, amongst others: Parliament is constantly out of touch with reality in its legislative work. It adopts laws that have no influence on society's life and leaves badly needed laws for later. Maybe the law on parties is precisely one of these untimely laws, thereby corroborating the criticisms?

[Sebentsov] The timeliness depends on when elections are held. If they are going to be held in 1995, there is still time. At present in our country normal political parties have not yet been formed, and we could wait a while before establishing the legislative base for them. Then again, what would waiting mean? The opinion is being expressed that the existence of the law would actually stimulate their formation!

However, if the elections are held in late 1993 or early 1994, the question arises: On what basis? If deputies are

elected as in the last Union parliament or the present Russian parliament, we can say straightaway that this path is by no means beyond reproach. People who are not bound by party discipline "go off" rather swiftly, escape the control of the mass of voters, begin to represent only themselves, and forget the interests of the section of the people they are supposedly representing. Whereas a deputy's membership of a specific party disciplines both him and the social force that got him into the organ of power. A lone wolf deputy may find a single term in parliament long enough to fully savor all the delights and difficulties of being in power, but a party is interested in remaining in power for as long as possible. So a party, not wishing to be discredited in society's eyes, will have to be responsible about selecting its representatives in organs of power and about their work there.

[Shchepotkin] Is that a party's sole aim: aspiring to power?

[Sebentsov] I would say it is its main aim! In a democratic society participation in power structures is the main method for any political force—party or movement—to implement its aims and program tasks. And the road into these structures must be purely a rule-of-law road. This is why there is a need for a law on political parties. But at the same time (I particularly emphasize this) there is also a need for a new electoral law. Only together can they produce the necessary political effect.

[Shchepotkin] Does the draft we are discussing guarantee that kind of rule-of-law road?

[Sebentsov] At the moment it does not entirely do so. Some elements in it have been fully worked out in the light of the legislative practice of the last few years. However, a whole series of provisions, in my view, do more to evoke questions than provide grounds for satisfaction.

[Shchepotkin] Questions of financing are very important, of course. But what I think will be a particular source of argument among rival parties and nonparty citizens is the question of who is worthy of the status of all-Russian party and who does not make the grade. And, Andrey Yevgenyevich, it seems to me that the draft itself provides grounds for such disputes. It states: Parties having territorial organizations in over half the components of the Russian Federation or receiving the support of over 3 percent of voters taking part in elections to the supreme federal organ of representative power or of the supreme official of Russia are deemed to be all-Russian parties. There are 89 Federation components. Over half means 45. It goes on to say: A group can be registered as a branch of a political party if it contains no fewer than three members. There you have an all-Russian party: 150 people! But you would be unable to spot not just those three but even all 150 members of such a party in any oblast! However, in all sorts of statements and declarations they would be presented to us as a significant political force. Is this right and proper? Maybe we should lay down a much bigger size for the party as a whole and for its branches?

[Sebentsov] I agree. In the Union law on public organizations—at the time there was only one party—we set the minimum size at 5,000 members.

[Shchepotkin] That too is not all that many...

[Sebentsov] But at least it is more than the current figure may be. Additional work is needed here too. Or take party membership. It currently says: Only Russian citizens can be party members. But the institution of dual citizenship is emerging. What is to become of them? Everything must be clear in the law.

[Shchepotkin] People may say to us: Since the draft law, as you yourself believe, requires additional work, what is the point in discussing a semifinished product?

[Sebentsov] So there is something to use as a springboard in further work. I am sure that the necessary amendments and additions will be made to the existing draft, including to the sections we have mentioned. So legislators will legally pave the way for parties to reach power.

But I want to repeat what I said earlier: The law on political parties can aspire to life only in close connection with the new electoral law. Especially as the main provisions of the law on elections of future people's deputies have already appeared in the press. They should both be adopted at once. That really would be timely.

Economic Freedom Party Official Interviewed

PM0408153193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 30 Jul 93 p 2

[Interview with Konstantin Borovoy, cochairman of the Economic Freedom Party, by Oksana Petrunko; place and date; interspersed with quotations from earlier Borovoy interviews and from his memoirs: "A Servant and a Slave of Freedom Cannot Be President"]

[Text] [Petrunko] Konstantin Natanovich, you left a prestigious and stable job as a teacher in higher education to organize your own cooperative. That was five years ago. And two years after that you created the Russian Commodities and Raw Materials Exchange. This was simply fantastic. Then you and your colleagues set up such major organizations as the Russian Commercial Bank, the Economic News Agency, and the VKT [expansion unknown] television company. The Russian Investment Joint-Stock Company (also your brain child)—a major investments company—is distinguished by the fact that all the projects in which it invests money are in Russia, not abroad, and, on the whole, they are more economically viable and reliable. In short, you have always been creating something. For example, the Economic Freedom Party [EFP]. Why are you setting up in a new field, in a new sphere? Whereas you are a maestro in economics, as a presidential candidate—

about which a politician cannot help dreaming—aren't you just one more dilettante?

[Borovoy] Politics, unfortunately, continue to be dominated by dilettantes, and I—I am forced to pay myself a compliment—am actually more professional than many. Because I read booklets, consult experts, and process large information flows every day. In the course of this year I have three times been offered rungs at various levels on the ladder of power. But I did not think I had the right to agree. Because, if I joined a team which had to resign tomorrow, I would not be able to realize the program which my party is putting forward. And I cannot leave the EFP and abandon my principles simply for the sake of power.

I created the party because I was unable to entrust my political interests as a citizen and an entrepreneur to anyone. I knew everyone, but...

[Petrunko] That is to say, you trust only your own moral stance?

[Borovoy] No, I trust the principles of many people. But individual politicians are a dime a dozen. Especially uncivilized ones. But a party reflecting the liberal concept of development did not exist in Russia. [Borovoy ends]

From an interview given by Borovoy in 1991.

"I always created everything on hate. All my life I had the feeling that I was building a career on a swamp—a whole crowd of impoverished people who, in the leaders' opinion, could be told any lie.

"Those years were characterized by direct, head-to-head confrontation between two economies: the old, bureaucratic economy, and the new economy, at that time represented only by cooperatives. This confrontation was unproductive and doomed to failure. A mechanism was needed to destroy the old economic system surreptitiously. It was necessary to devise the sort of market in which the two economies could coexist and one would absorb the other. We gathered some economists together, started thinking, and 'dreamed up' a stock exchange."

[Petrunko] You were involved in politics even when you were engaged in independent business. First, in that you set up new nonstate economic structures. Second, you did not launder any dirty or "ideological" money. Moreover, arguments of morality (in your personal understanding, naturally) and of contributing to the destruction of the totalitarian regime in many cases outweighed considerations of business profitability. Why did you need to go into politics?

[Borovoy] I created economic instruments which were supposed to make our country free. (Everyone speaks about a financial group, but that is not the case). But it turned out that this was not enough to influence foolish decisions. I needed an instrument directly influencing policy.

[Petrunko] I should recall that you said 18 months ago in the same interview that politics is a dirty business and that you would never go into it. And now you are already in it?

[Borovoy] We have a very curious position—we support the concept of the president and his government. But as soon as they move away from their own positions, which are essentially democratic and liberal, we say: "Guys, don't do that." It sounds ridiculous, but at the beginning of the year we almost began regulating prices. We do not blackmail the government, as Civic Union has done before now, in order to receive positions in it—it is not our government. We do not enter it. We behave morally, very morally.

I am asking you to believe something totally preposterous: I entered politics to make it less of a dirty business. And I will do everything to see that some kind of moral rules and civilized mechanisms emerge.

Dirty politics—that means dishonest actions, tripping people up, deceit. What is happening in Italy today—bribes, the mafia—is the most terrible thing that can be. There is plenty of dirt at home too. But, fortunately, we are not mixed up in it. Many have tried to link us with it. But unsuccessfully.

[Petrunko] You say that politics is a somewhat dirty business and you would like to ennoble it. I suggest that you will still have to play by the existing rules as soon as you find yourself mixed up in politics.

[Borovoy] I am not sure what lies ahead. Many journalists predicted all sorts of horrors for me when I was setting up the exchange, virtually that I would become a mafia leader. After all, the state economy was then very strong, and in order to survive... But this did not happen. And I would never contemplate this. So you must believe that a man who is entirely moral, who has been moral to this day, can be the same next Saturday. It happens. [Borovoy ends]

From an interview given by K. Borovoy in 1991.

"Don't stand on ceremony with me. Attack, provoke, snarl 'crook!' at me. That is the only way to talk to me."

[Petrunko] But you have a perfect opportunity to be influential in politics without leaving the sphere where you are powerful. You simply need to become very rich, and this is no problem for the leader of a large company; you have talked about this yourself many times.

[Borovoy] If I had set myself the task of becoming rich, I would not live here, but in New York. And I would not have set up a stock exchange to be the breeding ground of a market economy in a totalitarian country. At the time its leaders could have been thrown in jail at any moment. I would have lived on 42d Street, a large "Lincoln" would be pulled up in the drive, and on Saturday I would have gone to the Bahamas. But I want the situation in

Russia to change. Why have I not become a billionaire? Because I did not want to. I considered it immoral, and I still do.

And I do not want to be influential simply thanks to money. I do not want to be like Ross Perot. That is not my plan. I want to be a politician, representing a large social group and its interests.

[Petrunko] But at the same time one gets the impression that you have respect only for those who have found their way in business and you feel considerably contempt toward professionals who are poor.

[Borovoy] A teacher at one of the largest higher educational establishments came up to me and said how bad it is when students have small grants, and that they are ready to go on strike. She said that 30 percent of students work "in those dirty kiosks."

[Petrunko] Students have always done dirty jobs: as janitors; now it is kiosks.

[Borovoy] But why dirty? They are efficient jobs from the economic point of view. They exist without subsidies.

Recently I was in Boston. There are two universities in the city. And the students work in restaurants and snack bars. They hold down their jobs. And they pay for their education. Anyway, education is intellectual property. Once you have got it, you can move to another country. Why should the state pay for this? Anyway, anything that's free always costs three times the price.

A simple scheme: The state starts paying for your intellectual property. It takes labor and money from some people, raises taxes, and the result is that production and investment activity are squeezed and people's standard of living drops. This is a spiral which step by step leads to a totalitarian society. But it can be different, when the state reduces its nonproduction expenditure, less tax is levied from people, and they get an opportunity to pay for a good education. But in the transitional period there should be free education too. [Borovoy ends]

From K. Borovoy's book "The Price of Freedom"

"...When the time comes that the many citizens for whom I am working disinterestedly today say to me, we do not believe you, we do not want you and your party, and I get tired of carrying the torch, I think that within a year I will become a billionaire, maybe in dollars."

[Petrunko] Should a politician be rich? I believe that a man who can satisfy his needs can be described as rich. If you are not short of imagination and you have money, you are already an extremely wealthy person. And in my opinion, a politician should be rich—a civil servant too.

[Borovoy] This topic is discussed quite often in connection with Ilyumzhinov and Baskin: "He is a rich man—better to give power to him, he is already rich, he will not steal." But that is rubbish; I am sure that Ilyumzhinov will not steal—otherwise he would not make money in business. I know Baskin—it is against his moral principles."

[Petrunko] So much the better. They have already been tested by "gold"; should not a property qualification be introduced for politicians?

[Borovoy] That is wrong. It is undemocratic. What we are building is a society of equal opportunity. But when that happens I would not make it, and you would lose a good politician.

[Petrunko] In order to get votes, you will obviously have to completely change your image. You have said before that you do not aim to please. And it must be said that you have almost achieved your aim. You give the impression of being a blunt, waspish person, what is more, a dandy. But a politician, even if he is a decent man and an intellectual, should not be a smart-aleck young upstart like you are now.

[Borovoy] They tell me that a politician should take children by the hand, play games, and tell lies. But you do not want to do so, they say. But this is an image "from over there." In the West there is a high degree of competition. And who you get your picture taken with is also an extra bonus.

[Petrunko] You recently published your memoirs with the APN publishing house. Surely they told you that this is the sort of thing you do when you retire? That is the popular view. Moreover, there is a lot of talk now that you are beginning to have difficulties in VKT—your brainchild.

[Borovoy] But I have nowhere to retire from. I do not occupy any posts.

When I set up the party, I imposed restrictions on myself—I renounced the right to handle the exchange's documents, I gave up my official-signatory rights. Today a securities market is being created. For many people wishing to take part in it, the main condition is that I stand at the helm. And I concur.

As for the situation in VKT, it is quite simple: A contradiction between managers and owners. This kind of thing happens in civilized countries too. Managers start moving the company in the direction which they consider necessary, without consulting anyone about it. The Soviet Union, in a nutshell. But everywhere decisions are made by the owners. They may be wrong, but they are the owners, and are obliged to make decisions. [Borovoy ends].

From K. Borovoy's memoirs:

"Of course, the first wave of democratic leaders has nothing to do with democracy. They copy the old nomenklatura both in habits and primitive ambitions. And always their brains are pretty poor, and their ethics too."

[Petrunko] I would not want to agree with the epithets you use with regard to the democrats in power. After all, in order to take up democratic positions in this country a few years ago, you needed both brains and probity.

[Borovoy] I do not deny that many of our leaders possess remarkable qualities. But this is the first wave of "democrats." They have been traveling the road and have already made discoveries along the way. This generation will be followed by the next.

Right now everything possible is being done if not to destroy competition in the political sphere, then to weaken it as much as possible. Because the main politicians are weak. In many senses. I am in contact with many entrepreneurs—they are an intellectual elite; I am in contact with many politicians—I cannot say the same. That is the way it has happened. Some kind of principle of selection used to operate: Intellectuals were not needed, they were dangerous. This principle still operates now to some extent. I think that when Boris Nikolayevich was forming his team, the main criterion was loyalty. I said to him twice in meetings with him that his team lacks expertise. Because the most important thing that a politicians should do, is not to make mistakes.

[Petrunko] Suppose that at the next elections a candidate from the liberal wing is chosen. What actions do you expect from him and from yourself?

[Borovoy] First of all, he should reconstruct the system of administration. To complete the destruction of the centralized system, in which all the signals come from one point.

Why does Yeltsin support Luzhkov so much? He understands that for him, losing Moscow means losing control over the situation in general. Why does he not see that another, civilized administration is possible? Many say—and there is a grain of truth in this—that the pickets outside the television studio were an attempt to blackmail the president. They were seeking from him certain decisions on the Security Council. But normal administration is what known as framework regulation. An official monitors the boundaries; if they are not crossed, he has nothing to do.

[Petrunko] And what would be the actions of the liberals in power regarding bribes—one of the main factors, so they say, hindering the development of the market?

[Borovoy] I once said that Moscow would turn into a huge criminal market in property and trade. We held rallies at the time to demand the resignation of the mayor. I was not believed. And everything happened just the way I said; it is pretty galling.

A democratic system in which people are taken around a corner and shot at the slightest suspicion of bribery would be very like the totalitarian system. [Borovoy ends]

From an interview given by Borovoy in 1992.

"I could buy officials or come to terms with them. Indeed I could. But I will never do this, because it is beneath my dignity. I can even allow myself not to pay bribes."

[Petrunko] Suppose that the new generation of politicians will be more educated, more intelligent, better read... more free..

[Borovoy] The most important thing is what they will not have—the mentality of fear, connected with the camps, with slavery. And one of the features of that mentality—to struggle for power for its own sake. We have seen attempts to topple the president. But what follows? You can seize power, but you cannot hang on to it through civilized methods if you do not have a concept, a social group which supports you.

[Petrunko] But in our country—it has become commonplace—we have charismatic rule: It is more important who comes to power, not what he proposes as a program.

[Borovoy] No, the situation is changing even here. Dislike of power has emerged, an ironical attitude toward it. Well, the Americans do not believe their president. And that is good. That makes the authorities change. A critical attitude to power is the first sign of a normal society. Respect as a sign of stability belongs to the past, to slavery.

Dmitriy Yakubovskiy Interviewed on Corruption

LD0308213593 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1810 GMT 8 Jul 93

[Interview with Dmitriy Yakubovsky, lawyer and secretary of the Union of Advocates of the former USSR, by Andrey Karaulov; place and date not given; from "The Moment of Truth" program]

[Text] [Video caption reads: "Dmitriy Yakubovskiy, lawyer and secretary of the Union of Advocates of the Former USSR, was born on 5 September 1963 in Bolshevo, near Moscow. He is a graduate of the All-Union Institute of Law, and used to be a departmental head in the Moscow procuracy. He was one of the founders of the USSR Union of Advocates and the USSR Union of Lawyers. In 1992 he became an advisor to the Russian government. On 17 September 1992 he was appointed by government decree to the post of plenipotentiary representative of the Russian KGB, Interior Ministry, Procuracy General and other special services to the government of Yegor Gaydar. The Russian defense minister awarded him the rank of colonel by decree. Two days later, Dmitriy Yakubovskiy was forced to emigrate from Russia to Zurich."]

[Karaulov] So how are we going to conduct this conversation? On "ty" terms, as we used to in our backyard, or on "vy" terms, since you are a general now?

[Yakubovskiy] Well, since I am a general, better to be on "ty".

[Karaulov] OK then, "ty". You wanted me to come to you. We have not seen each other for a long time. Tell me, why do you need this interview right now? What do you want to say?

[Yakubovskiy] I just want to be understood.

[Karaulov] You consider yourself badly treated?

[Yakubovskiy] I think that what is written here, from the law's viewpoint of course, does not enhance my good name. And there is a lot that they have not written about.

[Karaulov] Regarding this article about you in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, also in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, and other publications. Urazhtsev's speech at the Supreme Soviet. Is there any truth in them?

[Yakubovskiy] Of course.

[Karaulov] A lot of truth?

[Yakubovskiy] Truth about what?

[Karaulov] About you.

[Yakubovskiy] Of course there is some truth. But one and the same truth can be presented in different ways. If I am at fault in any way, then I am not hiding from anyone. I am ready to provide explanations. If a court rules that I am guilty, then I am ready to accept responsibility. But what Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin and Vladimir Fillippovich Shumeyko have to do with this, I simply do not understand. That is the first thing. Second, I went to Moscow to a Supreme Soviet commission set up under the Procuracy and chaired by First Deputy Procurator General Nikolay Ivanovich Makarov, and for two weeks explained things to him and a member of the commission, Sergey Aleksandrovich [word indistinct]. I answered absolutely all their questions. Just before I left, I asked if anyone had any more questions and when I was told that I had answered all questions already and everything was clear, then I left and very shortly afterwards was reading deputies' speeches about the Supreme Soviet commission's report. That is it.

[Karaulov] Well, all right, let us talk to the point. I have known you since childhood, I am older than you, we lived in the same street. I will speak with you as if these cameras were not here. Tell me, please, are you a thief?

[Yakubovskiy] No.

[Karaulov] How could it happen that you, Dmitriy Yakubovskiy, a nobody lawyer, was suddenly appointed a representative of the KGB, the Interior Ministry, Russia's procurator general in Gaydar's government?

[Yakubovskiy] I must say that I had been involved in such activity long before I was appointed to Gaydar's government as representative of law enforcement bodies and special services. In addition to what you have already mentioned, it included also foreign intelligence service, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Defense Ministry, and a number of other special services. From 1990, as secretary of the USSR Union of Barristers, on instruction from the USSR Supreme Soviet and Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, the then chairman of the Supreme Soviet, I dealt with the issue of Soviet property in the Western Group of Forces. We chose an unusual method. At the time, we did not care about how many kilograms of metal, gasoline, or something were sold or bought. Our goal was to find a legal basis enabling us, at the time, to declare property located in Germany as the Union's property. We chose a way which was different from the tried and tested standard path used by everybody before us. We chose a new method. Instead of arguing with German legislation, we tried to find in German legislation such provisions which could protect us today, that is, instead of changing another country's law, to find possibilities of using it to protect our state interests.

[Karaulov] Did you manage to find them?

[Yakubovskiy] We did. A picture emerged which showed that about 20 to 30 billion marks could be saved and credited to the Russian side. A few days after the November holidays, I flew to the Western Group of Forces accompanied by the officials who were to work with me. We were taken there by the defense minister's private Il-62 flown by the defense minister's private pilot. When we were crossing the USSR state border, the pilots were ordered to return the aircraft. The pilots turned the aircraft around, landed at the Chkalovskiy military airfield, set me off, and after that flew to Wunsdorf.

[Karaulov] You imply that they were afraid of you?

[Yakubovskiy] The international treaties signed between the Soviet Union and Germany after that envisaged compensation for practically only a half of our property, and even from that half of our property we were given not money but credits on conditions which were difficult to meet. Big money came into play here. Only some years later, after Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov became a pensioner, he told me that he had approached Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on this issue, but instead of approval he had been told to stay away from the German question.

[Karaulov] In other words, Gorbachev needed a treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany at any cost, even to the detriment of our state economic interests?

[Yakubovskiy] Correct.

[Karaulov] And you emigrated?

[Yakubovskiy] After my meeting with Lukyanov, Anatoliy Ivanovich and others suggested that I should leave the Soviet Union and wait over there till better times, as the saying goes. And that was what I did.

[Karaulov] Did you have any money?

[Yakubovskiy] When I arrived in Zurich, I had about $30,000.

[Karaulov] Not bad! That is a lot! How did you earn them in the Soviet Union?

[Yakubovskiy] I did not earn them in the Soviet Union. Before leaving, I borrowed this money from a businessman to repay him later.

[Karaulov] Have you repaid it?

[Yakubovskiy] Yes, I have.

[Karaulov] Let us speak about something else for a moment. Tell me, please, is it true that Russian businessmen have spirited vast quantities of currency abroad?

[Yakubovskiy] And not only businessmen! And the quantities of currency are really vast! My job was to find a legal way to track this down in Russia and, when the money is gone abroad, to return it from over there, from banks in Switzerland, Monaco, Austria, Belgium, Liechtenstein and other countries.

[Karaulov] Have you found such a way?

[Yakubovskiy] I have found such a way, and the Interior Ministry, the criminal police are, in principle, using it now. Similarly, I called upon the Office of Procurator General to do the same. Here is a document, an appeal by the Revival Fund [Vozrozhdeniye] to Vice President Rutskoy to find $20 million. Why did this document attract attention? One cannot fail to notice straight away that the vice president's instruction was hand-written and not on a special form. It seems this was done in a situation where neither forms nor usual office facilities were available. The instruction was issued on 30 September, whereas the letter was dated only 1 October 1991. Also, a number of other peculiarities drew our attention. Together with the criminal police service and the Main Directorate for combating economic crimes of the Russian Interior Ministry, we started looking into this case. We established that $20 million had been transferred to the accounts of (Mirol Limited) company in Zurich at a price of 1.5 rubles for the dollar—not expensive, to put it mildly. Since we did not trace any confirmation of deliveries of goods for this sum, we started investigating whether goods had returned to Russia, to Russia's remote regions in dire need of this product.

Here is Rutskoy's letter, in which he gives instructions to find possibilities of implementing the contract, and the last paragraph of the letter says that the contract will be financed by Agrokhim [Agricultural Chemicals]. Since the money had gone, we took Agrokhim's payment authorizations, copies of the bank's fax on crediting $20 million to the account of (Mirol Limited) and asked the Revival Fund for Russia's social development to submit documents confirming that the mentioned baby food had been received and forwarded further. Soon after that I was thrown out of the country on 22 September. However—and this could be the reason why I am being linked with Vladimir Filippovich Shumeyko—Shumeyko continued to check and issued a special government instruction in spring 1993 on a comprehensive check of the Revival Fund.

This is just one of many facts which I was investigating with the criminal militia and the procuracy.

[Karaulov] Excuse me, please. I think I have lost you here. Why are you telling me this story?

[Yakubovskiy] I am telling you this story in order to show how the money were taken from Russia and how we tried to prevent this.

[Karaulov] In other words, you claim that Vice President Rutskoy and the Revival Fund which he was patronizing—or, shall I say, helping—have embezzled some of these $20 million?

[Yakubovskoy] I am saying that on instruction from Vice President Rutskoy, the money was taken out of Russia and never came back to Russia in the form of goods. At least, we do not have any documentary evidence to date to prove that they did. Therefore, we had to raise the question of investigating the Revival Fund in order to either get some documentary evidence that all the 20 million worth of baby food was delivered, or to prove that this was not done.

[Karaulov] What was the result of this investigation?

[Yakubovskiy] We were not allowed to investigate the Revival Fund. After this, Shumeyko appealed to the Supreme Soviet asking for documents necessary for investigating the activities of this Fund. Which, as far as I know, was also denied. I cannot explain why at the moment.

[Karaulov] You have just said that on 22 September—that is, last year—you were thrown out of the country. In other words, this was the second time since that story with the Western Group of Forces that you were forced to leave Russia. I still cannot understand—is it your fate or what? What is it all about?

[Yakubovskiy] I was not needed then, and it seems that I am not needed now.

[Karaulov] What has happened with your appointment as a representative of the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Procuracy General and other military departments in Gaydar's government? How long did you have this job?

[Yakubovskiy] Two days.

[Karaylov] Tell me please: The decree about your appointment to this post was, as far as I know, signed by Shumeyko in agreement with Gaydar and the president of Russia and undersigned by all the heads of all the military departments of Russia—Barannikov, Yerin, Stepankov, Primakov, Starovoytov and so on. Who could revoke this decree which was signed by all the top

officials in the country? Who is more powerful than all of them together? What is your view?

[Yakubovskiy] My view is that I was not needed at this post in the government because that direct line between the government and the law-enforcement bodies was just another uncontrollable channel of information which runs through Shumeyko directly to the president.

Well, I would like to give you an example. Many people today are talking about the Harvest-90 program. The main culprits of the breakdown of this program are people like Olkhovikov, deputy minister of the economy, who has been dealing with the currency regulation of our country's finances since the times of the USSR state plan. He is unsinkable! I will not venture to say today whether Olkhovnikov took bribes from them or not, but the fact remains: The list of firms which received orders for actual cash was strictly limited. Means of credit and other forms of financing based on these decisions were not used and a monopoly remained on the delivery of goods into the country. This was not advantageous—these were inflated prices—this was not advantageous as far as payments and many other things were concerned.

[Karaulov] Can you tell us, then, why it is that it is your name which is today being linked with that of Shumeyko?

[Yakubovskiy] I was advisor to Valentin Georgiyevich Stepankov on international legal questions, and then official advisor, unpaid.

[Karaulov] I do not seem to understand this—are you saying that your name needs to be linked more with the name of Stepankov rather than Shumeyko—do I understand that correctly?

[Yakubovskiy] Yes, because I was adviser to a specific person, but in the government I was adviser to the whole government. I brought Stepankov documents on the basis of which commercial state structures, in the words of that same Stepankov, transferred abroad a large quantity of hard currency, which sat there in a bank in someone's accounts—part of it sat there—and part of it came back to Russia in the form of goods, equipment, and so on.

[Karaulov] What was the sum that you found in these accounts?

[Yakubovskiy] If one is talking about what kind of sum was sitting there in percentage terms, I cannot tell you, but the amount on which a check was carried out was in excess of $6 billion.

[Karaulov] And it was you who found all of this?

[Yakubovskiy] Yes, it was I who found all of it.

[Karaulov] Tell us, if you would, whose path did you cross, specifically?

[Yakubovskiy] I believe that I crossed the path of those people who were behind all this—Rutskoy, after I had found documents testifying to the fact that the Revival Fund was engaged in commercial activity, with all the harm it would being to Russia, and many others who are today united around Rutskoy in a single block.

[Karaulov] Can you say specifically who they are or are you afraid to?

[Yakubovskiy] One could cite a long list.

[Karaulov] Well, did you show this piece of paper with Rutskoy's seal of approval with virtually an order to allocate $20 million—did you show this document to Stepankov?

[Yakubovskiy] This document was handed over to Procurator General Stepankov in September 1992 and now, when I was in Moscow in a special commission for the struggle against corruption which was set up in the procuracy by the Supreme Soviet, I once again asked about the fate of this document.

[Karaulov] Well, what happened to it?

[Yakubovskiy] I was told that a check was being made.

[Karaulov] You have collected a huge quantity of documents. And you take them around with yourself everywhere. What are you scared of? That they will be stolen?

[Yakubovskiy] No. This is just a small number of them, one of the files that I collated over the years. I am not frightened that they will be stolen.

[Karaulov] Alright then. What interests me is something else. Among them are documents that expose various people for having done this or that. Is the name Shokhin there? Chubays? Gaydar? Burbulis? Yeltsin? Are they named?

[Yakubovskiy] Some names are there, others are not.

[Karaulov] Are you willing to be specific?

[Yakubovskiy] The fact is that there is material here, in the light of which the activities of a certain organization have to be examined and which were permitted to take place by Shokhin, Gaydar, or someone else. But we cannot say right now that they are guilty or not guilty of anything.

[Karaulov] About this Yeltsin decree conferring on you the rank of major general, when the post of KGB and Interior Ministry representative in Russia was mooted. Is it a forgery or really a genuine document?

[Yakubovskiy] Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin never made me a major general, at least he has not up to now.

[Karaulov] Sorry, but it was published here, in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

[Yakubovskiy] I say it again: It is a forgery, there was never any such decree. Let ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA sort out who palmed it off on them. If I were in the president's staff I would sue, because there never was any such decree and neither could there be.

[Karaulov] Have you ever met Yeltsin?

[Yakubovskiy] Never.

[Karaulov] But you have met Shumeyko quite often?

[Yakubovskiy] I used to meet him quite often in the course of my work for the government, from about June to September 1992.

[Karaulov] So was Shumeyko really your protector? Helping out, signing various letters that you showed him?

[Yakubovskiy] It is difficult for me to be neutral in this. I always thought it was quite the opposite. I was not under his wing, because I was not taken on as one of his support staff. I never worked on Shumeyko's staff. He was always quite harsh and demanding toward me. True, when I asked him why, he explained that if I can do a lot more, then more demands should be made of me.

[Karaulov] In the report to the Supreme Soviet by Deputy Procurator General Makarov, there are two instances when your name is directly linked to Shumeyko's. The role played by Shumeyko in all these events, I repeat, is somehow linked to you. What is this link?

[Yakubovskiy] For the sake of clarity, I will begin my answer with the finale. They tried to talk me out of this trip to Moscow. I was told straight that if I came to Moscow I would be arrested immediately, that I would only be left alone if I gave in to Vladimir Fillippovich Shumeyko.

[Karaulov] Can you name these people who threatened you like that?

[Yakubovskiy] I can. They are personal and close representatives of Vice President Rutskoy.

[Karaulov] What are you looking for?

[Yakubovskiy, bringing out a folder of documents] I am looking for a transcript of a cassette, which Vladimir Fillippovich Shumeyko mentioned in an interview. It contains, as he put it, clearly recognizable voices. I think that was because soon after my departure, my dacha was searched. I want to quote some extracts from this cassette, from the transcript [reads from sheet of paper in the folder]:

One of Rutskoy's people says: Listen, I will try to spell it out to you. The situation is this. [says to Karaulov] He is talking to me. [continues from the transcript] You have ended up as the whipping boy. This is war. The fact is, your friend signed a piece of paper ordering a probe into the Revival Fund. That is, he fired a shot at Rutskoy and Khasbulatov, in that the Revival was set up by the Supreme Soviet and was under Rutskoy's control. He set up a special commission, a heavyweight commission with the whole works, and, I think, a team of auditors at the top of it all. They started to dig around in the Fund. Not only that, but while they were digging around, they unearthed this deal with the children's food. [says to Karaulov] What I just showed you... [continues from the transcript] And they got a story published in the papers. [says to Karaulov] That is right, because VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA published a report about it. [continues from transcript] They dug down deep into the Fund. The Fund's people started getting nervous, panicking. They came running to me. [says to Karaulov] I am talking in the first person, this is the trusted representative of the vice president. [continues from transcript] (Belkin) has gone, but there are still people left. He was the chairman of one of the branches, just one small branch. This is an enormous organization covering the entire country. The top man is Korovnikov, a people's deputy, a very powerful man. They brought Korovnikov himself to see me. They all went crazy... [says to Karaulov] Meaning who we were talking about earlier. [continues from transcript] They convened the Supreme Soviet presidium and set up a special procuracy. Anything that any other commissions or whatever did was declared as having no force. But because he, [says to Karaulov] meaning Shumeyko, [continues from transcript] signed this order to have the Fund checked out and felt free to talk tough in public, they decided to have a go at him. And I tell you: They will come out of it a lot better than he will, because they are much sharper and smarter and he, as it turns out, is not so bright.

Further, all this goes on in the same style. In fact, it was required of me to compromise Shumeyko. I could not and cannot do this. I have no grounds allowing me to draw the conclusion that Shumeyko was guilty of something. What is being proposed to me? He says here: It is a very simple question. Finally, I have agreed and received guarantees that they need that you give him away. Everything is possible, and that is it. But you will be taken out straight away. Instruction will be given straight away, they warned yesterday that a couple of people should be left in peace. And here is the text.

[Karaulov] Tell me please, you are a young man indeed, you are only 29, you are collecting all these papers, all this dirt, you are carrying it around—are you not disgusted?

[Yakubovskiy] Very much so. I would be much happier to carry on with my work instead of collecting these papers. But unfortunately, I have no other way today to let the truth be known to all those who now know the things that are written in newspapers.

[Karaulov] So what is happening at the top in our country? Are they at each other's throat?

[Yakubovskiy] Yes. Now, regarding the commercial activity of (Lomo) and the information agency mentioned in the report of the procurator general regarding

property in Monaco. Vladimir Fillippovich Shumeyko's signature on this document was not needed at all. It is simply an instance of playing safe. A joint enterprise, in which Agrokhim participated earlier, transferred this property to another joint enterprise in which (Lomo) was a partner. Both these joint enterprises are foreign companies and their relations are regulated by their national legislations.

As regards the baby food, I have sorted out this question, too and I have found out that, as was mentioned in the report by the deputy procurator general, baby food worth $1.7 million was delivered, the contract was signed for $10.2 million, and the equipment is arriving in Russia in July. Premises to accomodate the equipment have already been built in Russia, in Voskresenskiy rayon, in (Iktarino), and the remaining $3 million have been carried over to construct a new $12 million factory to make glass bottles and jars.

[Karaulov] But if, after all, a trial is held and not everything you are saying turns out to be true at the trial—will you stay in Canada where your wife lives, escape to Switzerland, or return to Russia, after all, to face the court, if need be?

[Yakubovskiy] If need be, I will gladly come to Russia and face any court. If I am guilty, I shall be punished. If, however, it is those who have slandered me who are guilty, then it is they who will be punished.

[Karaulov] Are you not scared of responsibility?

[Yakubovskiy] There are just two things that scare me. I am afraid of death, and I am ticklish.

[Karaulov] What do you think your former classmates feel listening to you now trying to justify yourself. Do they envy you?

[Yakubovskiy] Do they envy me? I envy them, more like it. They are not being shot at, they are not being thrown out of planes, they are not being chased in obstacle races on the roads of Europe. They sleep in peace and work at leisure.

[Karaulov] You mean you do not sleep in peace?

[Yakubovskiy] Not any more. Even now, in all the banks in Europe and America—Paribas, Indosuez, Bank Leumi, Bank Corporation, and in many others—many millions have been accumulated, instead of being kept in Russia.

[Karaulov] Millions of Russian money you mean?

[Yakubovskiy] Yes. This new class abroad—it must be seen to be believed. They are the people who do not count their money. It may surprise you, but in 1993 Mercedes sold more automobiles in Russia than in the whole of Germany. This will continue. My example is only a beginning. This has happened before in our history. My father once told me, quoting from Julius Caesar, that the higher your destiny, the more limited your freedom. He always said I should not get involved in politics, but I was sort of attracted to it. This was probably a great mistake on my part.

[Karaulov] You have been put aboard a strange plane on three occasions, and you must have been shaking with fear. Now tell me, do you really feel compelled to try your luck once again.

[Yakubovskiy] Certainly. It is like in a song by Vysotskiy [popular Russian singer-songwriter in 70's and 80's] "No one ever dies in vain, so better be killed by a bullet than die from a common cold."

Khabarovsk Kray Radio Shuts Down; TV Threatened

PM0308153193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Aug 93 First Edition p 1

[INTERFAX report: "Radio Stations Shut Down in Khabarovsk Kray"]

[Text] Local radio in Khabarovsk and Komsomolsk-na-Amure, as well as a number of independent radio stations, have stopped broadcasting programs from 2 August.

This has been brought about by the "Dalnevostochnaya" Television and Radio Broadcasting Company's desperate shortage of budget funds to pay for communications services.

The relay of Khabarovsk television programs to a number of the kray's remote areas is threatened with shutdown.

Economic Issues

Fedorov Asks Parliament To Cancel Bank Note Exchange

LD0408180393 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1600 GMT 4 Aug 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Russian Finance Minister Boris Fedorov has sent a letter to the Russian parliament demanding the cancellation of the Central Bank's money exchange program and the punishment of those guilty immediately.

Fedorov Moots Merger of Economy, Finance Ministries

PM0408145993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Aug 93 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Boris Fedorov Proposes the Abolition of the Ministry of the Economy"]

[Text] An official memorandum sent on 2 August by Minister of Finances Boris Fedorov to Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin has come into the possession of the editorial office. This document sets out proposals for a radical reorganization of the structure of the Russian Government.

First, B. Fedorov believes that in conditions of the market economy the Ministry of Finance should become the key economic department. Whereas the Ministry of the Economy should be merged with the Ministry of Finance into a single Ministry of Finance and the Economy, with a reduction in the overall number of personnel of roughly 30 percent.

In B. Fedorov's opinion, it would be expedient to include in the Ministry of Finance system the following departments also: the tax service, the tax police, the currency inspectorate, and the customs committee. This would correspond to world, and former Russian, practice.

In addition, B. Fedorov believes, irrespective of how the first question is resolved, there has long been a pressing need to abolish the Russian Federation Committee for Pricing Policy and the Russian Federation Committee for Precious Metals and Precious Stones, transforming them into departments within the Ministry of Finance. This would also produce savings on personnel and resources.

In general, B. Fedorov's memorandum devotes great attention to the reduction of executive personnel, which in conditions of inflated state expenditure looks extremely reasonable. In particular, he proposes at leat a twofold reduction of the number of sector committees, possibly by merging them or joining them to the State Committee for the Management of State Property. There is also a proposal to merge the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the Committee for Industrial Policy into a single Ministry of Trade and Industry.

B. Fedorov also draws attention to the fact that the number of deputy chairman in the Russian Government is unique in world practice and virtually annuls the role of ministers. When all is said and done, the deputy chairman is a person who deputizes for the chairman of the Council of Ministers in his absence. But in our country deputy chairmen, in view of their great numbers, have turned into something like senior ministers, and the actual ministers into junior ministers. Therefore, he proposes thinking about the possibility of reducing the number of deputy chairmen and enhancing the role of ministers.

'Preliminary Results' of Exchange Released

PM0408120193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Aug 93 First Edition p 4

[Ivan Zhagel report: "Results of Money Exchange Over the Week"]

[Text] By the end of 2 August the Central Bank of Russia had collated the preliminary results of the exchange of old bank notes over the past week.

According to information from the Central Bank Press Service, cash centers received a total of 721.25 billion rubles [R] during this period. Of these R94.7 billion—or around 13 percent—were collected via the Bank for Labor Savings and Credit to the Population [Sberbank] system (in other words, from the population).

These figures confirm to a certain extent the statements, made by the Central Bank leadership at the beginning of the operation, to the effect that ordinary Russian citizens hold or have been holding a considerable amount of old bank notes. But, at the same time, we cannot fail to note that the waiting lines outside Sberbank branches have still not disappeared. Nor can we disregard the long-term negative consequences of the operation currently being conducted to remove the old bank notes, which will be expressed in a lack of confidence in the national currency, the central banks, and any other state obligations.

It is interesting that, of the R94.7 billion collected through the Russian Sberbank system, R52 billion—or more than one-half—has been accounted for by Moscow branches of the bank. This fact unambiguously shows that Moscow is the center used by the population of other republics of the former Union to off-load their old money. The republics are using all possible means to this end, including involving residents of Moscow in the operation. Incidentally, this may largely explain the continuing lines at Sberbank branches in the capital.

Here is another interesting figure—R2 billion has been credited to six-month deposit accounts in Moscow alone. It is not yet known how much money has been deposited throughout the country, but we do have another figure—150,000 deposit accounts were opened in Russia over the past week.

Perils of Centralist Recovery Plan Viewed

PM0508085193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Aug 93 First Edition p 4

[Aleksandr Livshits article: "Ministerial Plan To 'Save Economy' Could Spell End for Reform"]

[Text] What people had always feared most has come to pass—the long-suffering Russian economy has found itself at the center of a political struggle. Just take the exchange of money. There have been very few commentaries on the economic aspect of it. There have been far more forecasts about who scored how many (or how few) political points.

The aforesaid program [reference to headline] will have no less of a political impact. It is quite likely that it will not discuss amending the reforms, even in a very substantive way, or measures to overcome the crisis, but will focus on fundamentally different approaches to resolving these issues.

We can expect that it will initially focus on reviving production and overcoming its extremely irrational structure. It will insist on a vigorous investment policy and major state action in the social sphere.

The tasks have been set properly, but have been organized wrongly. They are in the wrong order. Because there is nothing more important for the country at the moment than to overcome inflation. Although no realistic progress in all the aforesaid directions is possible unless this problem is solved, it will probably be treated as insignificant. And there may not even be any extensive anti-inflation program at all. Instead there will be a list of measures to restore state control over prices under inflationary conditions.

Since production and investment will have to be revived at a time of continuing inflation, market incentives will be sharply reduced. What shall we do? Very simple—replace them with various means of state influence over the economy. Including strong-arm methods that will destroy market mechanisms and limit economic freedom. The state, rather than the market, will get our economy out of the crisis—the key issue will be framed in those terms. And, in order to set the economy free, the state will have to be able to control everything happening within it.

It is quite likely that it will be proposed that control be established not only over quotas for increases but even over price levels for at least one-third of total industrial output. But that will not be all—such control would be too weak. Owners of goods will be forced to declare their price rises beforehand, and the terms under which they will be allowed to do so will be laid down in law. Violations will be very severely dealt with. For instance, executive organs will be given the right to force through price cuts.

And even that is not all. We can expect that state organs will be obliged to regulate income (including with the help of administrative methods, we must assume) not only at state enterprises but at private enterprises too, and to link their income and profits tax to output volume. The costs of production, the procedure for forming working capital, commercial banks' interest rates, the nature of privatized enterprises' production activity, and much else besides will to all intents and purposes fall under state control.

It is obvious that implementation of these proposals would spell the unconditional end of economic reform. The sacrifices endured by the country's population during the first and hardest phase would have been completely for naught, and the results of the April referendum would be canceled out.

But let's consider something else—is such a plan realistic? Both the supporters and opponents of reform now agree that it has already brought about irreversible changes in price formation, finances, commerce, and the sphere of trade as a whole, has laid the foundations of market relations, and has defined the outlines of Russia's new economy. But it is precisely these spheres and relations, and the country's new economy that could be hit hardest by predominantly strong-arm methods of influence.

So just what is happening? If the changes are irreversible, these methods will either have no effect or will lead to the destruction of the foundations of the new Russian economy that are now taking shape—something which, we have to assume, is in no one's interest. At any rate, major social and economic losses would be inevitable.

This—the price which the country would have to pay for the latest radical turnaround in its economic policy—is something that today's innovators and rescuers of the economy generally prefer to keep quiet about.

Another reason why there is little likelihood that this "abrupt" plan will be carried out is because it will probably turn out to be wracked by internal contradictions.

For instance, it is hardly likely to escape at least making a promise to reduce inflation. But, at the same time, by insisting on immediately reviving production, it will have to think up means of stimulating demand. These tasks are at the very least incompatible in the immediate future.

On the one hand, it is impossible to avoid recognizing the growing role of the nonstate sector as the defining mark of the new Russian economy—it employs 30 million people (40 percent of the work force) or 60 million including family members. On the other hand, the introduction of emergency state control will undoubtedly lead to the restriction of economic freedom and private enterprise.

It is clear that implementation of these plans would require a gigantic increase in state spending and centralized preferential credits. At the same time, it is necessary to overcome the budget deficit, reducing it to at least 5 percent of GDP. It is quite impossible to grasp how these objectives can be combined.

Or take defaults on payments. Clearly, it will be proposed that enterprises offset each other's debts without adding to the money supply or credit—something which, quite frankly, is hard to believe. But, let's suppose it does happen. And that the understandable calculation that the offsetting of debts will throw up potential bankrupts that have no prospect of clearing their debts proves to be correct.

It is entirely likely, however, that it will be impossible to resist the pressure from bankrupt debtors—they will come out in force in favor of "resolute" measures, without which they will be unable to survive. And they will demand compensation in return for their support. For instance, in the shape of the creation of a state organ to control the use of financial resources to help vitally important production facilities, defend the state's property interests, and define ways of preventing enterprises

going insolvent. Obviously, we will never get rid of unnecessary production facilities in that case.

It is unclear how to combine a sharp increase in investment activity mainly from budget resources with the pledge to rapidly improve the situation in the social sphere.

Negative effects are possible not only in the socioeconomic sphere. In the current situation we cannot fail to take political consequences into account.

If the "drastic" plan becomes reality, there is a growing likelihood of an open split in the government. Things could reach the point where the supporters of consistent market transformations resigned. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the reformist sociopolitical forces which supported the president in the April referendum could find themselves in opposition to the executive. We can expect a negative reaction from the broad strata of entrepreneurs, leaders of privatized and newly floated enterprises, and the regional political elite who are not interested in sharply beefing up centralized controls over the economy. Clearly there would be a negative response form the leaders of the developed countries and international economic organizations.

It is well known that the Ministry of the Economy has some first-rate studies—on the management of state enterprises, federal targeted programs, and other spheres—about which the specialists who have been working on them feel very confident. These proposals are typified by their high level of readiness for practical implementation, which is something that should follow immediately. But it is quite obvious that now is not the time for frontal attacks, much less in the opposite direction to reform. It is far more important to learn how to quickly patch up the holes which are continually emerging in our rapidly changing economic fabric.

Plant Director Assails Current Reforms

PM0508113393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Aug 93 First Edition pp 1, 4

["Viewpoint" article by Georgiy Kostin, director of the Voronezh Mechanical Plant and corresponding member of the Russian Engineering Academy: "Reforms Yes, But Not the President's Way"]

[Text] Georgiy Kostin's speech evoked tumultuous applause at last week's All-Russia Economic Conference. Today we present an article by him to our readers.

Today there is no more important question than the elaboration of an action program to stabilize the economy. Whether our people survive or not, whether Russia exists or not depends not on political phrasemongering about the constitution but on a competent economic policy, the effectiveness of the economic mechanism, and the government's consistency and responsibility.

As is well known, the effectiveness of any such program depends primarily on correct and objective assessment of the specific reasons for the crisis, accurate recording of the existence of resources, and analysis of the effectiveness of existing productive forces.

I would remind you that for a long time the crisis phenomena in the economy were attributed to the so-called administrative-edict system of management and to the resistance of "antimarket forces." And accordingly all efforts were channeled into destroying the socialist national economic system and publicizing the American-style market. We were told to hang on for just 400 or 500 days, then paradise would dawn.

But in fact specific actions to ruin the economy, deprave the working person, and turn him into a parasite and speculator without kith or kin were elaborated and rehearsed during this period. No one advanced even a step toward any proper market. Because the market mechanism operates effectively only when there is a surplus of goods, and in our country, by contrast, they managed to steadily reduce production.

At that time it was simply inconceivable for a sane person to believe that all this was being done deliberately, rather than out of incompetence. So as directors our assessment of the events that were taking place looked simplistic: Yes, the article of the law is imperfect, yes, a mistake has been made, and so forth.

Last year the situation changed. The system for management of the national economy had already been largely destroyed, the August putsch and the Belovezhskaya deal had eliminated the single economic space, effective measures to ruin industry and agriculture had been rehearsed, the people had been tricked, the foreign advisers and sponsors of "perestroyka" had become confident of impunity, and speculative capital had acquired citizenship rights. Moreover, the destruction of Russian industry and agriculture had become permanent. The selling off of state property was mounting. Ruble machinations had spread to the zone of convertible currency, and the mass export of material assets and raw materials had begun.

The greatest harm was caused to the financial system: Its unity was destroyed, prices were released when there was a shortage of goods, an artificial ruble-dollar rate was created, mutual debts on the part of enterprises were provoked, and a tax policy and investment policy in practice promoting the elimination of commodity production were introduced.

A blow was struck against production by creating ineffective and defective management structures, discrediting enterprise directors, forcibly reorganizing and breaking up enterprises and kolkhozes, and finally, by pursuing an unprecedented personnel policy which boiled down to picking "worthy candidates" on the basis of just two criteria: public devotion to the president and... incompetence.

From April 1992 we realized where the fateful course of events was dragging us. And we tried to express our concerns and conclusions aloud. Remember, for instance, the statement by Voronezh directors, the decisions of the conference and congress of commodity producers, and the decision of the First NSF [National Salvation Front] Congress, which all set abuzz Gaydar's team of "reformers."

But these actions did not stop the rot. Once again we believed our rulers' promises. The people did not realize the fate in store for them. Entrepreneurs did not realize the treachery. And the deputies too did not realize they were doomed and so took a quite tolerant view of the president's "games" with the constitution and the laws.

So the measures we proposed at that time boiled down largely to neutralizing the government's destabilizing actions, without profoundly intervening in the concept of the "reform policy." Of course, they were not aimed at fundamentally changing the situation, but they could have stopped the rot. However, they endeavored to placate and ignore us.

A half-new government has been at work for six months now, though it retains all the old methods and means. Even an outline plan for extricating the country from the crisis has still not been elaborated. Investments are channeled exclusively into the raw materials sector, and to a considerable extent are embezzled along the way. While letting our natural resources go for next to nothing, they are purchasing clearly unnecessary foreign output in exchange.

The thoughtless or (please excuse the harsh language) criminal release of prices of energy sources seems particularly disastrous for the economy. I will try to corroborate my words with an illustration. Today in the machine-building sector in the Central Chernozem region the payments structure is as follows, on average: under 1 percent on production development, 22-30 percent on direct taxes, 15-20 percent on materials and components, 15-18 percent on wages, and 35-40 percent on payment for energy resources. But in August (in view of the increase in coal, gas, and electricity prices) payments for energy resources will increase sharply, reaching 57-63 percent. It is simply the end, so to speak.

In this situation we enterprise leaders have to seek a way out. I think there can be five options.

We can increase the price of our own output four or five times over, while realizing that demand for it (because of consumers' inability to pay) will fall by a similar amount.

In theory we can totally stop purchasing materials and components. In practice this means stopping the enterprise in one-three months' time.

We can take the road of reducing wages (say by 10 percent). At present in the region machine builders' average wage is 25,000-44,000 rubles [R] per month. It is half that level for workers in the electronics industry. But in energy-supplying sectors the average wage is over R50,000, and in liquor and vodka plants it reaches R100,000. What can be said about an economic policy whereby the production of machines and equipment is unnecessary so far as the state is concerned? There is another important fact. The 300-500 percent increase in the cost of energy resources will increase the prices of basic necessities. In those conditions is it permissible to cut people's wages?

There is another option—declaring the sovereignty of economic regions, restoring (in accordance with the results of a referendum) working people's power and the planned economy there, stopping the payment of taxes to the center, and switching to a barter economy and direct ties.

Finally, there is a fifth option. We should immediately stop blathering about continuing the "reform policy." Within two or three months we should elaborate and adopt a blueprint for a managed economy for Russia. That is the strategy, if you like. The tactics too should be linked with it: We should introduce emergency measures to stabilize the economy.

It is perfectly obvious that the first three options are dead ends and would lead to social explosion and unpredictable consequences. The fourth is already being implemented in a number of regions. I am convinced that this path will eventually lead to unification—first economic, and then political. But it is long and agonizing. However, if the country's leadership fails to draw any conclusions for itself, we (I solemnly state) will begin setting up a Soviet Central Chernozem Republic. Public opinion is ripe for this, and there are no doubts about the disposition of forces in the region. You need only remind people that Voronezh pays 59 percent of tax revenues to the center, but Kazan pays less than 1 percent.

As for the last option, it is probably the most economically advisable, would take the shortest time, and poses the least threat of bloodshed. I would explain that by a managed economy I mean a transition to forms and methods of economic activity ensuring the creation of a competitive economy and socially stable society. Through the clear setting of goals, the utilization of existing means and resources, the creation of a real operational economic mechanism, and reliance on high technology.

I am proposing a new cost-cutting state-corporative model of macroeconomic regulation based on national productive forces and our own material and technical resources. The blueprint has been elaborated, and a long-term economic program can be rapidly drawn up on the basis of it.

In the tactical sphere there should be the following measures. The elimination of presidential formations which duplicate government structures. The transfer of the full panoply of economic power, including noneconomic stabilizing actions, to a government accountable to the Supreme Soviet. Russia's foreign policy should be

geared exclusively to economic interests. A strict state monopoly of foreign trade should be introduced, stopping nonstate exchange and the circulation of hard currency on the internal market. All available resources should be transferred exclusively to Russian commodity producers. Commodity production should be given priority in tax and investment policy.

That is not all. I regard it as absolutely essential to call an immediate total halt to Chubays' "privatization free-for-all" and to take the activity of property committees under the control of soviets at all levels. "Uralmash" should be immediately returned to the state sector. State guarantees should be restored to the population (albeit with some delay): the right to work, education, leisure, and property. An emergency program of aid to the countryside should be adopted within a week and the harvest should be saved.

In the sphere of conversion efforts should be primarily channeled into preserving and utilizing the potential of high technologies. The question of taking beneath Russia's wing national and territorial formations that appeal for such assistance on the basis of an expression of their peoples' will should be considered.

I agree it is not easy to implement these measures. Especially as there is bound to be resistance and even opposition. There will be opposition from foreign "patrons" and local compradors. But Russia's people will support these measures.

Our country has truly unique resources, and this will totally ensure that the program is fulfilled. Suffice it to say that last year we produced per capita 3.3 times more wheat, 4.5 times more oil, 9.2 times more gas, and 3.6 times more machine-building output than the world average.

There are also plenty of financial resources. It is merely necessary to impose strict order. And to smash the artificial ruble-dollar exchange rate, thereby stopping the colossal leaks of Russia's national wealth abroad.

Tremendous damage has been inflicted on our means of production, but we still have a powerful potential making it possible to pursue an independent industrial policy.

Finally, there are society's productive forces. A way out of the impasse is possible if we gamble on the positive-active majority of the population and urban and rural commodity producers. Enterprise directors can and must do a great deal once they are no longer smashed by the oppression of the presidential team. Room will also be found in the common formation for patriotically inclined entrepreneurs.

I want to make special mention of the soviets. The president is right—they are now very different from those that once brought him to power. The last Congress of People's Deputies was a turning point. And the Supreme Soviet's decisions on Sevastopol, on corruption in the government, and on suspending Chubays' privatization demonstrate its state approach, imbued with concern for the fate of Russia. Opposition parties (and today they contain the overwhelming majority of the organized, politically active section of society) support the soviets and regard work in them as a most important task.

Yes, there are some cases of individual elected representatives of the people switching to the opposite camp. That is natural: Scum is scum. Admittedly, there is no need to regret this. And the president's team should be thanked for the fact that the country's future—young people and students, and also rectors—is joining us.

The people's patience is running out. It is time to switch from talk to specific action. We cannot fail!

Military Issues

Communications Satellite Launched 4 Aug

LD0408201493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian !450 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Moscow, 4 Aug (ITAR-TASS)—On 4 August 1993 a Molniya-3 communications satellite was launched from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome by a Molniya carrier rocket for the purposes of ensuring the operation of a long-distance telephone and telegraph radio communications system, the broadcasting of television programs to Orbita network centers, and international cooperation.

The satellite was put into a high elliptical orbit with an apogee of 39,147 km in the northern hemisphere, and perigee of 455 km in the southern hemisphere. The satellite's period of revolution is 11 hours 42 minutes, and its orbital inclination 62.7 degrees.

Communications sessions via the Molniya-3 satellite will be conducted in accordance with the scheduled program.

Kokoshkin Remarks on Research, Output Standards

PM0508101993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 93 p 1

[Russian Federation Defense Ministry Press Service report: "Conference of Military Representatives"]

[Text] On 2 August Andrey Kokoshkin, Russian Federation first deputy defense minister, held a conference with representatives of military reception agencies at Moscow and Moscow Oblast enterprises fulfilling defense orders. Colonel General Vyacheslav Mironov, Russian Federation Armed Forces chief of armaments, and representatives of the commands of all Russian Federation branches of service took part in the conference proceedings.

Opening the conference, Kokoshkin noted that in the current socioeconomic situation military representatives' role in realizing defense orders, including in providing feedback to enterprises, working out optimal pricing for defense output, etc., is increasing sharply.

Talking about other tasks facing military representatives in contemporary conditions, Kokoshkin noted the need to raise acceptance standards for scientific research work, experimental design work, and series production, and to establish control over the receipt of resources by head enterprises, their distribution among project partners, and their economic utilization.

During the session particular attention was devoted to a detailed discussion of ways of retaining the most skilled cadres at enterprises fulfilling defense orders by means of introducing the practice of concluding contracts with these enterprises on new terms.

Deputy Minister Kokoshin on New Arms Program

MK0408130593 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 4 Aug 93 p 3

[Report on "exclusive" interview with Andrey Kokoshin, Russian first deputy defense minister, by Aleksandr Stukalin; place and date not given; from the "Armaments Program Finalized" column: "Defense Ministry Thinks About the Future"]

[Text] The latest political events unfolding along the southern borders of the former USSR suggest that the thesis about the reduction of the power factor in world politics is far from unequivocal. At the same time, a major condition for maintaining the military power of Russia and the Russian Army as the chief instrument of policy from a position of strength is the constant upgrading of its armaments in line with the latest technological and scientific achievements. Recently the Russian Ministry of Defense completed the elaboration of a new long-term armaments program for the Armed Forces. Although any details about the program remain off-limits until approved by the president and the government, Andrey Kokoshin, Russian first deputy defense minister, who yesterday met to discuss these questions with military department representatives at defense-related enterprises in Moscow City and Oblast, has agreed on an exclusive basis to comment for KOMMERSANT-DAILY on its main provisions.

In conversation with KOMMERSANT-DAILY's correspondent, Andrey Kokoshin said that the preparation of the armaments program for the Russian Armed Forces has proceeded under very difficult conditions. One of the big difficulties was the analysis of cost projections for developing and producing particular types of products in the context of high inflation and the rupture of many co-production links. The labor intensity involved in preparing an armaments program has grown considerably owing to the absence of forecasts and projections on the part of relevant state bodies, and therefore on a number of parameters it has actually been drawn up in several variants.

According to Kokoshin, the program covers the period until the year 2000. On a whole number of lines, however, especially regarding capital-intensive programs with a long financing and manufacturing cycle, it is calculated until the year 2005, 2010, and even 2015. The arms program was devised with due account for the R&D and production and technological capacities of Russia's remaining military industrial potential, the changes that have occurred in economic relations among the enterprises and in their economic status, and also in accordance with the new structure of the Armed Forces themselves, which are to be based on well-equipped, highly mobile formations.

In developing the program two key factors were taken into consideration: the requisite scope [bogatstvo spektra] and the prolonged cycle of developing specific arms prototypes. The latter depends to a large extent on the systematic provision of funds. By way of example Andrey Kokoshin cited the program of adjusting the Mi-28 fire support helicopter developed by the Mil design organization. According to Kokoshin, in the event of steady allocation of funds this machine could proceed to the trial stage in the army by the end of this year. But if funds for the program are not provided on a regular basis, the trial stage would be delayed by at least a year.

From Developing New Prototypes to Expanding Possibilities of Modernization

In choosing prototypes to be used in the Armed Forces, preference will be given to products that best combine an advanced scientific and technological level with possibilities for their further upgrading. With modernization, a product's life should be at least 20 years. According to the first deputy defense minister, the above-mentioned Mi-28 combat helicopter responds to such standards.

Earlier, in developing many new types of combat equipment the prospects of its modernization were virtually ignored, and invariably only new prototypes were adopted for service. A powerful cost-intensive mechanism was at work. That situation was predetermined by the nature of the former system—each new prototype meant to its developers both new awards, bonuses, and titles and new financial injections into corresponding defense industry enterprises. At the same time, the actual needs of the main customer—the Defense Ministry and the General Staff—were far from always taken into account. As much as 80 to 85 percent of projects were financed directly from the state budget, bypassing the military department. This practice, as many experienced Defense Ministry officers note, resulted in the unwarranted duplication of programs which, moreover, extended for many years.

As of now, in accordance with the new law "On Defense," the Russian defense department has been enabled to have full control over the disposal of all funds

allocated for these purposes, including the power to determine the range and volume of military equipment and weapons to be ordered and to finance the programs for their development, serial production, and modernization. This will create a foundation to go to a new system of relations with industry and science. The creation of such a system will take several years. Much depends here also on other bodies of state administration—above all, the Ministry of Finance which is to ensure regular financing for the Defense Ministry as a state customer, and the Russian State Committee for Defense Industries. The main function of the latter, many military experts believe, should be the provision of co-production schemes among enterprises, especially in producing complicated products. Under present conditions this means in particular putting in place tough oversight controls to make sure that financial resources are used in accordance with their purpose at all stages—from prime contractor to all subcontractors (up to the third or even fourth co-production level) in order to administer the entire cycle of developing, manufacturing, operating, modernizing, and eventually disposing of weapons. The Russian Defense Ministry is now forming special program directorates, including civilian and military officials from the ministry, divisions and branches of the Armed Forces, industry and science, the Russian State Committee for Defense Industries, and other departments.

Communications and Intelligence: High Priority

Another priority in the area of military project planning will be the development of combat command communication and intelligence facilities. Assessing the situation in this respect, Andrey Kokoshin had to admit that whereas on the strategic plane command and communications were at a sufficiently high level, on the tactical plane there was considerable lagging, which considerably weakened the combat ability of the troops that have the most sophisticated combat means. This lagging has become all the more inadmissible now, when in the context of a general reduction of armed forces and armaments the task is to preserve the combat potential of troops by raising their mobility. Therefore in the near future the troops will be equipped with Arbalet and Akveduk combat command systems and new safe communication means featuring sufficient temporary reliability to conduct modern speedy combat operations.

Powerful Financial-Industrial Groups as a Guideline of Industrial Policy

In determining arms development and manufacture programs, much depends on an adequate industrial policy. And here, according to the first deputy defense minister, stress should be laid on achieving maximum returns from a minimum of enterprises engaged in defense programs. Although this approach can eventually lose many defense enterprises their state production orders, which is arousing quite a logical protest among defense industry representatives, the Russian Defense Ministry intends to place its bet primarily on the creation of powerful financial-industrial groups of arms producers. Their appearance should not only simplify administration of the industry but also result in concentration of a "critical mass" of related high technology. This would make it possible to vary within the framework of a production program of one or several enterprises the share of civilian and military production while preserving their high scientific-research and production-technological potential regardless of market fluctuations, the economic situation, and financial support for the Defense Ministry.

In support of his view, the first deputy defense minister cited the processes under way particularly in the German aerospace industry, which he had an opportunity to study closely during his recent visit to the FRG. There, within the framework of Daimler-Benz, one of the major Western concerns, a plan is being implemented to concentrate the production of technologically related science- intense aviation, missile, and space equipment. At the same time the constant strengthening of the civilian sector (Mercedes-Benz motor vehicles) and using such a giant as Deutsche Bank to finance its programs contributes to the concern's added stability in the context of market fluctuations. The introduction of this practice in Russia, according to Kokoshin, would allow above all to preserve its capacities in developing and producing especially complex technical systems which are an indicator of the level of the country's scientific potential.

Talking about the prospects of Russian banks participating in financing defense complex projects, Andrey Kokoshin stated that owing to long (between three and five years) investment payback periods in this sector, banking structures are thus far not acting along these lines. In the future, he believes, this scheme of interrelations can not be ruled out. Private capital, however, would rather operate in export and conversion programs while the prerogative to finance arms development and production projects for the needs of the Russian Army should be reserved exclusively for the Defense Ministry.

Military Trade Union To Disband After 'Hoax'

MK0308133293 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Aug 93 p 6

[Pavel Anokhin report under the "In Brief" rubric: "Military Trade Union Ends Up in Limbo"]

[Text] The Independent Trade Union of the Military that was just recently hailed in the press has turned out to be a hoax. A statement distributed to journalists says that no such union exists today and that any statement to the contrary is deluding oneself and the public, and constitutes wishful thinking. The union, created in January, 1992 for the social and legal protection of servicemen, has failed during its 18 months to win support among members of the Armed Forces. The union's heyday membership of 500 is now down to 20 or so. "The plummeted prestige of the military trade union is no accident and the fault lies primarily in a crisis among

its leaders," says Andrey Gontar, former chairman of the union's presidium. "Seven of the 11 members of the executive committee very quickly lost interest in their job and quit. The remaining union bosses who jumped on the bandwagon of servicemen's social protection were preoccupied with purely commercial affairs and pursued personal comforts, wangling apartments and plots of land for dachas. Stemming this avarice proved more than I could do, so I finally decided to quit the trade union...." The organization itself has no option but to disband.

New Multirole Su-30MK Profiled

PM0408101193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Aug 93 First Edition p 6

[Viktor Litovkin article under the rubric "Russia's New Weapons": "Three Aircraft in One"]

[Text] The new multirole Su-30MK aircraft has appeared in the "OKB Sukhogo" Aviation Scientific-Industrial Complex' family of aircraft. And, although it was included for the first time in the Russian display at the recently ended Le Bourget exhibition, the fullest description of the fighter-ground-attack aircraft has been declassified specially for IZVESTIYA.

"Our new aircraft," Mikhail Simonov, general designer at "OKB Sukhogo," told me, "is a development of the Su-27 family of aircraft, including the Su-35; it can do everything that the Su-24 does, but is far more powerful; and it carries out the same number of missions as the Su-27, but has twice the range and endurance and is 2.5 times more effective in combat. The Su-30MK is also a threat as a strike aircraft in combat zones and coastal waters, like the Su-17 fighter-bomber, but carries eight tonnes of ordnance."

If the Su-30MK is compared to similar U.S. equipment, according to specialists it can carry out on its own the roles of the E-111 bomber [as published], the F-15 fighter, the F-15E fighter-bomber, and the A-10 ground-attack aircraft. But probably the main feature of the new two-seat fighter-ground-attack aircraft is that, unlike all its competitors, it can stay airborne indefinitely. Up to 10-16 hours. This is an indispensable quality when supporting mobile forces, which can be suddenly transferred to any part of the country.

The endurance of the Su-30 is limited by the capacities of the combat pilots. Even a passenger in an ultramodern and comfortable airliner finds it hard to withstand such a long flight, not to mention the pilots of a supersonic aircraft who not only have to control it at extreme altitudes, but also have to maneuver, sharply change their flight levels, execute highly complex maneuvers demanding supreme flying skills, and engage in intensive combat with an equally well armed and trained adversary. And they also have to know how to refuel in mid-air from a heavy Il-78 tanker or another aircraft from the Su-27 family.

Admittedly, the Su-30MK's internal tanks—its designers were categorically opposed to external tanks, believing that they adversely affected the aerodynamics—are very large. On an experimental nonstop flight over a Moscow-Komsomolsk-na-Amure-Moscow circuit of 14,000 km the fighter-bomber was refueled four times. On a trip of similar length—from America to Australia—an F-18 needed to be refueled 11 times.

But apart from its excellent aerodynamic qualities—a traditional feature of Sukhoi aircraft—the main feature of the Su-30MK is its state-of-the-art armaments. Its bombsight and navigation system makes it possible to use, as specialists would say, guided precision weapons against any targets in the air, on the ground, or at sea. And over very long ranges which are out of the reach even of the Su-27 interceptor.

For instance, the Kh-59M TV-guided missile, beyond visual range after launch at more than 100 km from its mother aircraft, relays pictures to the cockpit from its homing head and can directly attack targets following a radio command from the pilot.

Our readers probably remember the TV reports from the Gulf War, when two experimental U.S. missiles were launched in turn from different aircraft. One breached the wall of an Iraqi power station, and the other flew through the hole, exploding inside the building. All the while the missiles were relaying pictures of the target to TV screens. So everything that the missiles from several U.S. aircraft did can be done by the series-produced Kh-59M missiles carried by a single Su-30MK.

Incidentally, the Kh-59M missile was developed [sozdavalas] under the leadership of Igor Seleznev, the missile's general designer, and with the participation of Viktor Galushko, project leader [rukovoditel razrabotki] on the Su-30MK.

The aircraft also carries the Kh-29T TV-guided missile.

It is entirely automatic. Such missiles are called "fire-and-forget." The pilot-operator only has to line up the crosshairs with the target in question, press the memory button, and the "smart" weapon will do the rest once it has been launched.

The Su-30MK also carries the laser-guided Kh-29L and S-29L missiles. They are launched from the aircraft but guided to the target by laser target designators carried on soldiers' backs. The soldier only has to direct the laser illuminator onto the target. Just as in the case of the "Krasnopol" artillery shell (IZVESTIYA No. 65), but the range in engaging a tank or a launch installation [puskovaya] will, of course, be greater for an aircraft than for a "Msta-S" howitzer.

We could discuss the Su-30's armaments indefinitely, if space permitted. Nonetheless, we cannot fail to mention the Kh-31P antiradar missile. It was also developed [sozdaval] by Viktor Galushko. It is able to destroy all types of medium- and longer-range surface-to-air missile

system radars on a stand-off basis [bez zakhoda samoleta v zonu ikh ognevogo protivodeystviya].

For instance, the Patriot has a range of 35 km and the Hawk a range of 70 km, but long before reaching them, the missile's on-board system determines the radar's location, enters its coordinates in its own computer, "informs" the pilot, and, on his command, heads for the target. The Kh-31P too is a "fire-and-forget" missile.

The main designer of the Su-30 is Aleksey Knyshev. Indeed, the entire Su-27 family and the first Su-30MK fighter-bomber were developed [razrabatyvalis] with his participation. Aleksey Ivanovich was born in Mogilev, studied in Kazan, worked in Komsomolsk-na-Amure, and has piloted the Su-17 and Su-22. His name has never been mentioned in the press before, and his first trip abroad was last year, when Su-27's were sold to China.

Knyshev categorically refused to be photographed for this article. This picture [article is accompanied by portrait photograph of Knyshev] was only taken with the help of the general director—Mikhail Simonov. Knyshev has no academic degrees or titles. Admittedly, the Su-27—the prototype for the Su-30MK—includes more than 500 inventions. He says that they are all collective. Perhaps they are. We have always done everything in this country in collectives, we are only now starting to recognize people's faces.

One last point. The Su-30MK will be shown to the public in flight for the first time at the "Mosaeroshow-93" exhibition in August. I know that this aircraft is a gain for air superiority and by no means the last product to come out of the Sukhoi stable. The Su-27, Su-35, and Su-30 aircraft family is growing.

Supreme Soviet

Committee Debates Access To World Space Market

PM0408181993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Aug 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Andrey Sharapov under the "Parliamentary Hearings" rubric: "Problems of Commercial Space"]

[Text] The hearings organized 3 August by the parliamentary Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations on the question of delivering Russian rocket engines to India, as was to be expected, went beyond the bounds of this narrow problem.

Theoretically speaking, apart from timber, oil, and space Russia today has nothing to sell. However, whereas in the petroleum processing sector average monthly pay is around 80,000 rubles [R], in the space complex in the second quarter it did not exceed R19,600. The peak of space funding was 1989, when R6.9 billion were channeled into it. Since then the civilian part of space orders has been reduced by 30 percent, and the military part now constitutes 30 percent. In the current year R81 billion has been set aside from the budget for space needs, but this will not cover the sector's requirements. Fixed capital worth around R90 billion is falling into disrepair, and some experimental installations which exist nowhere else in the world could be scrapped.

Space expenditure of 0.39 percent of the budget, in the opinion of Russian Space Agency representatives, is not going to ruin the country. Space is everywhere under state patronage, and even in the United States $34 billion is channeled from the budget and only $4 billion from private sources.

Commercial space can earn money by attracting Russian commercial structures, but at the moment the new enterpreneurs find themselves ill-equipped at the investment stage. Russia could earn money by offering commercial services—launches, satellites, communications—but supply exceeds demand in this market by a factor of 2.5, and no one is waiting for Russia there. For example, by the year 2000 there is expected to be a requirement for 104 satellites, of which 66 already have "owners," and to win the tender for the rest in three or four years time it is necessary to begin work right now.

However, everything is not quite so straightforward, and commercial space often runs into political barriers. The rocket technology nonproliferation regime which has been in existence since 1987 and embraces 23 countries nevertheless does not include around 22 other countries which have missile weapons. Russia's attitude to this question is closely linked to the problem of export licenses for rocket payloads. Russia has prospects, for example, in the sphere of heavy satellites, but a whole series of "accompanying" political questions require solution.

In the row over the Indian contract consideration must be given to all the diversity of contemporary politics and economics—such perhaps is the main reuslt of the hearings. In the words of representatives of the Russian Space Agency, more categorical statements on this problem are now being heard from our side than from the Indian side. Thorough, well-considered negotations are needed which allow Russia the chance to save face and the opportunity to access the world space market likewise.

Khasbulatov Seen Looking for Allies in Power Struggle

PM0408111193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Aug 93 First Edition p 4

[Sergey Chugayev commentary: "R. Khasbulatov Proposes Peace to Executive Branch of Power. On His Own Terms"]

[Text] Saturday's sitting of the extraordinary Russian Supreme Soviet session was most of all reminiscent of a test alarm that the parliamentary leadership raised to check out the reaction of the corps of deputies and the degree to which they can be kept under control. The

check clearly turned out to be a success. Despite it being the vacation season, significantly more legislators turned up in the hall than during the last session and the speaker was in complete control of the situation.

But in other respects it seems that the sitting did not fulfill the hopes either of observers or of many deputies. Of course, parliament's ratification of the president's Edict on Extending the State of Emergency in the Area of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict was an important decision, which the latest tragic events in the region confirm yet again. But on the other hand, such topical questions as the situation surrounding the money exchange and the dismissal of the security minister, which were the focus of the politicians' and the public's attention last week, were left for later—in many respects owing to the efforts of the Supreme Soviet chairman, although only the day before he had given an unambiguous hint that these particular questions would become the main topic for discussion at the extraordinary session.

The speaker's unexpected maneuver at the sitting was accompanied by a series of panic stories in the opposition press, from which it was possible to make the following deduction: The opposition really has staked a lot on A. Rutskoy and is more or less certain that the materials which the interdepartmental commission led by A. Makarov has collected could leave them empty-handed. In this respect the speaker's behavior seems to be logical. Judging by information from reliable sources, you cannot rule out the possibility that the speaker's refusal to discuss the very vexed question of the security minister's dismissal might serve as a signal for the opposition camp to stop whipping up the confrontation and participate in negotiations. It is possible that these negotiations have already begun. If this is the case, then the expected detonation of the "bombshell" on 5 August—the report of the interdepartmental commission to combat crime and corruption at the Russian Federation Security Council session—may not even take place.

However, the possible compromise between the legislative and executive branches of power is hardly capable of radically changing the balance of power that developed after parliament's routine session had completed its work and the Constitutional Conference had failed. This balance of power clearly demonstrates the seizure of the initiative by the Supreme Soviet leadership, which skillfully exploited the presidential team's mistakes and is now counting strongly on getting the political situation back to what it was on the eve of the referendum by 17 November—the opening day of the next Congress.

R. Khasbulatov was uncharacteristically taciturn at the sitting of the extraordinary session. However, it seems that this taciturnity was more than compensated for the day before during an almost hour-long television interview with the speaker, from which, in spite of his being somewhat confused, it was possible to draw fairly clear conclusions about the Supreme Soviet leadership's current position.

Just take for a start the offensive description of M. Thatcher, which attracted everybody's attention. The speaker is, of course, a hot-tempered person, who, as we know, is unrestrained in what he says. But the point is that the interview was transcribed in advance, and R. Khasbulatov had the opportunity to correct his blunders. The fact that he did not do this is evidence that the insult was no blunder. Which the speaker actually confirmed the following day by saying: "Why should I apologize about this." You should thus regard these sharp words aimed at the former British prime minister as one in a series of important and effective steps by the parliamentary leader toward the national-patriots. Nationalism, it seems, is becoming an official parliamentary ideology.

A large part of the interview was taken up by R. Khasbulatov's accusations against Vice Premier B. Fedorov. The "patriotic" ideology was also very present here. But it was noticeable that in constantly attacking the government R. Khasbulatov acts in a precise and selective manner. The objects of the speaker's attacks in the television interview were V. Yerin, B. Fedorov, S. Shakhray, V. Shumeyko, and M. Poltoranin. Perhaps only A. Chubays and A. Kozyrev are absent from this list of regular Supreme Soviet targets. So all Yeltsin's team within the government are present. At the same time you cannot help but notice that in the past months not a single blow has been aimed at V. Chernomyrdin. Also the question of the complete dismissal of the Cabinet of Ministers has not been raised. All this gives grounds to suppose that the opposition led by R. Khasbulatov is banking on a split in the government and is methodically trying to achieve its goal.

R. Khasbulatov's statements about his support for private property and farming were also curious. This would seem illogical in the light of the speaker's close ties with communist factions. Nevertheless, there is reason in these assertions. It is plain that he was doffing his cap to major political figures who unite influential forces. Most likely to Ye. Gaydar and Yu. Skokov. You can draw the following conclusion: The speaker is also looking for allies in this camp so as to prevent it uniting with "Democratic Russia" —which R. Khasbulatov clearly purposely described for the first time as the "war party." Here you can detect a harsh logic—the uniting of "Democratic Russia" with "Civic Union" and other pragmatic movements at this time could bring the country to the point of early parliamentary elections, which parliament naturally does not want.

R. Khasbulatov has also attempted to drive a wedge into the Army. His regrets over the situation in the CIS Joint Armed Forces, taking into consideration the well-known friction between this structure and the Russian Ministry of Defense, gives grounds to suppose that the parliamentary leadership has initiated active measures to neutralize the power ministries and put them under its command.

With all this as a background, R. Khasbulatov's repeated statements about "parliament holding out the olive

branch" and about his readiness to cooperate can only be read in one way: Let's work together but on the Supreme Soviet's terms and under its leadership. How else can parliament cooperate with those people who it is deeply convinced have "ruined the country"?

You can regard R. Khasbulatov's television interview as a kind of summing up of the results of the current round in the battle against the president. A round which has been a success for parliament. It has succeeded in restoring the status quo from March of this year. Its strategic aim is the same: to transfer the government to its control at the November Congress, to effectively remove the president from office, and to prevent early elections being held. This goal seems to be absolutely possible to achieve at the moment.

However, events in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict could really alter the situation.

Ambartsumov Interviewed on Parliamentary 'Purge'

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[Interview with Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet's committee on international and foreign economic relations, by Aleksey Pushkov in the "Parliament" column: "'Shooting' Postponed Until Fall"; place and date not given]

[Text] In his interview with MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Committee on International and Foreign Economic Relations, tells about the attempts to conduct a purge within the leadership of the Supreme Soviet and his relations with Ruslan Khasbulatov.

[Pushkov] Lately, the impression has been that the Supreme Soviet is preparing a serious purge at the level of committee heads. We hear that a danger is also looming over yourself, that an attempt could be made to depose you from your post by dividing your committee in two. When did this campaign begin, and does this not mean an attempt at "witch-hunting" in the Supreme Soviet so as to get rid of those people in the leadership who disagree, or potentially disagree, with its line in the face of upcoming battles with Yeltsin and the executive branch as a whole?

[Ambartsumov] The campaign began after a few members of the Supreme Soviet presidium and committee heads—eight people in all (including Stepashin, Mityukov, Podoprigora, and myself)—called on the presidium to restore collaboration with the presidential structures, with the executive branch, and above all with the president himself. After that Mityukov, head of the legislation committee, was dismissed—under the pretext of a need to divide the committee in two. Because it was difficult to criticize him on purely professional grounds, political charges were leveled against him. Similar charges were made against Sergey Kovalev. I, as well as many others, thought that this approach unfair. But our statements against this decision were very painfully received by the Supreme Soviet leadership.

True, in the week before the parliamentary recess it appeared that the campaign could have run out of steam. The Supreme Soviet moved our reports to the fall, and they were obviously going to be used in order to discharge the "maverick" committee chairmen. In the meantime, I continue to work and naturally I come into contact with the Supreme Soviet chairman. Contacts with him, however, even at a purely businesslike level, have grown more complicated.

[Pushkov] How has your relationship with Khasbulatov been proceeding until now, given that you are advocating a centrist position in the Supreme Soviet?

[Ambartsumov] It needs to be said that Khasbulatov has never been obstructing me as chairman of the International Relations Committee; moreover, he has trusted me. And until recently there have been no accusations on his part to the effect that the committee is not doing a good enough job. He has been sufficiently patient toward my numerous appeals to establish cooperation with the president. I even reminded him at one point about a children's ditty about two rams fighting each other, which ends, as you will recall, like this: "In this river early in the morning, the two rams drowned." I told Khasbulatov at the time: Well, you and Yeltsin are very much like them. It might be okay if this was your own personal business, but it is totally inadmissible to allow society to be torn apart over your personal conflicts.

Yet after the events at the constitutional conference, Ruslan Imranovich took our positions as a personal attack against himself. It was then that we began to come under fire. But if this sort of purge is conducted in parliament, all independent thinking will be destroyed and it will cease to be a parliament. This is a suicidal step, meaning the abolition of parliamentarianism as such. A parliament where unanimity reigns supreme is no parliament; this is a return to the Stalin-type soviets when everyone automatically raised his hand to vote in support of any proposal from the leadership.

[Pushkov] You say that the campaign has subsided. Here, however, is an article from a recent issue of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, which is considered to be an organ of the Supreme Soviet, or, to put it simply, of Khasbulatov. This article, under the title of "Powerlessness," contains unprecedented sharp criticism of you personally and the performance by your committee. Is this a new spiral or an echo of the abating campaign?

[Ambartsumov] I should like to hope the latter. As for the article, first of all it is rude, and second, utterly mendacious. For example, it starts off with charges that the committee allegedly failed to deal with the well-known rocket engine agreement with India. This does not correspond to reality. As soon as we learned that a decision was made to cancel the agreement, we held a

committee session on the same day inviting Yuriy Koptev, head of the Russian Space Agency; Dunayev, former deputy general machine-building industry minister, who had signed the agreement with India; and a number of other people. We immediately went into that matter and we continue to investigate it now—jointly with the information provision committee, with a proposal that the Supreme Soviet adopt a resolution on the need to ratify the agreements bearing on missile technology and procedures for their termination.

As can be seen from the article, it was obviously timed to coincide with my report. All the arguments in it were borrowed from Khasbulatov's recent article in PRAVDA. It accused the committees on defense and on international relations of unprofessionalism, claiming that they had become appendages of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although if, for instance, we look at the situation on sanctions against Yugoslavia, the Foreign Ministry has actually revised its position under our influence.

[Pushkov] The speaker is known to have made repeated calls for Kozyrev's resignation. How big are the differences between Khasbulatov and Yeltsin in foreign politics?

[Ambartsumov] I cannot say that Khasbulatov particularly focuses on international problems, although he does show an interest in them. In the course of his foreign trips, in which I took part, he did not deviate from the state's foreign policy line. And I do not think he is unduly worried by Kozyrev himself. To him, this is an element of a political struggle, a bargaining chip in his fight with the executive branch. Generally speaking, he is rather cautious with respect to foreign political actions. For example, when the issue of Sevastopol was put to a vote, Khasbulatov proposed a moderate draft resolution, suggesting there should be talks with Ukraine, and it did not contain any objectionable provisions.

[Pushkov] Nonetheless, Khasbulatov's recent visit as head of a parliamentary delegation to the Council of Europe was marked by some gaffes.

[Ambartsumov] It is difficult to talk about it because I was not there. I learned that Khasbulatov was going there quite by chance; he did not consult me. I think that the trip was not sufficiently well organized. As for his visits to Arab countries, to Israel, Spain and Greece, he demonstrated composure and circumspection. With the exception of one instance, when both sides initiated a practice of which I do not particularly approve—the practice of using foreign partners as referees or arbiters in our internal political divisions.

[Pushkov] In this respect, the consideration of the Sevastopol issue by the UN Security Council is very indicative.

[Ambartsumov] Yes, I immediately stated at that moment that such things are inadmissible. The Supreme Soviet's resolution could be controversial, one could disagree with it, but the UN Security Council must not be turned into an arena for settling our internal political problems. This is humiliating to the state as a whole. And I am amazed that Yuliy Vorontsov—and I know him very well, he is a brilliant diplomat—who was definitely in a position to have that question taken off the Security Council agenda, nonetheless allowed it to be included and blown up; and the Council chairman—an Englishman—then began to sort out our domestic problems.

But I must say that Khasbulatov did the same during his meeting with German parliamentarians, which I attended. Although he was more discreet with foreigners than with his countrymen, so to speak, he started criticizing President Yeltsin during his conversation with them. I told him firmly at the time that such things are inadmissible for any side.

[Pushkov] It is being rumored that Khasbulatov is interested in the position of foreign minister....

[Ambartsumov] I do not think that Ruslan Imranovich is a man who sees himself serving anybody or following anyone's instructions. Moreover, I do not have the impression that he considers himself an expert on international matters. On balance, he is an intelligent and fast-moving man, of course—there is no doubt—but at the same time, he is too egocentric. He views the world exclusively through his own prism and he unduly personifies relationships. Yet he is a statesman, not just head of a clan. One cannot possibly select cadres depending on personal relationships.

[Pushkov] But Yeltsin often does the same.

[Ambartsumov] And this is why I say that they are very much alike.

[Pushkov] What is your forecast: Can the witch-hunting resume in the Supreme Soviet this fall as political struggles grow more acute?

[Ambartsumov] Yes, it can, although that would be very sad. For instance, I myself or Stepashin could fall victim to it. I am no expert on defense, of course, but it seems to me that Stepashin is undoubtedly a professional and it would be absurd to force him to join the presidential structure. Of course, he will find a place there, but his experience and efforts are very useful in the Supreme Soviet.

This would mostly depend on whether the president and parliament find a way to collaborate. At the same time, Ruslan Imranovich is a man with a malevolent memory, although this is not useful for a political figure. He may keep his attitude toward many Supreme Soviet members and start implementing it in any case. Let us hope this does not happen. I would very much hate tomorrow to hear some people say with joy and some with bitterness: Khasbulatov is today's Stalin.

Appeal on Ossetia, Ingushetia Published

PM0508112593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Aug 93 First Edition p 2

["Appeal No. 5594-1 of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet to the Peoples of the North Ossetian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Republic of Ingushetia," dated Moscow, the Russian House of Soviets, 31 July 1993]

[Text] Dear compatriots! Esteemed citizens of North Ossetia and Ingushetia!

The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet is deeply concerned as a result of the lack of any real results in dealing with the consequences of the tragic events that have taken place between the neighboring peoples of the Republic of Ingushetia and the North Ossetian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

We cannot fail to note that despite all efforts by the federal organs of state power and administration, attempts to extinguish the flame of military conflict have only been partially successful and it has not been possible to eliminate its causes entirely. Talks between the two sides to settle the conflict are proceeding slowly and painfully. There has been practically no appreciable progress in resolving key problems—the problem of refugees and the problem of disarming illegal formations.

If events continue to develop in this manner, it could lead to further bloodshed, to new tragedy for these neighboring peoples and new upheavals all over the North Caucasus, and this in turn could destabilize the situation all over the Russian Federation. Which means that everything positive that has been achieved at great hardship through the efforts of the federal organs of state authority and administration, social and religious organizations, and national movements in the matter of settling the Ingush-Ossetian conflict will collapse. This cannot be allowed to happen.

The most important thing at the present time is unconditional implementation of the decisions of the Seventh Congress of Russian Federation People's Deputies, Russian Federation laws, edicts issued by the Russian Federation president, and decrees of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government designed to settle the Ingush-Ossetian conflict and deal with its tragic consequences, and the agreements reached during talks in the city of Kislovodsk between the official delegations of the Republic of Ingushetia and the North Ossetian SSR.

The consistent and full implementation of pledges made by the federal center, including financial and material assistance for the provision of facilities for refugees and all those who have suffered as a result of the conflict, is of vital importance.

The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet believes that the Russian Federation president and the Russian Federation Government should apply the full force of the law to implement all the decisions that have been adopted to ensure law and order and defend the population's security. For its part, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet is ready to assist in this work to the best of its ability.

We urge the leaders of the Republic of Ingushetia and the North Ossetian SSR, all organs of state power and administration, all national movements, and social and religious organizations in both republics to do everything they can to unconditionally fulfill the commitments they have made in order to achieve interethnic peace and civil accord and restore good-neighborly relations between the Ingush and Ossetian peoples.

The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet expresses its firm conviction that the Ossetian and Ingush peoples will fully display their inherent wisdom, reasonableness, and lofty sense of historical responsibility during this extremely dramatic period. The very existence and successful development of the peoples of North Ossetia and Ingushetia, and of the other peoples of the North Caucasus and the entire Russian Federation, is only possible in conditions of peace, harmony, and mutual respect.

[Signed] The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet
Moscow
The Russian House of Soviets
[Dated] 31 July 1993
No. 5594-1

Decree on Financing of Conversion, Investment Programs

PM0508081993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Aug 93 First Edition p 5

[Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decree No. 5510-1 of 23 July 1993 signed by R.I. Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet: "On Progress in Implementing the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decrees 'On Granting Credits to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government for Conversion and Investment Programs in the Second Quarter of 1993' dated 2 June 1993 and 'On the Financing of State Spending Out of the Russian Federation Republic Budget in the Third Quarter of 1993' dated 1 July 1993"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet notes that, in accordance with the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decree "On Granting Credits to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government for Conversion and Investment Programs in the Second Quarter of 1993" dated 2 June 1993, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation concluded credit agreements 28 and 30 June 1993 with the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance on the granting of bank credits of 300 billion rubles [R] to finance conversion programs for the defense industry, and of R400 billion to finance investment programs. These credit resources totaling R700 billion were deposited in especially designated accounts of the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance bank account. But as of 23 July 1993 these funds had not been

moved, and the financing of conversion and investment programs by the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance had still not gone ahead.

The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decree "On the Financing of State Spending Out of the Russian Federation Republic Budget in the Third Quarter of 1993" dated 1 July 1993 is not being implemented in full.

The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decrees that:

1. The attention of V.S. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government, shall be drawn to the unsatisfactory work of the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance in implementing the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decrees "On Granting Credits to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government for Conversion and Investment Programs in the Second Quarter of 1993" dated 2 June 1993 and "On the Financing of State Spending Out of the Russian Federation Republic Budget in the Third Quarter of 1993" dated 1 July 1993.

2. The Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government shall take measures to urgently carry out the financing envisaged by the aforesaid decrees.

3. The Central Bank of the Russian Federation, in conjunction with the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, shall clarify before 1 August 1993 the procedure for the granting and utilization of credits to finance state spending from the Russian Federation republic budget on the basis of the need to ensure guarantees for the targeted and effective utilization and repayment of these credits.

4. The Russian Federation General Prosecutor's Office, the Russian Federation Ministry of Security, and the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs shall be instructed to verify the facts of the distribution and utilization of the credits allocated to the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, including via the Finance Corporation, whether the aforesaid credits correspond to legislation, and the facts of their distribution and utilization.

5. The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Republic Commission for the Budget, Plans, Taxes, and Prices, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Republic Commission for Economic Reform, and the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for Legality, Law and Order, and the Struggle Against Crime shall be charged with monitoring the fulfillment of this decree.

[Signed] R.I. Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet

[Dated] Moscow, House of the Soviets of Russia, 23 July 1993

Regional Affairs

Meetings Held in North Ossetia To Examine Conflict

LD0408131393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1135 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz, 4 Aug—Colonel General Yuriy Shatalin, head of the interim administration in the limited area of Ingushetia and North Ossetia where state of emergency regulations are in force, believes that there will be no peace in the region unless refugees are returned to their ethnic communities. Strong-arm methods cannot be used to settle ethnic issues. In his words, the only way lies through talks and mutual compromise.

Defining the aim of a trilateral meeting of the joint commission, held today in the town of Terek in the Republic of Kabarda-Balkaria and attended by representatives from Dagestan and Stavropol kray acting as mediators, Shatalin said that it is to give an impetus to continuation of dialogue between North Ossetia and Ingushetia and to a search for peace and accord between them. The meeting examined the issues related to a comprehensive solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons. Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray took part in the work of the commission.

Another meeting, this time at the North Ossetian Supreme Soviet, focused on the sociopolitical and operational conditions in the region, as well as on the ways out of the complex situation in view of the joint appeal to the people of North Ossetia and Ingushetia by President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Taking part in the meeting were Akhsarbek Galazov, head of the North Ossetian parliament; members of the republic's Security Council; Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray; Anatoliy Anikiyev, deputy chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet; and Yuriy Shatalin, head of the interim administration.

According to data of the North Ossetian Security Council, the situation in the part of the republic where state of emergency regulations are in force has not undergone any significant changes. The Russian peacekeeping forces are in control of the situation and continue to carry out their task to ensure the observance of state of emergency regulations. No exchanges of fire or attacks on militia and army checkpoints have been reported in the last 24 hours.

Ingush Involvement in Polyanichko Murder Disputed

MK0408101293 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Aug 93 p 1,3

[Natalya Pachegina report under the "North Caucasus" rubric: "Everyone Wants To Find Viktor Polyanichko's Murderer. Talks About Refugees Continue"]

[Text] Yesterday's visit to Nazran by Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray and General Colonel Shatalin, chief of the provisional administration, was interpreted here as a sign of trust in the Ingush people. The high-ranking Russian official's intention to devote attention to the conflict-torn region arouses hopes for a definitive settlement. Both Nazran and Vladikavkaz equally seem to cherish these hopes. The meeting of the deputy prime minister and the provisional administration chief with leaders of the Ingush Republic almost immediately after the Ingush People's Congress held on 31 July appears to have prompted some adjustments in the Ingush authorities' policy vis-a-vis Moscow. Khusseyn Barakhoyev, the Ingush president's press secretary, observed that a referendum on Ingush republic secession from the Russian Federation, which was called by the congress, may be removed from the agenda altogether if "the patient Ingush people, nine months after the bloodshed in Prigorodnyy Rayon, sense a genuine interest on the part of the Russian authorities in resolving the problems of the Ingush." Nazran sees a sign of this "genuine interest" in Sergey Shakhray's pronouncements that the negotiating process between the Ingush Republic and North Ossetia, which started in February, will continue despite any obstacles, including the tragic event of the day before yesterday in Tatarskiy—the assassination of Provisional Administration Chief Viktor Polyanichko. On 4 August, officials from Ingushetia, North Ossetia, and the Provisional Administration will set out for Terek (Kabardino-Balkaria) to resume negotiations on the return of refugees and forcefully resettled people.

The Ingush Security Ministry has expressed its protest against the theory whereby Polyanichko, Koretskiy, and Kravchuk were allegedly killed by the Ingush. On the contrary, as the Ingush Security Ministry's official statement points out, Polyanichko's short spell as provisional administration chief inspired hopes among the Ingush people that "the objective information coming from the state of emergency area through the provisional administration chief to the Russian Federation president and the Council of Ministers chairman" was about to change drastically the situation of tens of thousands of Ingush refugees. Ingush Security Minister Magomed Aushev (as for the minister's name, Barakhoyev remarked that there are as many Aushevs in Ingushetia as there are Ivanovs in Russia), reiterating the Ingush side's former demands that illegal armed formations operating in North Ossetia be dissolved, surmised that the crime in Tatarskiy was likely to have been perpetrated by a unit of the North Ossetian National Guard called "the Lion" [Lev], which controls a significant part of Vladikavkaz and Prigorodnyy Rayon. Indirect evidence in support of this theory (what Nazran sees as a strange appearance of Bibo Dzutsev, a National Guard commander, at the assassination site just ten minutes after Polyanichko's car was fired upon, and cartridge cases and machine gun discs found there by the Russian investigation group) flatly disprove the report carried by the Russian mass media that the assassins were a group of horsemen, who escaped to Ingushetia. Helicopters, which took off ten minutes after the attack following an alert, could not trace any horsemen trying to cross the Ingush border. According to the Ingush side, the information about the tragedy in Tatarskiy carried by the Russian press and television was provided by the North Ossetian Security Ministry.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has learned that North Ossetian Security Minister Yuriy Bzayev, claimed by Nazran to be the author of the slanderous theory, is attending a meeting of the republic's Security Council. The meeting is expected to devise specific measures to detect and detain those responsible for the deaths of Polyanichko, Koretskiy, and Kravchuk.

Official Version of Polyanichko Assassination Refuted

MK0408095793 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 4 Aug 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "That Was Not How the Deputy Prime Minister Was Killed"]

[Text] MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS has learned the circumstances of the assassination of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Polyanichko, completely refuting the official version.

First of all there was no question of any sudden change of route. From the village of Tarskoye to the settlement of Yuzhnoye, there is only one road. Second, there were no escorting armored vehicles. In early June, Anatoliy Koretskiy, commander of the Vladikavkaz garrison, persuaded the head of the interim administration that there was no longer any need for protection by armored personnel carriers. Moreover, discipline among the soldiers guarding top officials had allegedly slackened. With that order, Anatoliy Koretskiy planted a time bomb under himself.

He and Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Polyanichko were guarded by four officers from a special training center of the Alfa brigade, Yekaterinburg Division. Two of them—the driver and the security chief—were sitting in front and were killed along with the interim administration head and garrison commander. The other two, who were following the Volga saloon in a UAZ jeep, were wounded, and turned and fled the scene without returning fire.

Investigation Not Being Conducted 'Energetically'

MK0408095693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Aug 93 p 3

[Unattributed NEGA report under "North Ossetia" rubric]

[Text] "Someone does not want the conflict between Ingushetiya and North Ossetia to be resolved."

This was stated by two high-placed officers who wished to remain anonymous: one, a representative of the

Russian troops stationed in North Ossetia, the other, a Russian Security Ministry officer. According to them, the investigation of the assassination of Viktor Polyanichko, head of the interim administration in the area where a state of emergency was introduced, could also have proceeded much more energetically "had Sergey Shakhray, first deputy prime minister and chairman of the Russian State Committee for Nationalities, and the investigating team sent to North Ossetia so wished." According to the officers, however, there is no such desire, judging by their actions and statements, in particular those by S. Shakhray, who said on arrival that he was planning to stay there for only a few days. "In fact, it is not difficult to find out who is hiding in the forests. We thought that we would now be given a free hand, but there have been no orders or instructions," the Russian officers said.

Polyanichko Interview Carried Posthumously

PM0408145393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 93 p 1

[Interview with Viktor Polyanichko, former head of the Interim Administration on the territory of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict, by Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Pryganov, "especially for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA," on 31 July; place not given: "Viktor Polyanichko: While I Am Here, There Will Be No War"]

[Excerpts] This interview was given to our newspaper by the head of the Interim Administration on the territory of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict literally the day before his tragic death. [passage omitted]

[Pryganov] Do you have a plan for settling the Ossetian-Ingush conflict?

[Polyanichko] Until quite recently we simply did not study conflicts. There were simply no antagonistic contradictions in our society then, nor could there be, according to official propaganda. We lived, as it were, without problems, and were thus simply ill-prepared to settle inter-nation and interethnic conflicts—and there have been around 20 of them on the territory of the former USSR in recent years alone.

I have no ready-made prescriptions for resolving the Ossetian-Ingush conflict. Not could there be any, because extreme situations require a differentiated approach. And you can hardly apply previously developed peacemaking models to the conflict on the territories of North Ossetia and Ingushetia. That is why I want first of all to get to grips with the crux of the conflict on the spot.

I regard every conflict as a Moloch with its own unique, specific characteristics, and the kind of extraordinary person capable of working out a scheme for its solution on his own is unlikely to be found. But, by the strictest criteria, science—conflict studies, which enable you to produce several possible solutions in such complex situations—is essential. In this instance, however, we do not yet have any alternative to the thesis which argues the impossibility of Ossetian-Ingush coexistence. And in this context I insisted that conflict specialists from the Russian Federation, North Ossetia, and Ingushetia be included on the Interim Administration staff.

[Pryganov] The mass media have frequently described you as an advocate of tough, strong-arm methods. Is that your style?

[Polyanichko] Yes, such methods could also be used, but only to protect people, and only in strict compliance with the law. Extremists, people who foment interethnic strife and attack the policy of interethnic reconciliation, should be their sole target. But I, no matter how it might be there, seek ways of securing a peaceful settlement, I believe in the force of people's diplomacy. We can see the results today of the "surfeit" of strong-arm methods. I would stress once again that they must never be used against people who have already suffered and who are now in danger. Reliance on people's diplomacy and the sagacity of the peoples are my "strong-arm policy." I can assure you that not one shot will be fired and no innocent blood will be shed in the conflict area on my orders. While I am here there will be no war.

And another thing, I think it time the sides in conflict gave up their "leave-it-to-others mentality." It is naive to imagine that problems in relations between the two peoples are going to be solved by the Russian leadership.

[Pryganov] And how do you see the role of the peacemaking forces in the state of emergency area—the units of the Russian Army, internal troops, and militia?

[Polyanichko] The role of the power structures is to draw a dividing line between the contesting sides, population centers, and streets. This "division" line, you will agree, does have its own logic. However, I am ultimately a proponent of the logic of unification and I appeal to people, to that end, to display reason and commonsense. At the same time I do not regard the Armed Forces as the sole force restraining the opposing sides. I am convinced that the Ossetian and Ingush peoples have grown much wiser, experienced, and restrained over the last eight months. And the leadership of the two republics is no longer the same as it was last October. And on the whole relations are not the same either. People here are well aware who has killed whom and who has burned down whose house. It is natural that hatred persist on a personal level, but it is no longer nationwide in character.

[Pryganov] How would you, then, define the key problem of the conflict?

[Polyanichko] In my view, it is the provision of facilities for refugees and evacuees. They now number around 100,000 throughout the territories of North Ossetia and Ingushetia. During the eight months of armed conflict not a single house or apartment has been built for them, because of the lack of resources for those purposes in the national and republic budgets.

I should like to take this opportunity to appeal through your newspaper to businessmen, private entrepreneurs, the heads of administration of krays and oblast, and the leaders of industrial and agricultural enterprises of the Russian Federation, the Russian public, and all people of good will to help provide facilities for refugees and evacuees currently on the territory of North Ossetia and Ingushetia. They need food, medicine, and clothing. All help will be gratefully received. For those wishing to help I will give the number of the account in the bank of the city of Vladikavkaz and the address of the Interim Administration. Funds marked "Refugee Aid Fund" should be sent to Account No. 216120633, RKTs N.V. [expansion unknown]; parcels should be sent to the following address: Interim Administration, Vladikavkaz, 362006, North Ossetian SSR.

Armed Attacks Reported on North Ossetian-Ingush Border

LD0408181293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1754 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz August 4 TASS—The situation in North Ossetia's districts bordering on Ingushetia has become aggravated. A group of armed bandits attacked civilians mowing grass on hill slopes near the Ossetian village Sunzha in the Prigorodnyy District at about 14:10 on Wednesday [4 August].

Witnesses told TASS that a helicopter without identification marks appeared from the direction of the Ingush village of Ali-Yurt and flew around local hills. Then an armed group of unidentified persons turned up from behind a wooded hill, who opened fire from automatic weapons, killing a 20-year-old villager, Aslan Tigiyev. His uncle, Valik Tigiyev, and another refugee were badly wounded. The attackers also set on fire a Uaz car and fled for the Ingush border.

In protest against the action, villagers from North Ossetia's Prigorodnyy District came to the capital Vladikavkaz, carrying the body of the killed man and demanding for a meeting with Sergey Shakhray, Yuriy Shatalin and the republic's leadership. They also demanded that the authorities ensure the safety of North Ossetian civilians.

Chechen Fighting Continues; Accord Reached on Hostages

LD0408125693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1100 GMT 4 Aug 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer Tatyana Komarova] Armed clashes between government troops and the opposition detachments, which declared that the rayon would not bow to official threats, continue in Nadterechnyy rayon in Chechnya. (Zavgayev), the former communist leader of Chechen-Ingushetia, has appealed to self-defense detachments to respond with adequate measures to stop aggression from the side of President Dudayev's supporters.

ITAR-TASS reports that by morning skirmishes stopped. The sides are holding talks with the participation of a representative of the Chechen National Security Service and the mayor of Nadterechnyy rayon. There is information that an accord on exchange of hostages has already been reached.

Efforts Under Way To Halt Clashes

LD0408203193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1950 GMT 4 Aug 93

[by ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[Text] Groznyy August 4 TASS—The skirmishes ceased today near the Chechen village of Ken-Yurt where government troops clashed on Tuesday [3 August] with rebel armed formations from the Nadterechny district. Since Wednesday morning, the confronting sides have been negotiating with the participation of the Chechen National Security Service Chief, Salman Khasimikov, and the Nadterechny District's Mayor, Umar Avturkhanov. According to some information, the parties to the talks have already reached an understanding on exchanging hostages.

The conflict, which claimed four lives, flared up on the night from Saturday to Sunday. Officers of the public order department were rounding up Chechen villages in search for illegally stored weapons, but met with resistance from the Ken-Yurt residents, who seized hostages three policemen [sentence as received]. On the night from Monday to Tuesday, Chechnya's law and order forces made an attempt to release the hostages, but faced well-organized defence.

Some of Chechen governmental officials maintain that the Nadterechny district forces were backed by Russian snipers, military specialists and special agents. Furthermore, the leaders of the Chechen border and customs service informed the Chechen president that Russian military trucks, supposedly loaded with weapons, were noticed on Tuesday moving from the Stavropol territory towards the district center of Znamenskoye.

The mayor of the rebel Nadterechny district flatly dismissed the treatment of the events as it was presented by Groznyy. "We do not want to wage war with anyone, but we shall be able to stand up for ourselves," he told TASS by the phone. The Council of Chechen Elders met in Groznyy on Wednesday morning to discuss the best possible ways to settle the conflict between Chechnya's official authorities and the leaders of the Nadterechny district.

Further on Battle of Kursk 50th Anniversary

Yeltsin, Khasbulatov Visit

PM0508102193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 93 p 1

[Yuriy Rubtsov report: "The Lessons of the Battle of Kursk: Only Foresight, Unity, and Courage Brought Victory"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] As RIA reports, Russian President Boris Yeltsin plans to visit the city of Orel and Orel Oblast on 4 August. This trip is directly related to the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk. Boris Yeltsin will take part in various events marking this most important date in the history of the Great Patriotic War: He will meet with war veterans and address ceremonial assemblies.

During the course of Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov's working visit to Orel, Belgororod, Voronezh, and Vitebsk Oblasts, which began 2 August, the head of parliament will also take part in ceremonies. He plans to meet with the public, war veterans, and officers and cadets of the government communications military institute in Orel, to visit the "Orel Offensive Operation" diorama, and to lay wreaths on the memorial to tank crews.

We have information that the country's Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy, Constitutional Court Chairman Valeriy Zorkin, and Oleg Soskovets, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers, will also be taking part in ceremonies on the soil where the battle was fought half a century ago. Representative deputations are being sent to Kursk, Orel, and Belgorod by the Ministry of Defense.

Of course, like any event, it is impossible to see the celebration of the jubilee of the Battle of Kursk outside the context of the current confrontation between different political forces and between the branches of power in the country. And it cannot be ruled out at all that the top political leaders plan during these trips to consolidate their positions in this struggle and to assume the mantle of trust of the population of the region and the war veterans who will assemble there from all corners of the country.

There is hope, however, that here, on the site of that awesome battle, beneath the invisible gaze of the almost 900,000 who died, one simple truth will appear before our leaders in all its magnitude, namely the truth that our society and our people need stability and consensus among the various forces in order to finally overcome the crisis and reform Russia. The ceremonies should therefore in that sense become a kind of moment of truth for all Russians.

There is in fact a whole host of practical work to do just in connection with the half-century jubilees of the main events of the Great Patriotic War: Writing a true history of the war; building a Great Victory Monument; compiling an all-Russia roll of honor—a Memorial Book; and providing a fitting resting place for all who died.

The survivors of those battles should not be forgotten either. It is good that the administrations of Kursk, Orel, and Belgorod Oblasts and other regions of the country have found and are still finding opportunities to help frontline soldiers materially. But, first, no one must be neglected or offended; and, second, care and concern for those to whom we owe our lives cannot be one-shot incidents. That would seem to be understandable by all, but how many poverty-stricken old people we see around us. Half a century ago they blocked the enemy's path and defended the country. And they are entitled to expect to be defended against life's adversities today.

Neither they, nor all the Russians who hope that a Battle of Kursk—a breakthrough to better times—is taking place in our lives today, must be deceived.

Soskovets Scolds Ukraine

LD0408161093 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1336 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Passages within quotation marks recorded]

[Excerpts] Let us return to the 50th anniversary of the great victory at the Kursk Bulge. Our correspondent Grigoriy Tarasov reports on the celebrations and meetings in Belgorod:

[Tarasov] The streets of Belgorod are crowded at the moment. The celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Battle of Kursk are in full swing. [passage omitted]

Ruslan Khasbulatov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, is also attending the celebrations. This morning he met the cereal farmers and animal husbandry workers of the Frunze collective farm in Belgorodskiy rayon. Judging by what he had to say, he was left with a satisfactory impression of their work. He ought to be! This is the best collective farm in the oblast. Thanks to its chairman, Gorin, it has managed to keep its specialized role and to maintain a high level of production.

During the afternoon, the parliamentary speaker met veterans, chairmen of town and district Soviets, and heads of local administrations. Referring to the relationship between the executive and legislative branches, he said:

[Khasbulatov] "Some people claim that there is some kind of conflict under way. We are not involved in any conflicts. No conflicts are under way. What are they talking about then? This talk of conflicts refers to the fact that one side is striving to get rid of the Soviets altogether, to eliminate them completely. Naturally I, as chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and the majority in the Supreme Soviet are saying that the country has a constitution and it should be observed. Can you really call it a conflict if we squabble over something? No, this must be

understood—and the people are coming to understand this quite well. Unfortunately more important things are being forgotten because of this skirmishing, which our society certainly does not need."

[Tarasov] Referring to the future of the Soviets, the parliamentary speaker said:

[Khasbulatov] "Without trying to score any political points, let me express my absolute conviction that the system of Soviets must not just be preserved but must be strengthened. Anybody who opposes this system must disappear from the political scene in the Russian Federation."

[Tarasov] Russia's First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets, who was also in Belgorod today, met heads of the town's industrial enterprises and called for the introduction of clearing settlements in trade with Ukraine. Russian energy resources should be exchanged for equipment manufactured in Ukraine for the power engineering industry, he said. He made this proposal after Belgorod industrialists complained that there has been a considerable reduction in deliveries of pipes and equipment for local enterprises which produce equipment for power stations. Oleg Soskovets said that Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma is telephoning him and Council of Ministers Chairman Viktor Chernomyrdin almost every day, asking Russia to supply Ukraine with oil and petroleum products for harvest operations. But Kiev does not want these supplies to increase Ukraine's state debt. We are supplying Ukraine with oil and petroleum products for almost nothing. Since the beginning of the year it has paid only 18 percent of what it owes for them, Oleg Soskovets said.

Yeltsin Cited on Border Situation

LD0408153193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1431 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondents Lyudmila Aleksandrova, Oleg Velichko, Yuriy Likhopek]

[Text] Orel, 4 Aug—In his speech at a meeting to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Orel-Kursk Battle, the Russian president dwelled on the problem of the so-called "hot spots." Russian citizens continue to die in the conflict zones, Boris Yeltsin said. Particular concern today is aroused by the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush confrontation.

The recent events connected with the death of Russian border troops and also of Viktor Polyanichko, head of the temporary administration, show how highly acute these crises are, the president said. "We have made it a rule to call strictly to account those leaders whose work leads to such tragic consequences. We shall follow this rule rigorously," Yeltsin declared.

Evidence of this, according to Yeltsin, can be found in the latest changes in the leadership of the border troops and also in the Ministry of Security. "We shall defend our people with the whole might of the Russian state, the president declared. In this matter we have sometimes taken up a timid attitude, and the incorrectness of that is now evident."

The complex situation along the perimeter of the Russian borders illustrates in the best possible way the harmfulness for the security of Russia and for internal tranquillity of the confrontation which still exists in the echelons of Russian power, Yeltsin emphasized in conclusion.

Parliament 'Guarantor of Democracy'

LD0408191293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1815 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Filippov]

[Text] Belgorod August 4 TASS—No one in the world needs a strong Russia, except Russians themselves, Russian parliament Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov said.

Speaking at a meeting in Belgorod devoted to the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk in the Second World war in the summer of 1943, Khasbulatov said that "the great power rose in the summer of 1943 through its own strength. It made many foreign leaders to look at itself differently."

Speaking about the present day situation in Russia, the speaker said that "the main guarantor of democracy in the country is the Russian Parliament." He believes that the system of soviets can guarantee real protection of the interests of Russian people.

Khasbulatov is expected to meet with the leaders of the Belgorod and other Russian regions later on Wednesday.

Khasbulatov on Economic Reform

PM0508094793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Aug 93 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report under the general heading "Boris Yeltsin and Ruslan Khasbulatov Visit Kursk Bulge Region"]

[Text] As has already been reported, Ruslan Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, was in Orel Oblast 2-3 August. On day two of his visit to the Orel area he visited the "Dormashina" Association.

The line of economic reforms similar to that currently being implemented in Russia has not succeeded in a single country, Ruslan Khasbulatov stated in a speech to the Orel City and Oblast aktiv. He stressed the urgent need for the country to introduce market relations. At the same time, the speaker of parliament noted that the state should safeguard the interests of all its citizens, including through democratic institutions—particularly the soviets. He noted in particular the pernicious nature

of the accelerated pace of privatization and stated that the "attempts to Americanize or Latin-Americanize the country" are leading nowhere. At the same time, he noted, neither the president nor the government realize this.

Talking about domestic political problems, Ruslan Khasbulatov noted that parliament intends to "step up its constitutional controls over the actions of the executive." At the same time, he noted that the latter, not wanting to come to terms with this position, has imposed constitutional confrontation on the Supreme Soviet.

Outlining his vision of the political future in Russia, Ruslan Khasbulatov spoke of the "need for a very strong, cohesive government of national consensus," which would not be at war with its people and parliament but would act in harmony with national interests. The speaker of parliament also noted that such a government could end the conflicts flaring up on the outskirts of Russia.

Touching on the country's position in the international arena, Ruslan Khasbulatov noted the appearance of "leaders in other countries who are dreaming of dismembering the Russian Federation." "They hate parliament for not letting them do so," the chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet said. He stated that the country's unity would be preserved. But, to this end, it is exceptionally important to instill in people the belief that the only path of transformation possible for the country is one which will lead it to success.

If the financial and credit policy being pursued by the current Russian Government is continued, Russia will soon be unable to count on a highly skilled, well-equipped army. Ruslan Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, addressed those words to officers and students at the Military Institute of Government Communications, which he visited in the afternoon. Ruslan Khasbulatov noted that the recession and economic crisis impose a particularly heavy burden on military communications personnel, who until recently had used the best products manufactured by the Russian military-industrial complex.

The meeting participants expressed dissatisfaction at the way in which the Army's social problems are being resolved. In Ruslan Khasbulatov's opinion, a considerable contribution to this is being made by the "unsatisfactory work of the Russian Federation Government."

Answering a question about his relationship with the Russian Federation president, Ruslan Khasbulatov said that compromise between them is possible only if Boris Yeltsin abandons his attempts to "sweep away the representative authorities and become a one-man dictator."

Congratulating those present on the anniversary of the Soviet Army's glorious victory at the Orel-Kursk Bulge, Ruslan Khasbulatov assured them that the "policy of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet will remain firm and unshakable for the sake of the prosperity and preservation of the state."

The same day Ruslan Khasbulatov visited the "Orel Offensive Operation" diorama and laid a wreath at the monument to tank troops in Orel. This was followed by a meeting with the city's leaders behind closed doors.

Chelyabinsk Town Council Supports 'South Urals Republic'

LD0508105493 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0800 GMT 5 Aug 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The Chelyabinsk town council has decided to support the initiative of people's deputies to change the oblast into the South Urals Republic [Yuzhno-Uralskaya Respublika] within the Russian Federation and to build relations with the Federation on the basis of a special treaty.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Sergey Sergeyev] This decision was made following the failure of the idea of the territorial division of Russia into provinces put forward during the Constitutional Conference in Moscow. Chelyabinsk deputies think that their oblast, which boasts as great an economic potential as any in Russia, should have equal rights with the republics which form part of the Federation.

[A.A. Nacharov, acting chairman of the oblast soviet] The principle is this: political independence to some degree, to some degree, combined with social and economic independence. I do not think Russia will disintegrate because of the oblast's independence. However, if we take an in-depth look here and see that it will not yield anything, that it will not improve the situation of Russia, and that it will not improve the situation in which the oblast's population is finding itself, we will, of course, never take this step.

[Sergeyev] Over the next few days sociologists will begin to study the attitude of the Chelyabinsk people toward the idea of turning the oblast into a republic. The decision to set up a South Urals Republic has given rise to a sharply critical reaction on the part of the coordinating council in charge of the intraregional policy attached to the oblast administration. The decision has been labeled an attempt to undermine Russia's unity at a critical time in the emergence of Russia's statehood. The coordinating council has appealed to Chelyabinsk Oblast residents to refrain from joining the rebellion against Russia. [end recording]

Chelyabinsk Oblast Administrator Seen Trying To Usurp Power

PM0308142193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Aug 93 First Edition p 2

[German Galkin report: "Opposition in Chelyabinsk Intend To Seize Power by Force"]

[Text] Chelyabinsk has been the venue for an event officially described as a meeting between voters and the new oblast administration head. This is a reference to Petr Sumin, former oblast soviet chairman, who was elected head of the administration in illegal elections in April (throughout the summer Sumin has made repeated attempts to actually take up office).

Judging by the results of the so-called meeting with voters, two trends are taking shape in Chelyabinsk. First, it is being proposed that the idea of a South Ural Republic be implemented in practice and, second, there is a manifest desire among circles close to the soviet to seize power by force. A statement by Sumin a long time ago that from the moment it came to power the new administration would ensure unity of action with the soviet "in the interests of the oblast's population" was backed up by the makeup of the people on the platform at the said meeting. Sumin shared a table with Aleksandr Salomatkin, deputy chairman of the soviet, (his was the signature on the decision on transforming the oblast into a republic). And the meeting was chaired by Lev Leonov, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's own correspondent in Chelyabinsk, who has recently turned into some kind of semblance of a local political figure and has even become a member of the executive committee of the National Salvation Front's South Ural Branch.

The meeting began with a speech by Salomatkin, who said that in a situation when laws are not being implemented by the president, the government, or the Supreme Soviet alike, Chelyabinsk Oblast Soviet has been compelled to adopt a number of decisions at variance with the federal authorities' actions. Salomatkin went on to say that in the conditions which have developed it is necessary to change Chelyabinsk Oblast's state-territorial status.

"We are not seeking to seize power, but the voters' wishes must be fulfilled," was Salomatkin's closing assurance to the audience, which consisted mainly of representatives of communist and patriotic movements and also pensioners and people of indeterminate occupation.

The architect of the triumph, Sumin, was in optimistic mood: "They want me to give up. But that won't happen."

The most interesting part of the meeting began when the "voters" were given the floor. Anatoliy Beloglazov (Russian Communist Workers Party) tossed Sumin a suggestion that he should launch a "determined attack" with a view to seizing power. Representatives of the most senior section of the audience immediately expressed their readiness to support with action the well-known decisions of the recent National Salvation Front congress. Albeit somewhat ambiguously: "We don't want to use arms. But we will use force." Vitaliy Knyaginichev, chairman of the Chelyabinsk Oblast Patriotic Forces Committee, was extremely frank: "We must take power without prior warning."

There was a totally logical ring to the proposal by the next speaker to "seize the mass media." Followed, of course, by "the station, the telegraph office, and the post office..." Nevertheless at the end of the meeting Sumin stated that a legal way to resolve the conflict is needed.

According to Andrey Belishko, first deputy head of the oblast administration, Sumin's actions are aimed precisely at seizing power. In this instance the wishes of the electorate are being used as a formalistic and not completely justified cover. But the administration, Belishko believes, is continuing to operate normally and there is no reason to doubt either its powers or it viability. It is possible that the determinant factor in the protracted dispute could be the attitude of businessmen, who have been biding their time for a while but—particularly financial circles—have started to become more persistent in conducting a dialogue with the existing administration on tackling the economic problems that have come to a head in the oblast.

Population Opposes Tomsk Resolution on Referendum

LD0508100393 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 5 Aug 93

[Text] ITAR-TASS reports: A resolution by the Tomsk Oblast Soviet's little soviet to hold a referendum on 3 October on the question of the status of Tomsk Oblast has not been supported by the majority of the population of the oblast. The little soviet of Tomsk Town Soviet has also opposed the referendum. Half the population of the oblast live in the town of Tomsk. The little soviet of the nuclear workers' town of Tomsk-7 is also proposing that the decision on the oblast referendum be revoked. The decision has also been challenged by the oblast procurator's office, which believes it to be illegal.

Yeltsin Orders Investigation of Leningrad Nuclear Plant

LD0408131793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1230 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Following the Russian president's instruction, a commission of the North European area of the state supervision agency of atomic power today began its investigation of the Leningrad nuclear power plant. It is planned to have the work completed by 13 August.

Most Groups in Chita Support New Constitution

LD0408085293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0442 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Fomin]

[Text] Chita August 4 TASS—Most political parties, movements and public organisations in Chita region have voiced support for the draft new constitution of the Russian Federation prepared by the constitutional assembly in Moscow.

Representatives of most political forces in eastern Transbaykalia said in a joint resolution "the constitution can become a consolidating factor in the further development of Russian statehood".

Along with this, the resolution stresses that "a new Russian constitution can be adopted only in a legitimate procedure—a congress of people's deputies or an all-Russia referendum".

Many parties and public organisations have declared their intention to form a single election bloc. The resolution has not been signed by representatives of pro-communist parties and the Russian national assembly.

Chuvash Deputy Assesses New Russian Constitution

LD0308135593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1310 GMT 3 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valentina Ivanova]

[Text] Cheboksary August 3 TASS— The constitutional process will be developing, also in republics, believes Atner Khuzangai, president of the Chuvash National Congress, people's deputy of the republic. "The new Russian constitution will not be adopted shortly", he told ITAR-TASS. "It is not a matter of its being good or bad. In conditions of instability and the economic crisis it is impossible to resolve simultaneously the two tasks it sets: To achieve accord between the two branches of power and to balance interests of the federal centre and subjects of the federation". The crisis may be resolved by new elections at the federal level and in republics.

Peoples' right to self-determination must be one of the main aspects of the new constitution, Khuzangai believes. Although the preamble of the draft new fundamental law states that Russia is multi-ethnic, it does not give any guarantees of the development of ethnic groups, particularly small groups, in Russia. The status of subjects of the federation is not defined clearly. The Chuvash deputy believes that it is a drawback of the draft constitution that narrow functions are assigned to the Council of the Federation.

Khuzangai believes it is right that the draft constitution does not even mention councils (soviets). He believes they have outlived their usefulness as a form of local government.

International Affairs

BBC Cites Kuchma on Control of Nuclear Weapons

PM0508105193 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1700 GMT 4 Aug 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Komarova] A statement by the Russian Government was circulated today, calling on the official authorities in Kiev to review the decision of the Ukrainian Parliament and the republic's Ministry of Defense on the establishment of control over nuclear weapons. Let me recall that the Ukrainian Parliament passed a document entitled "Basic Guidelines of Ukraine's Foreign Policy" 2 July, in which it proclaimed its ownership of nuclear weapons. The Russian Government statement warns that this could have very serious consequences for international stability and the security of the entire system of international relations.

People in the West are seriously concerned. The BBC, citing Ukrainian Premier Leonid Kuchma, reports that Ukraine is capable of creating its own coded commands for launching certain types of nuclear missiles located on its territory. This means that there is a possibility of sidestepping Moscow's control over nuclear weapons.

Kuchma, Slezevicius Sign Free Trade Agreement

LD0408212893 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1905 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Kiev—A news conference was held today by the prime ministers of Ukraine and Lithuania, Leonid Kuchma and Adolfas Slezevicius, on the results of the one-day visit by the governmental delegation of the Lithuanian Republic to Ukraine and Ukrainian-Lithuanian negotiations. They announced the signing of an agreement between Ukraine and the Lithuanian Republic on free trade, cooperation in the prevention of the customs law violations, and also cooperation in the spheres of education, science, and culture.

The two prime ministers showed a positive attitude toward the idea of a close cooperation of the Baltic-Black Sea region states in the sphere of oil processing and power supply, which will allow them to overcome their dependence on Russia's deliveries of power sources.

As far as the economic union between Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine is concerned, Leonid Kuchma referred to reports by many mass media sources toward that end, quite unambiguously characterizing them as "a wild campaign against the prime minister," and pointing out that he has always been a proponent of the economic union, although he is against Ukraine losing "even a grain of its independence."

Pavlychko Views Controversy Over Sevastopol

AU0408122893 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 4 Aug 93 p 3

["C.G." report: "Concern About Sevastopol"]

[Excerpts] Bonn, 3 August—Ukraine fears a dangerous aggravation of the conflict with Russia over the port of Sevastopol. Pavlychko, chairman of the Foreign Committee of the Ukrainian Supreme Council, is currently in Bonn for talks with German deputies and members of the Foreign Ministry. Pavlychko, who is also the chairman of the Democratic Party of Ukraine, told this newspaper: "The Sevastopol problem is very critical and alarming." The Supreme Soviet decision reclaiming the Black Sea city for Russia has not been rescinded.

In Sevastopol militant Russian forces are already making a call to arms, he said. The city is under the control and administration of the Ukrainian Government; the Ukrainian Navy is also deployed there. At the same time, the staff of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and its respective naval units are in Sevastopol. The Navy is formally subordinated to the two presidents—Yeltsin and Kravchkuk—but most members of the Russian fleet only listen to Moscow, he said. The majority of the city's population are Russians. "There may be a provocation and then bloodshed." If such a conflict developed as a consequence of Russian provocation, it must be expected to spread from Sevastopol to Ukraine and then be settled between Ukraine and Russia. Whether the Supreme Soviet withdraws its claim or not is a decisive factor. Foreign countries must request that it do so. The Russian Parliament will never revise the decision on its own as the democratic deputies also voted for the appropriation of the city and made a broad majority possible. Pavlychko said: "It would be very useful if the Bundestag raised its voice and condemned the Supreme Soviet decision as illegal." The Ukrainian ambassador to Bonn sent a written request for a statement to Bundestag President Suessmuth, the chairmen of all Bundestag groups, and Stercken (Christian Democratic Union), chairman of the Foreign Committee. Pavlychko said sarcastically: "Perhaps Moscow waits for the Bundestag to call Koenigsberg [Kaliningrad] a German city, for which it would at least have more grounds. The withdrawal of the Moscow legislature's resolution might not be ruled out if the parliaments of Germany and other European states, the Council of Europe, the CSCE, and the Atlantic Cooperation Council made a clear statement.

A nationalist-chauvinist syndrome is developing in Russia: "The diverging tendencies are increasing; there is an effort to hold the barrel, which is falling apart, with new hoops." For fear that Russia will otherwise fall apart, Moscow wants again to tighten the grip around the Baltics, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Ukraine. Moscow uses every possible means to this end. If the West fails to support the democratic forces as well as Ukraine in this context, Russia will reach for the West:

"If the chauvinist forces gain the upper hand in Russia, one can begin collecting bricks for the new wall here," Pavlychko said. [passage omitted]

In the West, Ukraine is canvassing for a fund for the destruction of missiles by declaring itself prepared to get rid of all 130 SS-19 missiles in addition to the 57 missiles required by the START treaty (this would correspond to the requested 36 percent). It is true that the United States promised $175 million, but $3 billion are necessary for the elimination of all missiles on Ukrainian soil, he said. The fund has not been established yet. Apparently, Russia sold enriched plutonium from the tactical nuclear weapons that were returned to Kiev to other countries. Russia should pay Ukraine for this. This is also a prerequisite for the ratification of the START I Treaty. Ukraine's experience with Moscow, which is valid for the entire field of trade, is this: "Russia takes it all and does not compensate financially."

UNSO Deputy Commander Comments on Abkhazia

LD0408200993 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1905 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Kiev [no date as received]—"Eduard Shevardnadze, chairman of the Supreme Council of Georgia, has expressed his thanks to the fighters of the Ukrainian National Self-Defense [UNSO] for the help rendered by them, and has received an assurance that our military support will continue," Dmytro Korchynskyy, deputy commander of the Ukrainian National Self-Defense, informed an UNIAN correspondent.

According to Dmytro Korchynskyy, approximately 10 Ukrainian National Self-Defense soldiers have been recommended by Georgia's Ministry of Defense for state decorations. Dmytro Korchynskyy stated that Ukrainian National Self-defense fighters have often come across units of the Russian regular army in Abkhazia. Moreover, they have noted the participation of Russian aircraft in the bombardment of Sukhumi and also the use of chemical weapons in the Sukhumi area by Russian troops.

"Intervention by yet another political force is becoming ever more disadvantageous for Russia," Dmytro Korchynskyy noted. "During the offensive of 17-19 July alone, the Russians lost 54 killed." The Ukrainian National Self-Defense representatives also perceive credit to themselves in the recently signed truce between the conflicting sides. However, they believe that it will not last for long. For this very reason the armed Ukrainian National Self- Defense detachments will continue to be sent to Georgia, although the group has lost three members killed and 14 wounded.

Two UNSO 'Volunteers' Die

AU0408151393 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 3 Aug 93 p 1

[Taras Velychko report: "What Are We Fighting For?..."]

[Text] A few days ago, the first group of wounded and crippled "volunteers," who had gone to fight in Georgia returned to Ukraine. It is not the first time that UNSO [Ukrainian People's Self-Defense] organized the movement of militants to "hot spots." The leaders of the "self-defenders" continue to talk about the protection of the interests of independent Ukraine.

As has become known, the wounded are just the first signs. Two mercenaries who went to the Sukhumi area have been killed. One of them was a Kievan and the other a resident of Lvov Oblast.

One is justified in asking those who inspired this adventure: Who has given you the right to decide on other people's lives? How can we continue to reconcile ourselves to the fact that there exists a grouping in Ukraine that stands up, with weapons, for the interests of another state? Who knows where the UNSO members will be fighting tomorrow and what sacrifices will be made in the name of ...what?

There is information that the dead militants will be buried in Sukhumi.

Labor Party, Civil Congress Support Economic Union

LD0408194393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1927 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Gordeyeva]

[Text] Donetsk August 4 TASS—The Ukrainian Labour Party and the Ukrainian Civil Congress have issued a joint statement to support the creation of an economic alliance between Belarus, Russia, ukraine and other CIS countries.

The statement emphasises that "the failure the isolationist policy imposed on our peoples has become quite evident".

"Economic alliance is a chance to survive, stabilise the economy, diminish social tensions in the sovereign states tied together by long-standing historical roots", the statement says.

However, Ukrainian nationalist parties and movements occupy a different position on this point which was revealed during a "round-table" meeting held recently in Kiev.

Nationalist Congress Condemns Union

LD0408180993 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Kiev, 4 Aug—The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists has made public a statement condemning the document signed by Leonid Kuchma on 10 July as an attempt "to integrate Ukraine in a single economic union with Russia and Belarus." The congress calls on all Ukrainian patriotic forces and national minorities residing on Ukrainian soil to oppose artificial "integration," since it will result in Ukraine being plundered anew, increase the impoverishment of its population, and lead to ethnic genocide.

The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists appeals to all national minorities in Ukraine to express protest against the integration of Ukraine in this union and not to allow Ukraine to be transformed into a colonial appendage of a newly-established empire by way of making mass statements, appeals to President Leonid Kravchuk, and speeches at people's assemblies and gatherings.

Ukraine Agrees To Ban Oil, Arm Deliveries to Haiti

LD0508083593 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0700 GMT 5 Aug 93

[Text] Ukraine has imposed a ban on deliveries of oil and arms to Haiti, says a note by Ukraine's permanent mission to the United Nations, which was circulated as a document by the Security Council at the headquarters of the community of nations on 4 August.

The document notes that in connection with Resolution 841 adopted by the Security Council, which imposes an embargo on deliveries of oil and arms to Haiti, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers has instructed our state ministries and departments, those of the Republic of the Crimea, as well as the cities of Kiev and Sevastopol, to ensure that the relevant provisions of Security Council Resolution 841 are implemented and the necessary measures are taken to minimize the possible damage to our state associated with the act.

Estonian Embassy To Open in Kiev

WS0408152293 Tallinn BNS in English 1016 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Kiev, Aug 04, BNS—The Estonian embassy in Ukraine begins work in Kiev Aug. 9.

Charge d'Affaires Andrei Birov worked until recently as the minister-counselor of the Estonian Embassy in Moscow.

The embassy in Ukraine is Estonia's 44th representation abroad and 12th embassy.

Initially two diplomats and head of the consular department will work in Kiev. Estonia plans to increase the number of diplomats to as many as seven in the future.

National Affairs

Space Agency Official Interviewed on Program

AU0508100493 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 3 Aug 93 p 3

[Interview with Andriy Zhalko-Tytarenko, deputy general director of Ukraine's National Space Agency at Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers, by Volodymyr Oliynyk; place and date not given: "We Are One of the Strongest Space Powers"]

[Text] [Oliynyk] What has Ukraine inherited from the Union in the space sphere?

[Zhalko-Tytarenko] We have the world's largest missile-building complex and an artificial-satellite building complex, the Pivdennyy [Southern] machine-building plant and the design bureau "Pivdenne". Ukraine has inherited a number of other plants in Kharkiv, Kiev, and so on. All of these plants are known in the West, but they are known as mainly manufacturing weapons. A great part of the former Union's military space technology was manufactured in Ukraine. These are heavy ballistic missiles that have no analogues in the world, and we are now also capable of manufacturing them. Of course, this is a large part of the complex, but this is a section of it that has been derived from the total Union cooperation. This is a major industry at a world level. Speaking absolutely openly, Ukraine is already capable of exporting, to the world market, either products of the aerospace industry or raw materials for that industry: steel and semi-finished products. If we lose the possibility to work in the aerospace sphere, we will automatically turn into an ordinary third-world country with all the consequences of such a status.

[Oliynyk] However, this is not only a matter of prestige. This is commercially profitable—the exploitation of space. Isn't that so?

[Zhalko-Tytarenko] There are commercially profitable things. There is a system of artificial-satellite communication that we can manufacture. It is a profitable industry. There are things that we simply need—this is remote-control probing of the earth, control of the ecological situation, and emergency communication systems. These are things that we will do. If we lose these things, then, in two or three years, the presently functioning artificial satellites will end their service life, and we will have to purchase artificial satellites from our neighbors for the same currency that we may, as they say, save today, and not for coupons as we do now. Most likely, in Russia, this issue will be conditional upon our independence.

[Oliynyk] Incidentally, how about the presidential communication system?

[Zhalko-Tytarenko] I am not convinced that it is worthwhile purchasing a special-communication system for

our president somewhere abroad. This contradicts the issue of Ukrainian independence.

[Oliynyk] What are the tasks of the National Space Agency?

[Zhalko-Tytarenko] We have a National Space Program that was prepared within a short period of time and is oriented toward resolving urgent problems of the space industry. This is, primarily, the development of what we already have. We manufacture "Tsiklon" [Cyclone] launch vehicles, which are the most reliable in the world, and we have "Zenit" [Zenith] launch vehicles that are capable, if we wish, of launching a Ukrainian cosmonaut into space tomorrow.

We have a broad range of artificial satellites that need to be reoriented from military to civilian tasks. We must create a national artificial satellite, and this is envisaged in the program.

[Oliynyk] How about launching conditions?

[Zhalko-Tytarenko] Unfortunately, in this aspect, we are still strongly tied to Russia. There are two space-vehicle launching sites there. These are "Plesetsk," from which we may launch "Tsiklons," and Baykonur, from which "Zenits" are launched. This question also needs to be resolved, and we are working in this direction. I will not disclose technological secrets of how we are going to do this. Already now, having many strategic missiles, we can launch, to relatively low orbits, artificial satellites that may be used in communication systems and so on.

[Oliynyk] However, these missiles are subject to conversion?

[Zhalko-Tytarenko] Naturally, but not in the way it is envisaged: by blowing them up. Why not mount an artificial satellite on the missile and use it to launch the artificial satellite instead of simply destroying it in addition to spending a lot of money on eliminating the consequences of its destruction?

[Oliynyk] How does the project justify the development of the industry in such a difficult economic situation?

[Zhalko-Tytarenko] The project envisages this. We have unique equipment that is presently standing idle. If it is not used, let us say, for six months, it may simply be discarded. This business must be boosted, something that does not involve great expenses. We will do this. Our task is to survive until better times. Moreover, we must not halt our development.

[Oliynyk] What will happen if Russia and Kazakhstan refuse to allow Ukraine use of their space vehicle launching sites?

[Zhalko-Tytarenko] It is necessary to influence our CIS partners through interstate channels. However, there are many more fish in the sea, even though we now have absolutely normal and, I would say, friendly relations with the Russians and Kazakhs. However, we must look for other channels. We are working in this direction. The French are trying to prepare "Orient-5" (which is still in the form of a project; it is somewhat weaker than our "Zenit") at the Kourou space vehicle launching site, and we can come to an agreement with them in this respect. For light-weight missiles, aviation takeoff areas may be used.

[Oliynyk] What specifically is being prepared for launching?

[Zhalko-Tytarenko] We are preparing our national artificial satellite for remote-control probing of the earth. Commercial negotiations are under way with several Western countries on launching their artificial satellites into space with the help of our missiles, but mainly on assembling artificial satellites in Ukraine. The only problem lies in the fact that we have dissimilar standards for receiving transmissions, but these are technical difficulties and they are being eliminated.

[Oliynyk] How does Russia, which is an actual owner of two space vehicle launching sites, react to Ukraine's space activity.

[Zhalko-Tytarenko] In principle, at the working level, we have normal working relations with the corresponding Russian agency, because they realize that their space programs will not be able to survive without Ukraine. As regards the highest ranking politicians in Russia, you know that there exists a tripartite agreement on the use of Baykonur that was concluded by Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Then, all of a sudden, Russian Defense Minister Grachev arrived in Baykonur and made a statement that Baykonur is Russian. Despite the fact that Baykonur is financed by three states. Whereas, making declarations about the status of Sevastopol, they can deliver something there by sea, in the case of Baykonur, I absolutely do not understand how the Russians may get there. In other words, Russia does try to break it all up.

[Oliynyk] What profit may Ukraine's space activity bring?

[Zhalko-Tytarenko] I do not like predictions, but I will quote one example. A commercial launching of an artificial satellite for remote control earth probing earns almost one-half billion U.S. dollars. This is a sufficient sum to compensate for all the outlays on our space industry for several years ahead. The price of a missile similar to our "Zenit" ranges between $60 million and $120 million.

We are conducting negotiations on the sale of missiles. Although this is very difficult because nobody on the world market is waiting for us with roses, but there already are partners.

Five Observation Centers Planned

WS0508104193 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian 24 Jul 93 p 1

[Untitled report from the "To Kiev... in Kiev... From Kiev" column]

[Text] The Ukrainian National Space Agency has announced that five regional centers for observation of the Earth from space are being created in Kiev, Lvov, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, and Sevastopol. In the future, they will form a network. Additionally, the construction of a Ukrainian-made all-purpose satellite "Okean-U" designated for remote exploration of our planet is under way. The sputnik is expected to be launched in 1994.

Cabinet Agrees To Send More Funds to Sevastopol

LD0408111193 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 0700 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] To implement the directive of the president of Ukraine with the aim of putting a stop to the crisis phenomena in the economy and improving the social conditions of citizens of Sevastopol, Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers adopted a resolution on additional measures concerning the socioeconomic development of the city. In accordance with this decision, the Ministry of Finances makes adjustments to the amounts of budgetary expenditures and funds for financing the stabilization program of Sevastopol taking into account the changes in prices and the necessity of supplying the city's most urgent needs with financial resources. These expenditures will amount to a general sum of 190 billion karbovantsi. In particular, 70 billion karbovantsi will be allocated to implement the city's stabilization program and 10 billion karbovantsi will be allocated to the budgetary credit to provide the population with credits for the construction of dwellings by house-building cooperatives. It is recommended that the National Bank of Ukraine together with the commercial banks allocate resources to Sevastopol amounting to 100 billion karbovantsi for the purpose of granting credits for procuring agricultural produce, obtaining fuel and lubricants, purchasing goods of a seasonal nature and an assortment of goods for children, and purchasing foodstuffs to provide for children's health and medical institutions. A regional branch of the National Bank of Ukraine will be opened in Sevastopol. This will ensure up-to-the-minute influence on the organization of the emission office's work, on payments, and on interaction with commercial banks.

National Guard Denies Sending Units to Sevastopol

AU0408145393 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 3 Aug 93 p 2

[Unattributed report: "The Beloved City May Sleep Quietly"]

[Text] The Press Service of the commander of Ukraine's National Guard has described the INTERFAX Agency information broadcast on 29 July by the Moscow Radio Station ROKS [expansion not known] as misinformation. It alleged that Ukraine's National Guard troops, among whom residents of Ukraine's western areas prevail, are on their way to Sevastopol.

The Press Service of the commander of Ukraine's National Guard issued a refutation and claimed that this does not correspond to reality. Never has a single subunit of the Guard been created in Sevastopol, especially considering that no Ukraine National Guard serviceman has been sent to that city. All units of the National Guard are stationed at their permanent quarters. Obviously, states the Press Service of the commander of Ukraine's National Guard, somebody needs to misinform public opinion in order to justify the illegal actions with regard to the Crimea.

Justice Ministry Assails Sevastopol Assembly

LD0408165693 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] The holding of a so-called People's Viche [assembly] in Sevastopol, and the decisions and documents adopted by it, contradict Ukraine's legislation which applies in full measure to that Black Sea town. This assessment of the latest events in Sevastopol was given by the Ministry of Justice of our state. It was indicated that the formation of any representative or executive structures under the auspices of the Viche would be illegal.

The Ministry of Justice experts analyzed in detail the actions by the self-proclaimed People's Viche and also the decisions by the city council on the sociopolitical and socioeconomic situation in the city of Sevastopol and measures to normalize them. The explanatory note expresses an opinion on the expediency of the adoption of a legal act on the status of the city of Sevastopol by the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

Kuchma Discusses Introduction of National Currency

WS0508105293 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 1000 GMT 5 Aug 93

[Text] In an interview with reporters, Prime Minister Kuchma pointed out: The fact that Russia has removed old rubles from circulation assures us that we must introduce the hryvnya as soon as possible. He said that teams of experts are intensively working on drafting documents on a monetary reform in Ukraine. The prime minister emphasized that the establishment of a stabilization fund is a matter of primary importance. The fund would facilitate the alleviation of many acute issues connected with the introduction of the national currency.

Cabinet Issues Decree Raising Coal Prices

LD0408215493 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in English 2100 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] In view of growing prices for fuels, equipment, spare parts and timber imported from other countries

the Cabinet of Ministers decreed to raise coal prices by an average of 2.5 times, versus its prices as of 31 July 1993. Exact figures of wholesale coal prices will be set by the State Committee for the Coal Mining Industry as agreed with the Economics Ministry.

Public Organization Seeks To Dissolve Odessa City Soviet

PM0408154793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Aug 93 First Edition p 2

[Leonid Kapelyushnyy report: "Collection of Signatures for Dissolution of City Soviet Has Begun in Odessa"]

[Text] Odessa—It is not only incorrigible idlers who abuse the authorities now, but the latter carry on ruling regardless. Let them have their fun, they say... But it seems that in Odessa the "process has started moving" in an interesting direction. On an initiative of the "Working Union" public organization, a meeting has been held and an action group formed to collect signatures to terminate the city soviet's powers ahead of schedule.

"Working Union" members have resolved to make use of the forthcoming referendum in Ukraine on confidence in the president and the Supreme Soviet (if it takes place at all) and have included an additional question on the ballot paper.

Leaflets that "Working Union" has put out accuse the corps of deputies of inactivity and powerlessness in resolving questions of vital importance to the city—from providing a normal supply of drinking water to providing medicines.

Those who have taken up the cause of disbanding the soviet have to collect 100,000 signatures for the question to be put at a referendum and they are filled with optimism. It can be assumed that citizens are so "fed up" with the disruption and neglect, with the outbreak of crime and the communal political squabbles in this fine city, that they will even support the "Working Union." But what will happen next?

The situation in Odessa is curiously fueled by the political passions which are running high in Ukraine. At least three incompatible trends have emerged. The first is to send the Supreme Soviet and the president into retirement; the second is to send only the Supreme Soviet into retirement and keep the president so as to avoid anarchy and complete chaos; and the third is to not hold a referendum at all but to immediately announce new elections to the Supreme Soviet, again without touching the president.

The stubbornness with which the country's Supreme Soviet is keeping soviet power afloat is worthy of special study and reflection. More than a year ago, President Leonid Kravchuk said that elections to local soviets should take place in the fall of 1992. But there has been no movement, and the mounting dissatisfaction in cities and villages could create that critical atmosphere that would demonstrate not only the inability of the "higher echelons" to act (in essence they have never been able to do so), but also the resolute unwillingness of the "lower orders" to do so. The sad experience of the inability to resolve such problems in a civilized manner may lead not to the authorities being reformed, but to their being carted off in a tumbrel—in such cases people rarely succeed in preserving their common sense and taking what is wise and useful from the past.

Nationalist Congress Issues Appeal on Referendum

LD0408183893 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Kiev, 4 Aug—The leadership of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists has made public an appeal to Ukrainian people's deputies in connection with the 26 September referendum on confidence in the Supreme Council. It is proposed that people's deputies should:

Immediately come up with a legislative initiative to convene a national assembly or constituent assembly, which would adopt the fundamental law of the Ukrainian state and the law on elections, and determine the terms and conditions of elections to the Ukrainian parliament to be held in the nearest possible future;

Lay down the plenary powers of deputies and propose that deputies at all levels on the territory of Kiev and Kiev oblast should do the same.

Ecological Problems in Kiev Outlined

WS0508074793 Kiev RADA in Ukrainian 29 Jul 93 p 2

[Report by UNIAN correspondent Mykola Khriyenko: "Kiev Is Among Ten Most Unhappy Cities in Ukraine"]

[Text] According to the environment pollution level, Kiev with its 2.8 million inhabitants is among the 10 most unhappy cities in Ukraine.

The main sources of the harsh ecological situation are, as in the past, industrial enterprises, which are not interested in environment protection activities. They are concerned only with production volume, profit, productivity, and net costs... It has been estimated that during the last year, Kiev's enterprises emitted 559,200 tonnes of harmful substances, only 5,300 tonnes less then in 1991. Auto transport pollution amounted to 120,000 tonnes. You can also add the Lybid River contamination and the devastation of the environment in the vicinity of Kiev caused by unorganized storage at dumps, sand pits, and quarries. Utility and construction waste also reaches astronomical proportions. After all, you cannot forget the radioactive contamination left after the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster. There are still places in the city where radioactive spots have been located with huge amounts of active cesium, plutonium, and strontium.

In such ecological circumstances, you should not be surprised that the birth rate in Kiev is falling and it is

almost equal to the death rate. Of course, there are many reasons for that, but along with the deteriorating social protection standards, the ecological situation is one of the primary causes. The results of the Ukrainian Ministry of Health Hygiene Center research confirm this. In practically all the examined districts of the capital, increased morbidity, especially from cancer, was discovered. Cases of endocrin system disease, allergies, and lung disease are growing. The high level of environmental pollution also considerably impairs the functioning organisms and their immunological systems. After the Chernobyl disaster, the health condition of the growing population became particularly alarming. The morbidity rate among the Kiev children swelled 1.3-2.2 times over the last 10 years, which poses a threat to the capital's human resources.

Health care workers and ecologists pledge to improve the harsh situation in Kiev. However, without the help of political, economic, and legal authorities, those pledges remain useless.

Defense Ministry Stresses Exercise Not Directed at Neighbors

LD0408174793 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] The command and staff training on the territory of the Odessa Military District shows efficiency of interaction between the headquarters of the land forces, aviation, navy, frontier posts, and the national guards. This was stressed today by the press service of the Defense Ministry, which emphasizes that these exercises have no aggressive purposes against any neighboring country. This is a planned event envisaged by the program of training the Ukrainian armed forces.

Officers Union Criticizes Security Service

WS0508103893 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian 29 Jul 93 p 3

[Appeal by the Ukrainian Association of Servicemen (SOU) Executive Committee to L. M. Kravchuk, Ukrainian president and commander in chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and I. S. Plyushch, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet chairman; place and date not given]

[Text] In the appeal to you adopted at the fourth congress of the association, we noted the insufficient performance of the Ukrainian Security Service [SBU], the key posts in which are held by officers who actively thwarted the national renaissance of our country and its Armed Forces, and disgraced themselves through amoral deeds and abuse.

The latest events connected with the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol, the widespread coal-miners strike, attempts to entangle the servicemen in political battles, the unpunished frenzy of anti-state forces in southeastern Ukraine, and dissemination of anti-state literature—all this betrays that the SBU, and in particular military counterespionage services, are working not for Ukraine's benefit, but against it.

The SOU repeatedly confirms no confidence in those generals and colonels who tarnished officers' honor through amoral deeds and abuse of office, and who have neither the moral nor professional qualities to serve in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

In its statement, the SOU proposed to subordinate military counterespionage to the president and commander in chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and to the Ukrainian minister of defense.

The SOU asks you to create an indispensable committee for investigating the SBU activities and to take adequate measures. The association is willing to grant assistance in the transformation of the law enforcement organs into a guarantor of Ukrainian independence.

Belarus

Shushkevich Meets Representatives of Parties

WS0508105693 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0700 GMT 5 Aug 93

[Text] Before leaving on vacation, Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich held a conference with representatives of the United Democratic Party of Belarus [ODPB], the Belarusian Peasant Party [BKP], and the Movement for Democracy, Social Progress, and Justice. At the conference, the parties exchanged views on the situation in the Republic. The conference was of a confidential nature.

The ODPB and the BKP are known to have initiated the movement in support of Stanislav Shushkevich.

According to unofficial reports, the chairman is planning a number of meetings with representatives of other parties of Belarus.

Shushkevich Greets PRC Delegation

LD0408163293 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1715 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] We so far have little experience in international relations, so the visit to Minsk of a delegation of the Chinese National People's Congress is a good lesson. The envoys of the great eastern country are always welcome guests in Belarus. It was with these words that Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislaw Shushkevich greeted the parliamentary delegation from China today.

During the negotiations, representatives of both sides expressed the wish to establish closer trade and economic cooperation between our countries. The Chinese parliamentarians confirmed their readiness to receive a delegation from Belarus in the near future.

Shushkevich Meets With Entrepreneurs

WS0308123693 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 2000 GMT 2 Aug 93

[Text] The meeting between Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Stanislav Shushkevich and representatives of the biggest Belarusian enterprises focused on the development of enterprise in the Republic. The issues of creating private enterprises, government policy, and prospects for capital movement were discussed at the meeting. Opinions on many other issues were also exchanged. The participants agreed to hold such meetings more frequently.

Cabinet Adopts Military Service Regulations

WS0508065493 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1715 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] The Belarusian Cabinet of Ministers has adopted series of resolutions on On Duration of Active Military Service in the Republic's Armed Forces, On Military Draft, and On Training of Recruits regulations. They will all be put in force under the decree On Military Service and Duty. The resolution On Confirmation of Regulation on Duration of Active Military Service reads that this regulation will apply to servicemen of the active service of the Internal Forces, the Frontier Guard, the State Security Committee Forces, the National Guard, and other military units. The regulation provides for the duration of service, the training of officers, transfers to other units, leave, discharges from duty, and disciplinary actions. In the regulation On Military Draft, such a term is explained as military training and retraining of officers, ensigns, sergeants, and privates of the Belarusian Armed Forces' Reserve in order to improve the battle readiness of the Army. The Cabinet of Ministers also adopted the regulation On Training of Recruits. It provides for health care measures, physical and technical training, and patriotic education.

Conventional Weapons Dismantling Continues in Borisov

WS0508095493 Minsk BELINFORM in Russian 1259 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] While in the Borisov tank-repairing plant dismantling of armored equipment is proceeding in accordance with the CFE treaty, and in other Belarusian bases, aircraft fighters and armored personnel carriers are being ripped apart with welders, there has been another lull in the NATO military inspections. But the inspectors will certainly arrive again to officially and scrupulously witness that independent Belarus has gotten rid of yet another dozen units of dangerous military equipment.

As a BELINFORM correspondent learned at the National Agency for Control and Inspections [NACI], the next NATO military experts' "commando" is expected to arrive on 16 August, when in the "Lesnaya" military base for aircraft equipment dismantling in the vicinity of Baranovichi, another MIG-27 fighter will be torn into pieces of scrap metal.

The NATO inspectors will also be witnessing the completion of the regular dismantling session of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles in Borisov. After that, they will set the beginning of a new period.

NACI Chief, General Major Viktor Vakar, told a BELINFORM correspondent that scientists and military engineers from the Defense Ministry managed to significantly improve the arms dismantling technology during the completion of the CFE treaty, which remarkably helped to cut down the consumption of oxygen and other components that burden Belarusian taxpayers.

Government Develops Program for Utilizing IMF Money

PM0508091593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Aug 93 First Edition p 2

[Mikhail Shimanskiy report: "Support of $300 Million for Reforms in Belarus"]

[Text] Minsk—The IMF has granted Belarus credit of $300 million. The sum was finally agreed during the recent visit by republic Supreme Soviet Chairman S. Shushkevich to the United States.

Such solid financial assistance is extremely highly valued in Belarus. But how does the republic intend to use such a tidy sum? S. Shushkevich made an unequivocal statement on this: In granting us this credit, the bankers want to be sure that the capital will not be put toward buying produce and patching up the republic's budget, but toward serious rebuilding of the economy.

A government program has been elaborated in the republic to this end. It contains a special section on raising the cost-effectiveness of output. It is extremely low at present so it is not possible to count on increased exports.

The main task in industrial policy today is to select and to speed up the development of priority sectors, which will extricate the whole national economy from the crisis. They will be the first to receive the international dollars.

This government economic program was presented to the IMF and it has now approved it.

Moldova

Parliament Rejects Ratification of CIS Treaty

AU0408204493 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Dispatch from Chisinau]

[Text] After 2100 [1800 GMT], at the end of an exhausting day filled with tension, the Moldovan parliament, which met in an extraordinary session in Chisinau, rejected the draft resolution on ratifying the agreement on Moldova's adherence to CIS. That was a momentous event, which certain participants in the proceedings considered as memorable as the moment that sanctioned the declaration of Moldova's independence. It was a moment when, according to certain parliamentarians, reason and a feeling of responsibility for the republic's future triumphed.

Here is sequence of events leading up to this denouement, which was not certain until the very last minute. The presentation of the draft resolution was followed by a session of questions, answers, and briefings on that document. The discussions revealed the existence of two opposed trends regarding the issue of the Republic of Moldova's adherence to CIS. The opinions in favor of the ratification of the CIS treaty basically emphasized the exclusively economic participation within the CIS, which is currently considered as the only way for ensuring advantageous supplies of raw and energy materials, as well as markets for the predominantly agricultural produce of the Republic. However, that position did not exclude the conclusion of economic accords with the West and the creation of conditions for the economic exchanges and cooperation to develop and eventually become mutually advantageous.

On the other hand, the opinions against ratifying the CIS treaty stressed that once ratification takes place, no one will pay attention to the qualifications regarding the exclusively economic cooperation and the Republic of Moldova will thus be reintegrated in a suprastatal structure that will impose military and political conditions, which will practically cancel the Republic's sovereignty and independence. Russia does not need economic cooperation with the Republic of Moldova; it nevertheless wants to integrate Moldova in a political system that allows it to achieve its geopolitical strategy—one of the supporters of this trend of thought claimed. According to the same trend of thought, the foreseen economic advantages are not even real, as can be seen from the two years since the Republic of Moldova has been de facto within the CIS or from the experience of other countries that have already ratified this treaty. The Baltic states and Central Asian countries, which are forming their own commonwealth, were given as an example of the fact that one can nevertheless exist in the former Soviet space on its own. As an alternative to CIS, the supporters of this trend of thought proposed the creation of an economic commonwealth with Romania and the signing of the treaty with our country.

After the end of the discussions, it was decided that the ratification of the CIS treaty should be done by secret ballot. In the ensuing break to prepare for the voting, 91 deputies belonging to the democratic parliamentary groups, the Intellectuals Congress, the Christian Popular Front, and the Democratic Labor Party announced that they will not participate in the vote, considering it a betrayal of national interests and sovereignty and independence.

After an hour-long break, the parliament proceeded with its secret vote on the basis of pro and contra bulletins. After slightly more than an hour, when the tension rose to unbearable heights, the result of the ballot was announced: 162 votes in favor of rejecting the draft resolution, 22 votes against rejecting the draft resolution, and 4 votes invalidated. Therefore, the draft resolution on the Republic of Moldova's adherence to CIS was rejected.

The session's proceedings will be resumed tomorrow morning at 1000 [0700 GMT].

Four Votes Short

LD0408214093 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2015 GMT 4 Aug 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The Moldovan parliament has given the president extra powers while economic reform is being implemented. Deputies also looked at the question of joining the CIS. We have just learned of the results of a secret

ballot. Just four more votes were needed for the ratification of the Minsk agreement on Moldova's entry into the CIS.

Parliamentary Groups Reactions

LD0508045293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0447 GMT 5 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Fyodor Angeli]

[Text] Chisinau August 5 TASS—People's deputies from the parliamentary group of the Popular Front and the Congress of Intellectuals, which support Moldova's joining of Romania, have met with applause the information of the chairman of the counting commission that the Minsk agreement on Moldova's joining of the CIS has not been ratified, because it got only four votes less than it was needed for ratification.

Members of parliament from the parliamentary groups of agrarians, the largest one in the Moldovan parliament with the strength of about 100, intend to resign. This means that Moldova will soon face another political crisis.

Tiraspol Authorities Ban 14th Army TV, Press

AU0508084793 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1713 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Text] Tiraspol, BASAPRESS 3/8/1993—The Transdniestrian Committee for Radio, Television and Press banned the cable broadcast of the ARM-TV, a programme of the 14th Army. The committee, led by Boris Akulov, intends to forbid and confiscate the 14th Army's newspaper, SOLDAT OTECHESTVA (Soldier of the Motherland). The reason is that this paper criticises the politics of Tiraspol leaders. Previously, the Tiraspol mass media committee had repeatedly tried to liquidate the ASKET Independent TV studio.

Kyrgyzstan

Akayev Vetoes Amended Housing Privatization Law

PM0408125193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Aug 93 First Edition p 2

[Rina Prizhivoyt report: "In the Interests of Property Owners"]

[Text] Bishkek—Kyrgyzstan's President A. Akayev has vetoed the Law "On Privatizing the Republic of Kyrgyzstan Housing Stock" adopted by parliament 7 May this year.

The 12th session amended the law, specifying that state and municipal apartments and houses were to be transferred to citizens free of charge and that the sale of private accommodations is banned for five years from the date the property is acquired. The deputies who introduced the amendment justified it by saying that apartments are mainly being sold to members of the Russian-speaking population who are leaving the republic, thereby disadvantaging members of the indigenous population who do not have the means to purchase accommodations, the cost of which is now running into seven figures (in rubles) in the capital.

A. Akayev noted that these articles in the new law contradict the Constitution of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, which guarantees protection of private property and citizens' rights and freedoms, and that the egalitarian approach will be unfair to those who have invested considerable sums in building individual houses and cooperative apartments and those who have already bought their houses, since no compensation is envisaged for their outlay.

The law has been returned to the Supreme Soviet for repeat examination.

Ruble Exchange Hurts Russians in Kyrgyzstan

PM0408143193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Aug 93 First Edition p 2

[Rina Prizhivoyt report: "Russian Migrants From Kyrgyzstan Have Fallen Victim to Ruble Exchange"]

[Text] Bishkek—Kyrgyzstan quit the ruble zone in May, and this measure was a lifesaver for most of the republic's population when Russia announced the ruble exchange. However, many people did suffer as a result of it.

The exchange hit Kyrgyzstan inhabitants who had hoarded Russian money in order to travel on leave to Commonwealth countries. But it has been a real tragedy for Russia's new citizens who managed in Kyrgyzstan to sell their houses, cars, and property, getting paid mainly in bank notes which are no longer in circulation in their future place of residence. Under a decree dated 26 July, the Committee for Introducing the Republic of Kyrgyzstan's National Currency banned the exchange of som for 1992-issue Russian rubles and banned sales of 1993-issue rubles for national currency before 7 August, and has also fixed a ceiling of 200,000 rubles on the amount of recently issued Russian money that can be taken out of the republic by one individual.

Nowadays people stand in line all night to get into the Russian Federation Embassy in Bishkek. Anyone who is slow off the mark in legalizing their Russian citizenship before the end of August risks being left totally destitute, since it will be impossible to exchange money locally or to take it to Russia when they are able to go.

Russian Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Mikhail Romanov told your correspondent that throughout last week his embassy was visited by fellow citizens who are here on leave or on business. They suddenly found themselves here without any money to survive, unable to buy a either a return ticket or food. They are being shown sympathy, but there is nothing that can be done to help them. At the present time the procedure according to which money will be exchanged for Russian servicemen stationed on the republic's territory, representatives of accredited Russian mass media in Bishkek, or the embassy staffers themselves and members of their families is not known. Numerous attempts to find out something definite from the Bank of Russia have proved fruitless. The reply from the bank is: "The question is being examined."

National Democrats Oppose Government's Economic Plans

PM0208101093 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Jul 93 First Edition p 7

[Report by Vladimir Berezovskiy: "National-Democrats 'Divorce' Askar Akayev"]

[Text] Bishkek—To all appearances the Kyrgyz national-democrats have mounted another attack on the authorities. Representatives of eight parties and movements gathered last week in a boarding house in Issyk-Kul to introduce order to their ranks as though they were facing their "last, decisive battle."

Topchubek Turgunaliyev, leader of the "Free Kyrgyzstan" democratic party, has intimidated official Bishkek by suggesting that the republic is on the threshold of a social storm. The reason is the economy's plunge into the morass of a crisis into which it is being drawn by the ill-considered introduction of a national currency. In the opposition's opinion, the som has doomed the republic to fatal self-isolation. Yet the authorities, the national-democrats believe, do not have a clear-cut foreign and domestic policy, lack internal unity, and quite often violate the laws and Constitution.

The opposition is convinced that the fall will decide the republic's fate.

Representatives of the "Asaba" party, which stands on nationalist positions, insist on the immediate self-dissolution of parliament in which, in their opinion, prosecutors, ministers, judges, governors, economic leaders, and businessmen have no right to sit. They should be replaced by professional politicians representing the parties and movements. If the Supreme Soviet insists, the national democrats threaten acts of civil insubordination.

The "roundtable" demanded the convening of an extraordinary Supreme Soviet session in order to voice lack of confidence in the government and form a new cabinet of ministers with full powers until the election of the future parliament. The national-democrats are also insisting on the introduction of an emergency economic situation.

For the first time the opposition has also demanded early elections of the president. Askar Akayev, who came to power on the wave of national resurrection and the struggle against the communist party, no longer suits the radicals.

Foreign Minister To Visit India; Accords Expected

LD0408164093 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Kyrgyz 2300 GMT 3 Aug 93

[Summary] As has been reported by the press service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an official visit of Foreign Affairs Minister Ednan Karabayev of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan to the Republic of India begins today.

Note should be made of the fact that the first and most important contacts between our countries were established last year in March during the official visit of President Askar Akayev to India. Since then, India, one of the biggest countries of the world, has come to hold an important place in Kyrgyzstan's foreign policy.

It is anticipated that during the visit of the Kyrgyzstan foreign affairs minister to India an agreement will be signed on a regular air route and an inter-government agreement on cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and the Ministry of External Affairs of the Republuc of India and also in the area of tourism.

Discusses Reforms With President

LD0408165193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1609 GMT 4 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Baydashin]

[Text] New Delhi August 4 TASS—Kyrgyzstan Foreign Minister Ednan Karabayev currently on an official visit to India was received by President of India Shankar Dayal Sharma on Wednesday [4 August].

During the meeting Karabayev spoke of the constitutional and economic reforms underway in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan attaches great attention to the economic cooperation with India, he said.

Shankar Dayal Sharma spoke of an economic liberalization program being implemented in the republic. According to the Indian president, this program opens great possibilities in developing cooperation between India and Kyrgyzstan in the sphere of economy, first of all, in agriculture.

Discusses Economic Cooperation

LD0508065093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0411 GMT 5 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Zaytsev]

[Text] Delhi, 5 August—Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Ednan Karabayev handed a special message from Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev to Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao. The head of the Kyrgyzstan Foreign Ministry arrived in India on Wednesday on an official visit.

E. Karabayev informed N. Rao about the implementation of the economic reforms in Kyrgyzstan. The two sides also discussed issues of mutual interest.

Prior to this, E. Karabayev had a lively exchange of views affecting the prospects of the political and economic cooperation between the two states at a meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh.

The leaders of the foreign affairs departments of India and Kyrgyzstan also signed documents that envisage the development of economic, agricultural, scientific, and technological ties.

The expansion of economic cooperation with India is of great importance to Kyrgyzstan, said E. Karabayev, following the ceremony of the signing of the documents.

Tajikistan

Defense Ministry Claims 'Successful Attack' on Rebels

LD0408175693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1721 GMT 4 Aug 93

[by ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Grizneva]

[Text] Dushanbe, 4 Aug—According to information from the Tajikistan Defense Ministry, the republic's government forces are continuing a successful attack on the armed opposition's formations in the Tavildara Rayon of the Pamir mountains. By this evening the republic's Defense Ministry subunits had completely routed four major groupings in Dashti-Shuyer, Khur, and other areas of the Tavildara canyon.

Both sides sustained losses. There are, however, no casualties among the peaceful population, the press center of the Tajikistan Defense Ministry claims, because long before hostilities started, the residents had left the village of Tashgisher and other populated areas. The military also denied reports in some foreign media alleging that the government forces carried out air raids on villages of Kalaikhumskiy rayon, which is part of Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous oblast. According to the information available to the Defense Ministry, the Gorno-Badakhshan self-defense detachments are not taking part in combat in Tavildara Rayon.

The final goal of the operation, an ITAR-TASS correspondent was told at the Tajikistan Defense Ministry's press center, is to completely clear Pamir regions of anti-government groupings and to free the Dushanbe-Khorog route in order to dispatch a major convoy of food and other vital goods to Gorno-Badakhshan oblast in the near future.

Official Denies Bombing Gorno-Badakhshan

LD0508074893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0656 GMT 5 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vitaliy Gordiyenko]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Aug—In a telephone interview given to an ITAR-TASS correspondent, Anatoliy Kuptsov, deputy chairman of the Tajik National Security Committee, today denied reports that the government forces carried out aerial bombing strikes yesterday against villages in Kalay-Khumb Rayon in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast.

"This could not have happened, if only for the simple reason that the Tajik defense minister has no Air Force," he said. Apart from the units belonging to the republican Defense Ministry, no other forces are taking part in the operation to unblock the Dushanbe-Khorog highway, Kuptsov said. According to Kuptsov, the operation is being carried out only by government forces. The units of the Russian Army and the Russian border guards are going strictly about their business, strengthening the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Everyone here is aware of the importance of ensuring that Gorno-Badakhshan gets its supplies of food and medicines before the passes become impassable because otherwise the rayon would be left without vital supplies, noted the deputy chairman of the National Security Committee.

Kuptsov added that government troops were in Tavildara Rayon, some 400 kms from Khorog. The duty officer of the Russian border troops in Tajikistan confirmed that the border guards were guarding the border and not taking part in the events in the Pamir area. He said that the situation along the Tajik-Afghan border was normal overnight.

Local Official Comments on Events

LD0508130793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0957 GMT 5 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Dushanbe, 5 Aug—The withdrawal of government forces is an indispensable condition for a political dialogue between Gorno-Badakhshan and the Tajik leadership, Garibsho Shabozov, head of the autonomous area's administration, has said. Their presence in Pamir's Kalaikhumskiy Rayon is evoking a strong negative reaction among the local population, he told an ITAR-TASS correspondent. Shabozov denied the assertions of official sources in Dushanbe that the military used no helicopters in the area of combat operations. The Pamir authorities, in his words, have enough evidence to prove the opposite. Moreover, several civilians were killed in the shelling of the village of Sagirdasht.

Following the latest "tragic" events in the region, Shabozov and the head of the Gorno-Badakhshan administration are to urgently fly out to Dushanbe for a meeting with the republican leadership. The meeting will also discuss the issue of urgent humanitarian aid to the population of Pamir. "If it does not arrive in the near future, the people will die of starvation. The only food the majority of mountain people have is a piece of bread and a handful of mulberries," he said. The autonomy's authorities appealed to the Russian Government to send air transport to speed up the delivery of foodstuffs from Dushanbe to Pamir and to take refugees from the republic's central rayons—there are about 40,000 of them in the oblast—to their places of permanent residence.

According to some local observers, the sociopolitical situation in Gorno-Badakhshan is extremely tense. The opposition groups, including the most radical ones, have stepped up their activities, pushing local authorities toward confrontation with the central government.

Russian Official Discusses Role of Russian Troops

LD0508105793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0750 GMT 5 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe, 5 Aug—"The Russian troops quartered in Tajikistan have not been involved in and are not involved in the internal political conflict in the republic and play no part in any kind of combat actions against the internal opposition." This was stated today at a news conference by Lieutenant General Aleksandr Sokolov, chief of an operational group of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, in connection with continuing slanderous accusations against Russian servicemen on the part of some mass media outlets.

Russian troops have not planned and are not planning any preemptive strikes against Afghanistan, the general noted. "The aims and tasks of the 201st Motorized

Infantry Division are to assist the Russian border troops in guarding the Tajik-Afghan border. This is provided for by the treaty on collective security and by the bilateral agreement between Russia and Tajikistan. In his words, cooperating with the border troops, subunits of the 201st Motorized Infantry Division are taking part only in repulsing attacks from the territory of Afghanistan by fighters of the Tajik opposition and in the suppression of firing positions that are firing upon outposts from the neighboring shore.

The general described as "extremely complex" the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. The fire upon the outposts from Afghan territory and attempts to violate the border on sections of the Pyandzh and Moskovskiy border detachment—against which a large buildup of opposition detachments and Afghan mojahedin is being noted—does not cease for a day. In the region of the 11th outpost, a group of fighters—roughly 15 people—succeeded two days ago in crossing into the territory of Tajikistan in the direction of the village of Vari and in consolidating their hold there. The border troops are combing the area in order to neutralize the fighters.

Denies Afghan Analogy

LD0508121693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1117 GMT 5 Aug 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Aug—Over 120 attempts to force a way across the Tajik-Afghan border have been made during the past month, a Dushanbe news conference was told today by Lieutenant General Aleksandr Sokolov, head of the operations group of the Russian Defense Ministry and deputy commander in chief of ground forces, and Colonel Anatoliy Ivlev, deputy commander of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division.

According to details given to ITAR-TASS by the Defense Ministry's Information and Press Directorate, the participants in the news conference noted that of late some sections of the mass media have been actively using the terms "Afghan syndrome" and "lessons of Afghanistan." It is claimed that the Russian leadership, including the military command, is repeating the mistakes that led to the war in Afghanistan. According to the Russian officers, no analogy whatsoever can be made with the present situation and there is no real basis for this conjecture.

Unlike Tajikistan, which is linked to Russia by age-old bonds of history, culture, and tradition, Afghanistan did not have a Russian-speaking community numbering many thousands, who are now being defended by Russian border guards and motorized infantry. The news conference was told that the rebuff they are giving to bandit gangs is an indispensable and unavoidable measure and a practical implementation by the Russian side of the collective security treaty in respect to the Republic of Tajikistan.

Kyrgyz Regiment Arrives To Support Russian Guards

LD0508100793 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Kyrgyz 2300 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] A Kyrgyz regiment of 250 soldiers led by Major Umurbekov has arrived at the Tajik-Afgan border from the Tashkent border guards. They will serve with Russian border guards at the first, second, third, and fourth border posts and also at the [word indistinct] training center. A buildup of guerrillas can be seen on the Afgan side of the border and the local population is alarmed. According to intelligence data, an attack on the first border post is expected in the near future. It is believed that the guerrillas want to break through and strike Dushanbe.

Garmskiy Leader Denies Concentration of Opposition Forces

LD0408142293 Dushanbe Radio Dushanbe Network in Tajik 1200 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Bahriddin Muzafarov, chairman of the executive committee of Garmskiy rayon, has denied the information which was provided by the Russian Federation's "Ostankino" Television on 1 August pertaining to the rayon's situation. According to this information the armed groups of opposition have been concentrated in this rayon and the situation is tense.

In reality the situation in Garmskiy rayon is calm and I appeal to the republic's population not to believe the false information, the chairman said.

Rakhmanov, Yeltsin Discuss CIS Summit, Border Conflict

LD0408142493 Dushanbe Radio Dushanbe Network in Tajik 0030 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Yesterday Imamali Rakhmanov, head of state and chairman of the Tajikistan Supreme Soviet, had a telephone conversation with Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin. The head of the state was informed about the forthcoming summit meeting of the heads of the CIS countries, which will take place on 7 August in Moscow. The situation on the Tajik-Afghan border was discussed during the telephone conversation.

Armenia

Karabakh Leader Appeals to Mario Raffaelli

NC0408154093 Yerevan SNARK in English 1118 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Stepanakert, August 4 (SNARK)—On the threshold of the "9+1" group new meeting which will take place in Rome Karen Baburyan, acting as a head of the Karabakh Parliament has appealed to Mario Raffaelli as a chairman of the CSCE Minsk conference.

He asked Raffaelli to be more attentive to the position of Nagorno-Karabakh, to understand it and take all possible measures to achieve peace in the region.

The Karabakh leader underlines in his appeal that "the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh doesn't pretend to capture strange territories but till guns fire the Karabakh towns and villages we have to neutralize them. We have no other way out."

At the same time Mr. Baburyan's letter says with regrets that the UNO Security Council 853 Resolution unilaterally accuses the actions of the Karabakh defense army. The basis of the 853 Resolution is the project of your report. It ignores the argumentation we sent you in our letter, July 23, 1993. It seems as if neither "9 states", nor members of the Security Council of the UNO were aware of the letters's content, data on the Azerbaijani aggression: Stepanakert was shelled with long-distance artillery on July 21, 22, 23, 1993, the settlements of the Askeranskiy region were bombed. These facts were confirmed by the representatives of the authoritative international organizations who were in Nagorno- Karabakh. But their witnesses were not taken into consideration.

You, Mr. Raffaelli, tried to persuade the world community that the Karabakh side led you astray saying that the Stepanakert-Agdam road was mined and the Karabakh side had no intentions to attack. But the fact that trying to break the defense line two Azerbaijani tanks were fired on July 22 at one of the parts of the road confirmed the statements of the Karabakh side. Just imagine how many peaceful citizens would be killed by those tanks if only the road wouldn't have been mined.

It seems as if you, Mr. Raffaelli, being a chairman of the peaceful conference, give the recommendations to apply the punitive measures to the Karabakh people. Don't you know that the only wish we live with is to live on our land.

Our special regret is the fact that the Minsk Group didn't support the direct contacts between Karabakh and Azerbaijan though during your visit to Stepanakert we appealed to you to help installing such contacts within the CSCE. The Azerbaijani side following its own initiatives entered the direct dialogue with Karabakh but being encouraged by your report and the accepted 853 Resolution of the UNO Security Council left the shortest way to peace which is the direct contacts with Karabakh. We hope you will give us the explanations on your position which let us clear up our further mutual steps."

Azerbaijani Shelling of Karabakh, Borders Reported

NC0408163893 Yerevan Radio Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Armenian Defense Ministry press service informed us that the enemy opened Grad, artillery, and howitzer fire towards Shavarshavan in Noyemberyanskiy Rayon yesterday evening. The enemy also opened artillery fire in an unsuccessful attempt to set fire to the wheat fields in Parekamavan in the same rayon. The shelling caused no damage. The shelling stopped after counter-measures were taken by the Armenian fighters. Relative calm has been prevailing on the Armenian-Azerbaijani front since last night.

The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR]: The NKR Defensive Army Headquarters reported that the defensive positions in Gadrutskiy and Martuninskiy Rayons came under shelling from the Azerbaijani military bases in Fizulinskiy Rayon after 1100 on 3 August. Fortunately, there were no serious losses.

The people of Karabakh are adhering to the provisions of the temporary cease-fire and are refraining from resorting to counter-measures.

Azerbaijan

Possibility of 'Summit' With Armenians Denied

NC0408172393 Baku TURAN in English 1509 GMT 4 Aug 93

["An Information of the Armenian Sources About the Preparation of an Official Meeting of the Azeri Authorities With the Representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians Is Incorrect"—TURAN headline]

[Text] Baku, Aug. 4 (TURAN)—The Armenian mass media recently spreaded an information about the consultations on organization of a "summit" that are going on between Baku and Khankendi [Stepanakert]. According to the Armenian sources, the parties hold an intensive talks on preparation of that kind of meeting. But, as the Azeri presidents advisor on foreign affairs Vafa Gulizade told TURAN agency correspondent, that the members of Azerbaijan delegation had no powers to discuss any questions, concerning so-called "summit" at the recent talks with the representatives of the Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh. To V. Gulizade's words, the members of the Azeri delegation were enpowered to discuss only the questions, concerning a cease-fire, the terms of its maintenance, an exchange of prisoners and hostages.

Together with this V. Gulizade said, that probably, the proposal of holding a "summit" were put forward by the

Armenian party. "But it doesnt mean, that the agreement of holding such a meeting was achieved", the presidents advisor said.

Fizhuli, Kazakhskiy Reportedly Under Fire

NC0408171693 Baku TURAN in English 1509 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Baku (August 4) TURAN—As press-centre of Defense Ministry of the Republic reports, tonight five villages, neighbouring with Kazakhskiy region and region centre had been bombarded from 'Grad' power plants from Berd [Tavushskiy] region of Armenia. Villages Farahli, Gaimagli, Dash-Salahli had been fired from several tens of equipments and rockets. Two rockets have fell down at residential districts of Kazakhskiy, in the result of that one house had been damaged. Fortunately, there is no victims.

Yesterday from 21 oclock Fizuli town had been massively bombarding Guring 4 hours. As it was reported, Armenian units have taken all the heights around this town in the south of Nagorno-Karabakh and they were going on to fire at it.

Firings of Sadarak district of Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic from Araratskiy region of Armenia are again resumed. There are some damages and wounded.

Elchibey Interviewed on Situation in Azerbaijan

MK0508095593 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No.31, 8 Aug 93 (signed to press 3 Aug 93) p A12

[Interview with Abulfaz Elchibey, deposed president of Azerbaijan, by Dmitriy Ukhlin in the village of Keleki; date not given: "President Elchibey: 'Democracy Cannot Be an Internal Affair'"]

[Text] Abulfaz Elchibey, the Azerbaijani president deposed by a military coup, is currently staying in his home village of Keleki, 35 km from Nakhichevan. After his sudden departure from Baku, the new Azerbaijani authorities immediately attempted to cut Nakhichevan off from the capital. Citing the laws of the military period, they imposed a curfew, a system of special passes, and permanent passport control. You cannot buy an air ticket or enter or leave your plane unless you have a Nakhichevan residence permit, and the very attempt to commit such a seditious act will land you in a police station—there are more military and police patrols in the airport than there are passengers. Journalists who come to Baku wishing to visit the president are initially gently persuaded to abandon the idea, and then resolutely blocked. Our Western counterparts sneak in there via Turkey. Your MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent had to make use of underground channels of the Azerbaijani People's Front. With false documents issued to Fuad Bayramov, a resident of Nakhichevan, he was passed literally from hand to hand by People's Front activists, and finally reached the carefully protected residence of Abulfaz Elchibey.

[Ukhlin] Mr. Elchibey: First of all, why are you staying here? How real was the threat to your life and freedom when you were removed from power?

[Elchibey] It would not be entirely correct to say that my life was threatened. My decision to leave Baku and move here was prompted by a real threat of civil war that I tried to hold off.

[Ukhlin] Do you think that Geydar Aliyev and Surat Guseynov coordinated their efforts? Can we speak about any involvement of Ayaz Mutalibov?

[Elchibey] According to my information, Aliyev and Guseynov have very long-standing ties, albeit not direct ones, but through middlemen. Recent events have generally proved this. They act with one purpose and in unison. Surat Guseynov is a man who carries things out, and he is manipulated by Aliyev. As for Mutalibov, he has also long been in close contact with Guseynov. But presently, the latter's positions have been weakened because more and more figures join in the fray, more and more political forces. Guseynov is simply unable to figure all this out, and anyone who is willing to take the trouble is trying to exploit his military capacity, including former Defense Minister Ragim Kaziyev and Deputy Parliamentary Speaker Tamerlan Karayev.

[Ukhlin] Are there any political forces in Russia that had an interest in your removal?

[Elchibey] This is a serious question. The thing is that there are Russian structures that have great possibilities to influence Azerbaijan's internal politics. Unfortunately, I do not have any documented evidence to that effect, and I will not give specific names. The influence of the Russian Security Ministry, Defense Ministry, and the intelligence service, however, is beyond doubt. Being directly involved in military operations on the border with Armenia and in Karabakh, these three agencies have been constantly exerting pressure on the internal political situation in Azerbaijan, adding to civil confrontation. Of those acting in the republic, I can name Shcherbak, commander of the airborne regiment in Ganja, who supplied the rebels with arms and was involved in drafting their strategic plans.

I would like to point out that Russia's democratic forces have not expressed their attitude to the events in Azerbaijan. In 1991, when there was a coup attempt in Russia, or recently when Yeltsin faced the complex issue of the referendum, Azerbaijan was the first to respond and made official statements in support of democracy. There does not seem, however, to be any reaction in Russia. The Foreign Ministry said that Russia would not interfere in Azerbaijan's internal affairs. But democracy cannot be an internal affair of just one country, as, for example, in the fight against terrorism.

[Ukhlin] Do you receive reports about repressive acts, either those upcoming or already taken by the new authorities against your supporters? What is your explanation for the lack of mass actions in your support?

[Elchibey] Repressive acts began immediately upon the arrival of the new authorities. Many supporters of the Azerbaijani People's Front have been arrested, and other arrests were sanctioned. If this continues, the People's Front will find itself under serious pressure. The reason the opposition is not so strong is that the situation on the front is very difficult: Agdam fell, and Fizuli is under serious threat. All attention is focused on the events there, and we have to act very carefully so that Armenia will not exploit the destabilization. Its latest actions are a stab in the back to our democracy and the desire for a peaceful settlement. If we succeed in achieving a halt in combat operations and negotiating a truce thanks to the efforts of the United States, Russia, and Turkey, we will initiate a full-scale political struggle in the republic.

[Ukhlin] Can your current plight be compared with that of Zviad Gamsakhurdia?

[Elchibey] This is a correct parallel. The same hand can be traced in both cases. Both armed coups were prepared in one location and the plans were executed using indistinguishably similar methods. I sensed these developments in Azerbaijan and tried to reverse this course of events, to avoid a civil war, compared to which any changes in power would pale in significance.

[Ukhlin] Do you link your removal with the successful completion of talks on the withdrawal of Armenian troops from Kelbadzhar?

[Elchibey] Indeed, the issue of Kelbadzhar Rayon entered its final stage in June. The peaceful liberation of Kelbadzhar would have been a serious factor for stabilizing Azerbaijan's internal situation and finalizing a definitive withdrawal from the war. This did not suit the rebels, and they chose to expedite events.

[Ukhlin] Who do you think must be held responsible for the events in Gyandzha?

[Elchibey] Undoubtedly, those who created that situation. I would not act like my political opponents do, first naming those responsible and then doing everything possible to sentence them without trial. A careful investigation is indispensable. I believe that responsibility rests with the rebels, who refused to pay heed to the legitimate government authorities. This is also the fault of those who, while carrying out the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry's order to dissolve the 709th Brigade, made a number of mistakes.

[Ukhlin] Why didn't you move to dissolve parliament and call a new election while you were in power?

[Elchibey] Last fall, I asked the parliamentary speaker and a number of deputies to pass a new election law in the shortest time possible. But they replied that there was no need to make haste, because there were more important and urgent matters on the agenda. At the beginning of this year, a draft law on elections was drawn up by my staff and submitted to the parliament. I repeatedly tried to rush it through, but unsuccessfully. I think this was our main mistake, and it led in the end to this turn of events.

[Ukhlin] What are your immediate plans? Are you planning to return to Baku?

[Elchibey] The Azerbaijani parliament under Geydar Aliyev is passing one anti-constitutional decision after another. The latest to bypass the terms and rules provided for in the Constitution concerns the holding of a referendum on confidence in the president on 28 August of this year. These matters are being decided upon in the president's absence and without his consent, so I am considering a way to make a stand against this. What is now being aired from Milli Majlis sessions makes it clear, not only to the intelligentsia but also to other sectors of the population, who has actually come to power. As for my return to Baku, it depends on whether the democratic forces of Azerbaijan take a principled stance on the issue.

Authorities Seclude Elchibey, Arrest Supporters

MK0408113393 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 39, 3 Aug 93 (signed to press 2 Aug) p 4

[Mekhman Gafarly report under the "Power" rubric: "Elchibey Becomes Gradually Isolated From Outside World. Neither Journalists Nor Associates Are Allowed To See Him"]

[Text] Entry into the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, where A. Elchibey now stays, has been restricted as of last week by the republican leadership directive. Only those having permanent Nakhichevan residence permits can enter the republic's territory without restriction, while all others wishing to enter are supposed to obtain permits from the permanent representative of Nakhichevan in Baku. Due to a blockade imposed by Armenia, the region can only be reached by air. Those without special permits are rejected at the plane's entry area. Several journalists and members of the Milli Majlis Nadzhaf Nadzhafov and Tofik Gasymov were barred from boarding the plane. Elchibey thinks this is "an attempt by the republic's present leaders to isolate him from the outside world, to deny a chance to win the referendum." The barring of the journalists' trip to Nakhichevan is attributed to the fact that many members of the mass media have been speaking of late in support of the deposed president.

Given today's situation in Azerbaijan, Elchibey is not going to win the referendum scheduled for 28 August because it will be held while the emergency situation ruling is still in effect and all forms of propaganda, including meetings, are banned. Elchibey declares that the holding of the referendum under an emergency situation rule is a breach of generally accepted principles

of democratic expression of will, while Azerbaijan's ex-Foreign Minister Tofik Gasymov simply called the republic's parliament referendum decision a "legal paradox", implying that it is going to be held under an emergency situation. Besides, the calling of the referendum was accompanied by fresh arrests of activists of the People's Front of Azerbaijan (PFA). This time around, arrested in a Baku tea room were Rushtu Mamedov, plenipotentiary representative of the PFA chairman in Gyandzhebasar; Mamed Amrakhov, member of the Gyandzha PFA branch executive committee; leaders of the "Musavat" (Equality) party Rizvan Guseynli; and Yashar Tyurkazer. All of them are in a holding cell of the Sabailskiy Rayon 9th Precinct Internal Affairs Department of the city of Baku. A deputy chief of the precinct, Allakhyarov, explained their arrest by the fact that "down there in the tea room, they conducted conversations directed against the present authorities of the republic."

Today all PFA rayon heads have been fired from their jobs, which puts in doubt the disgraced president's victory in the referendum, especially in conditions where all power in the republic is in the hands of his political opponents.

But Elchibey is not giving up. Last Sunday, he, as Azerbaijan president, sent letters to U.S. President B. Clinton and UN Secretary General B. Ghali, thanking them for having condemned the Armenian occupation of Agdam Rayon, and for the adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 853 demanding the withdrawal of the occupation troops.

In the meantime, new Elchibey supporters have appeared in the republic. Such influential parties as the Party of National Independence, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, the "Musavat," among others, have pledged their support to Elchibey in the referendum.

New Presidential Press Chief Comments on Refugees

NC0408173193 Baku ASSA-IRADA in English 1536 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Baku 04.08.93 (ASSA-IRADA)—129.384 peoples—nowadays this is the number of the registered refugees from the Agdam district of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenia. It means 23.552 families are accommodated in Baku at relatives and friends, or 19.870 peoples, the rest—in 36 districts of the Republic. Azeri Government payed refugees an allowance valued at 5000 manats per each person. In the nearest time humanitarian assistance will be delivered from abroad valued at 10 mln. dollars,—new chief of president press-service Tofiq Abbasov said at his first briefing. Speaking about the situation in Lenkoran, he assessed activities of the self-declared, so-called Talish-Mugan Republic as separative but stressed with pleasure that at present there is no armed confrontation in Lenkoran asked about allegedly increasing pro- Russian orientation of the new authorities, T. Abbasov said, that Azerbaijan adheres only to pro-Azerbaijani orientation. Nevertheless the Republic must develop equal mutually beneficial relations with all neighbours: Turkey, Iran, Russia.

Short information about the new leader of president press- service: He is 34 years old, he graduated from journalist department of Baku State University, professional TV journalist, on national television he passed from junior editor till studio director. He believes, that professional skills and abilities are more important in journalism but not rank. He is sure that journalist must focus himself on any definite sphere and be well-informed. T. Abbasov would like to organize press-service work at more highest professional level. He doesn't belong to any political party and movement. Not married.

Abbasov Comments on Political, Economic Situation

NC0508073193 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Tofik Abbasov, acting head of the presidential press service, held a briefing for local and foreign journalists today. He briefed the journalists on the social, political, and economic situation in the republic and stressed the importance of telling the world the truth concerning Armenia's aggressive actions against Azerbaijan. Abbasov also explained the nature of UN Security Council Resolution 853 and replied to the many questions put to him by the journalists.

'Creative Intelligence' Group Protests Kamberov's Arrest

NC0408174393 Baku TURAN in English 1509 GMT 4 Aug 93

["Appeal of Representatives of Creative Intelligence to the Chairman of the Parliament Geydar Aliyev"—TURAN headline]

[Text] Baku, Aug. 4 (TUAN)—The representatives of creative intelligence of Azerbaijan have addressed an appeal to the chairman of SS [Supreme Soviet] of the Republic Geydar Aliyev in connection with arrest of former speaker of the parliament.

The appeal runs, norms of legal state excluded the necessity of arresting the person and declare him the criminal without judgment of the court and irrespective of his political views.

The representatives of intelligence asked G. Aliyev to change the measure of punishment for Isa Kamberov and expressed their hope, that positive settlement of this question would be the base for forming favourable situation in political world and unity in the Republic.

Aliyev Receives Greek Ambassador

NC0508074393 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Geydar Aliyev, acting president and chairman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet, today received Panayiotis Karatsasis, Greece's extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador to Azerbaijan who recently assumed his duties. The ambassador presented his credentials to Aliyev.

Geydar Aliyev said that because of its geographic and economic position, Greece, which is one of the oldest [words indistinct], can play an important role in Azerbaijan's relations with Europe. He said: Azerbaijan is convinced that Greece can influence the countries in Europe and in the eastern world, as it has done so in the past, and that the new Greek ambassador, who has worked in diplomatic missions for a long time, will be able to contribute to the improvement of our relations.

On his part, Karatsasis thanked Aliyev for his warm welcome and said that Greece regards Azerbaijan as a very interesting country, especially its program on the Transcaucasus. The Greek Government is convinced that peace can only be established in Azerbaijan through talks and adherence to the decisions adopted by international organizations, such as the United Nations and the CSCE. The ambassador said: Using Greece's presidency in the EC, we shall try to resolve Azerbaijan's problems.

Vefa Gulizade, state adviser on foreign policy, and Acting Foreign Minister Albert Salamov also attended the meeting.

Georgia

Shevardnadze Seeks Immediate Deployment of UN Forces

LD0408155093 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1500 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] According to CONTACT news agency, Eduard Shevardnadze, chairman of the Georgian parliament and head of state, sent a telegram to UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali today.

The telegram expresses the belief that by the active interference of the United Nations, a political settlement of the bloody conflict in Abkhazia will be possible. The moment is crucial, says the telegram, and if this possibility is not used now that the cease-fire has been reached, our combined efforts will be in vain and the processes will get out of hand. From this point of view, the fact that the military observers are going to be dispatched next week is a step forward.

The head of the Georgian state, in his telegram to the UN secretary general, also raises the issue of an immediate deployment of the peace-keeping forces under the auspices of the United Nations in the conflict zone.

Shevardnadze Orders Ban on Flights From Sukhumi

LD0408131693 Tbilisi IBERIA NEWS AGENCY in Georgian 1030 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Tbilisi, 4 Aug— E. Shevardnadze personally instructed the commandant of Sukhumi, who has issued an order banning civilian air flights from Sukhumi Babushara Airport. The press center of the Abkhaz Armed Forces links this decision to the start of an exodus from Abkhazia of the Georgian population.

Abkhaz Cease-Fire Agreement Published

AU0508105693 Tbilisi SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA in Georgian 29 Jul 93 p 1

["Agreement on a Cease-Fire in Abkhazia and a Control Mechanism for Observing it" signed in Sochi on 27 July]

[Text] Representatives of the sides participating in the conflict, through the mediation of Russia, have agreed to the following:

1. From 1200 on 28 July 1993, the sides participating in the conflict are to return to the strict observance of the cease-fire regime and the mutual non-use of force in the conflict zone that was established on 20 May of this year.

Any kind of combat use of aviation, artillery, and floating vessels and the use of any kind of military hardware and weapons are prohibited.

Additional troops and other armed formations will not be introduced into the conflict zone (on the territory of Abkhazia); there will be no mobilization or the uncoordinated transfer of troops and other formations; no weapons and ammunition will be brought in; and no installations of the military infrastructure will be built.

2. From 29 July 1993, Georgian-Abkhazian-Russian temporary control groups (from three to nine persons) will begin to function, the composition of which will be agreed upon by the sides.

The temporary control groups will monitor observance of the cease-fire regime. They will be located in Sukhumi, Gulripshi, Ochamchire, Gudauta, Akhali Atoni, Tqvarcheli, Gagra, and Gali. If necessary, such groups, upon agreement by the sides, will be deployed in other points as well. The control groups have the right to enter any point in the conflict zone that is of interest to them after they have given the appropriate notification to the sides. The sides participating in the conflict are to ensure the security of the control groups, are to create living conditions for them, and are to provide them with transportation facilities.

The control groups can examine appeals from the population relating to different issues.

Following the arrival of international observers, the temporary control groups are to establish close contacts with them.

3. Each side participating in the conflict undertakes to implement immediate effective measures in order to halt any violation of the cease-fire regime by its formations that has been registered by the control groups and to react efficiently to recommendations and proposals from the control groups.

The UN and the CSCE are to be informed of cases of noncompliance by the sides with their obligations assumed under this treaty.

4. A joint commission for regulating the situation in Abkhazia is to be formed by 5 August 1993. A statute on it will be ratified by the sides. Representatives and observers from the UN and the CSCE will participate in the work of the commission upon their agreement.

5. The sides consider it necessary to invite and use international observers and peace-keeping forces in the conflict zone. At the same time, it is envisaged that the number and composition of the international peace-keeping forces will be determined upon consultation with the UN secretary general and Security Council, provided the sides consent to this.

6. A stage-by-stage demilitarization of the conflict zone is to begin.

International observers are to enter the conflict zone immediately and Republic of Georgia armed formations are to leave the territory of Abkhazia within 10-15 days following the cease- fire.

Armed formations, groups, and individuals located in the conflict zone are to disband and leave Abkhazia over the same time period.

In order to protect trunk roads and important installations in accordance with the final document of the Moscow meeting of 3 September 1992, a subunit of internal troops from the Georgian side is to be formed in the conflict zone from the local population that is to be put on barracks alert. Subsequently, this subunit together with the regiment of internal troops mentioned below will become a part of the multinational internal troops of Abkhazia.

The armed formations from the Abkhazian side will comprise a regiment of internal troops that will be put on barracks alert and will fulfill the functions characteristic of internal troops (protection of trunk roads, important installations) until a full- scale settlement is reached.

All the aforementioned actions are to be implemented under the observation of the joint commission.

International observers are to be placed at the Gumista, Psou, and Inguri Rivers.

Immediately after the cease-fire, a multinational militia, whose composition and number will be determined by the sides, is to be created in the conflict zone in order to maintain public order.

In order to maintain the cease-fire and law and order, international peace-keeping forces are to be used and also, in consultation with the UN, the Russian military force that is temporarily located in the conflict zone.

The sides participating in the conflict guarantee to protect the rights of the multinational population.

Measures will be implemented to return refugees to their permanent place of residence and to assist them. The joint commission is to create a special group in order to resolve efficiently the tasks connected with the problem of the refugees.

7. The Russian troops temporarily situated on the territory of Abkhazia are to observe strict neutrality.

The status of the temporary stay, the conditions of the functioning, and the dates of and procedure for the withdrawal of the Russian Federation military formations and border troops will be determined by separate treaty documents.

The sides guarantee the security of the Russian servicemen and the members of their families.

8. In accordance with the final document of the Moscow meeting of 3 September 1992, the sides will create conditions for renewing the normal activities of the legal bodies of power in Abkhazia.

9. The sides in the conflict, under the aegis of the UN and with the assistance of Russia, will urgently continue negotiations on the preparation of an agreement for the full-scale regulation of the conflict in Abkhazia.

The fundamental questions of the maintenance of peace, the demilitarization of the conflict zone, the use of international peace-keeping forces, the regulation of economic life, the protection of law and order, the instituting of proceedings against persons who have committed crimes against the peaceful population, the return of refugees to their permanent places of residence, the protection of human rights and the rights of national minorities, and guarantees for ensuring the political status and state structure of Abkhazia will be reflected in the agreement.

10. The parties to this agreement undertake not to use its provisions and the cease-fire regime for actions that could damage the interests of any of them.

[Signed] On behalf of Georgia, V. Goguadze
On behalf of Abkhazia, S. Jinjolia
On behalf of the Russian Federation, A. Kozyrev
[Dated] Sochi, 27 July 1993

Former Abkhaz Minister Doubts Cease-Fire Will Be Honored

MK0408115593 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 4 Aug 93 p 3

[Unattributed report under the "NEGA Reports" rubric]

[Text] Tamaz Nadareishvili, former chairman of Abkhazia's Council of Ministers and member of Georgia's parliament, doubts that the cease-fire treaty signed between Georgia and Abkhazia will be honored.

He stated in an interview for the newspaper SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA on 3 August: "We were forced to take this step. Despite my radical position and repeated statements to the effect that peace talks are not going to yield positive results (and I still hold this view), I am also positive that such a document is necessary."

Yet items 6 and 8 in the treaty raise big doubts. Item 6 says that all Georgian troops should be pulled out of the territory of Abkhazia. Nadareishvili, however, thinks that it is necessary to leave on the territory of Abkhazia the army corps under General Uchadze and two mechanized brigades—23 and 24—manned by residents of Sukhumi and the Sukhumi zone.

Item 8 deals with restoring the legal organs of power in Abkhazia, i.e., the parliament led by its chairman V. Ardzinba. Nadareishvili voiced his resolute disagreement with Ardzinba's returning to power in Abkhazia while referring to deputies of the republic's parliament as "war criminals." He also stated that criminal proceedings have been filed against Ardzinba and Shamba as the organizers of this war, and against leaders of what he referred to as the fascist Aydgilar organization.

Delegation Visits Azerbaijan, Meets With Aliyev

LD0408151893 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1300 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] According to reports by the CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY, on 3-4 August a Georgian governmental delegation visited Azerbaijan. The delegation included Vakhtang Rcheulishvili, deputy speaker of the Georgian parliament, Deputy Prime Minister Zurab Kervalishvili, and other officials. During their visit, Vakhtang Rcheulishvili and Zurab Kervalishvili met Geydar Aliyev, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Geydar Aliyev welcomed the cease-fire in Abkhazia and stated that under the current situation the agreement of 27 July is the optimal variant for achieving peace in the region. The importance of the UN's role in resolving the Abkhaz conflict was especially stressed at the meeting as well as the fact that no such instances had taken place in conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union republics.

The importance of Georgian-Azeri relations was also stressed at the meeting. A wish was expressed to deepen the bilateral cooperation and mutual assistance as well as make contacts more active starting from regular summit meetings and ending with mutually beneficial cooperation between all economic circles. In this connection, the Azerbaijan Cabinet of Ministers was given relevant tasks.

Estonia

Defense Minister Rebas Resigns

WS0508095693 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1850 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Tallinn, August 4—Estonia's Defence Minister Hain Rebas left his resignation with Prime Minister Mart Laar's office Tuesday [3 August] evening over conflict with a rebel Estonian light infantry company, Rebas told ETA in a telephone interview from Sweden.

"The government's methods in solving the Pullapaa (the location in west Estonia of the company which last week refused to serve under the Ministry of Defence) conflict did not go with my understanding," Rebas said. "In a civilised society an official resigns if he is not able to be responsible for a situation and cannot act. I was playing a fair game all the time. I did not come to Estonia to sovietise myself," said an expatriate Rebas (50) who has a home in Sweden.

Rebas also criticised Estonia's government for creating a situation where young defence forces could have been ordered to engage in an armed conflict with the rebel company and said that his second born son Juhan was serving in the Kalev company and could have been one of them.

Rebas also said he had proposed the government to ask the Minister of Justice, Kaido Kama, to deal with the conflict as he knew several men from the rebel company in person and added that the head of the army, Major General Aleksander Einseln also supported the idea which the government ignored.

Rebas refused to comment on his possible withdrawal of the resignation. "Let us wait what the government commission will say," he added referring to a commission, led by the Minister of Transport and Communications, Andi Meister, established on Tuesday to investigate the conflict from both sides.

Rebas, left Estonia on Wednesday to resume his vacation near Gothenburg, Sweden, interrupted by the conflict and said all he wanted at the moment was rest.

The Minister will resume his vacation as the conflict at Pullapaa was being solved, the Estonian Ministry of Defence told ETA earlier while neither confirming nor rejecting rumours about Rebas' resignation.

Prime Minister Mart Laar was touring south Estonia on Wednesday and his press office said he had, consequently, not received any statements from Rebas.

Estonia's government at its session on July 27 decided to disband the voluntary Laanemaa light infantry company whose declaration of insubordination to the Defence Forces Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence was broadcast by the Estonian Radio the same morning.

The authors of the declaration, including the head of the Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP), a member of the ruling coalition, Ants Erm, a co-partisan of Rebas, expressed dissatisfaction over the company's training programme, financing, equipment and management of the company.

The 80-strong company was given two days to hand over their weapons while the decision was to be enforced by the Ministry of Defence. Rebas broke off his leave of absence to ensure enforcement of the government's decision.

On Monday, Laar who returned from his leave of absence said the Estonian defence police had started a criminal case in connection with the conflict and the same morning, the police at gunpoint arrested the deputy commander of the company, Jaak Mosin.

On Wednesday, the Defence Ministry said Mosin would remain detained under criminal code paragraph 248 article 2 on insubordination to one's superior and faces an eight-year imprisonment, if convicted.

On Tuesday, the government cancelled its ruling to disband the company following their revocation of the separatist declaration and formed a committee to investigate the conflict.

Security Services Can Bug Phones, Monitor Mail

PM0508091993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Aug 93 First Edition p 2

[Leonid Levitskiy report: "Permitted To Eavesdrop and Spy"]

[Text] Tallinn—The Estonian Government has adopted a decree "On a Temporary Procedure for the Use of Special Operational and Technical Devices." The document gives the security police legal grounds for bugging telephones, monitoring correspondence, and hidden surveillance.

The decree defines 40 types of crime for whose prevention or investigation special devices may be used. The security police's general director or his deputy will grant permission to use them. It is well understood that with such wide opportunities for investigation—40 reasons for it—the most varied information on many citizens and noncitizens will be accumulated. If leaked accidentally or in an organized manner, it could destroy the career of a political figure or entrepreneur.

The decree's authors have taken this contingency into consideration. The document forbids the use of data collected in such a specific manner outside the official framework.

Defense Commission Head Denies Advisor's Dismissal

WS0508100193 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN in English 0714 GMT 5 Aug 93

[From 5 August RAHVA HAAL, p 3]

[Text] Thursday, August 5—Kalle Eller, advisor of the Riigikogu defence commission, has not been dismissed, head of the commission Rein Helme told ETA. He admitted having made an oral suggestion to Eller to resign due to the latter's statements to the news media, unsuitable for a government official. Helme added that Eller had failed to provide any information on the activities and history of the National Defence Initiative Centre, despite repeated requests by the commission.

Former Rifle Company Leader Admits Mistakes

WS0508095993 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN in English 0714 GMT 5 Aug 93

[From 5 Aug PAEVALEHT, HOMMIKULEHT, p 1,3]

[Text] Thursday, August 5—Former Deputy Commander of the Rifle Company Jaak Mosin, currently under arrest, admitted his mistakes and invited the company officers to resign in an interview to the PAEVALEHT. The Tallinn City Court sanctioned his arrest up to ten days yesterday. All materials concerning Mosin had been handed over to the Central Investigation Bureau, head of the Defence Police Jiri Pihl said.

Mosin stressed that the conflict must be solved as soon as possible without anybody suffering and admitted that the company officers violated the existing legislation. He suggested that the officers might resign if their personal safety were guaranteed.

Officers Assemblies of the Kalev, Kuperyanov, Viru and Guard Battalions made a statement yesterday, stressing that the officers of those units had done their best to solve the crisis in a peaceful way. They criticized "the constant desire of the media and some political forces to escalate the tension and to destabilize the society with tendentious statements and lies about the Defence Forces." The officers expressed their wish that the media refrained from publishing unproven information and that officers avoided using the media for solving their problems.

Marine Section of the Border Guard Department protested against the newspaper reports of patrol craft armed with 23-millimetre cannon blocking the coast near Pullapaa. "The patrol craft were performing their usual duties during that time and none of them was near the Pullapaa region," the statement read. Deputy head of the Marine Section Juri Kreek added that only the patrol craft operating in the Muhu Straits could have been seen from Pullapaa. The Border Guard patrol vessels have no cannon—they are armed with large calibre machine guns, Kreek explained. However, the PAEVALEHT questions the statement and claims to possess video recording of at least one patrol craft anchored near Pullapaa.

Interior Minister: No Danger of ERSP Breaking Up

WS0508095793 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1850 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] Tallinn, August 4—"There is no danger that the Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP) will break up," its former chairwoman, the present Interior Minister Lagle Parek, said, commenting on the controversial statements made by the leaders of the ruling coalition party over a conflict concerning a rebel light infantry company over the last week.

The leader of the party, Ants Erm, on July 30 made a joint statement with the commander of the Laanemaa light infantry company, Asso Kommer, justifying the company's behaviour.

The Laanemaa light infantry company had previously declared its insubordination to the national army headquarters and the government decided to disband and disarm the company at its session on July 27.

Erm's statement was followed by the three ministers belonging to the ERSP, Lagle Parek, Hain Rebas, and Andi Meister, saying that Ants Erm cannot remain the leader of the party and its parliamentary faction.

Lagle Parek told ETA the board of ERSP had reached an agreement "to move collectively one step backwards". The ministers withdrew their demand about Erm's resignation, and, according to Parek, the party leader had also understood that no country could afford two separate armies.

Parek said the dissension was due to some politicians' inability to come out of the state of being in continual opposition like in the Soviet times. "People enjoy delivering blows, not understanding that they should not only criticize the government but render their help by making practical proposition."

Embassy To Open in Kiev; Envoy Appointed

WS0508100293 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN in English 0714 GMT 5 Aug 93

[From 5 Aug PAEVALEHT, RAHVA HAAL, p 3]

[Text] Thursday, August 5—Estonia is to open its Embassy in Kiev on August 9. Andrey Birov, Minister-Advisor of the Estonian Embassy in Moscow, is to be appointed Charge d'Affaires to Kiev. The Embassy staff will include two diplomats and head of the consulate at first but the number of officials is to rise to 5-7 in the future.

The embassy in Kiev will be Estonia's 44th foreign representation and 12th embassy.

Ivar Raig MP, currently studying in the Netherlands, is to be appointed the Estonian Ambassador to Italy, an unnamed government official was reported as saying. Estonia is to open its embassy in Rome next year.

Lithuania

Brazauskas News Conference on Talks With Russia

LD0408151493

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian at 0905 GMT on 4 August carries a 60-minute live news conference by Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas and Foreign Affairs Minister Povilas Gylys with moderator Nerijus Maliukevicius and unidentified correspondents in Vilnius.

Brazauskas begins his opening remarks by appealing to everyone to avoid passions and tensions in their comments on negotiations with Moscow. He says: "Persons who are responsible for one area of activity of our state or another will answer to the relevant institutions in accordance with our laws."

Brazauskas says that a remark that emerged during his vacation was that he missed official information, and that this official information was drowned in a quagmire of subjective reflections and commentaries.

He says: "Any discussion may begin only when one is completely familiar with official, objective information that is not supplemented by the considerations of some politician, journalist, or other person."

Brazauskas says: "Yesterday evening, we—Minister Gylys, Ambassador Kuris, and some members of the delegation—discussed various proposals and coordinated them with the Russian stand. We also discussed proposals relating to the articles—especially to Article 12—which deals with the compensation for damages. I formed a definite opinion, the opinion that this article should be examined, first of all, and discussed with Russia."

Brazauskas says this article is unacceptable as proposed. He says: "There is no doubt about it. There are also some differences of opinion about other articles, and this should be clarified. I then decided to phone President Boris Yeltsin. I did this and proposed to him that our meeting be postponed for a few days to allow the delegations of our states to work and once again examine and prepare a text that would be acceptable to both sides. He agreed."

Brazauskas says that Yeltsin expressed his wish that during this period of time the delegations and government representatives could deal with other agreements that have been discussed more than once and are at a stage when they could be signed. He says these agreements concern military transit, pensions to Russian servicemen, and some other agreements.

Brazauskas then says: "I want to express my wish—if I have the right to do this—that journalists see relations in their full context, their whole volume. It is not possible to single out some article and stick to it. Economic relations, the customs system, and the price of our goods depend on export and import duties of Russia and other states." Brazauskas describes the contacts of various enterprises in seeking partners in the East and the West.

Brazauskas says: "Of course, there are conditions and demands that we cannot and never will give up. They are our statehood, sovereignty, and our prestige as a state, which we are going to maintain. I will always do this."

Foreign Minister Gylys then begins to speak. He says: "I would like to describe in a few words the atmosphere during our contacts in the last few weeks with Russia. I must say that the talks have been taking place against a not very favorable background." Gylys says it was not possible to assemble the whole team during the holidays and that accusations were made that the visit was taking place secretly. Gylys adds: "There has been a lot of incorrect information that the delegation was bringing a letter from the Russian president. This is incorrect. There has been information from the Russian side—and it was repeated today—that everything had been agreed upon in Moscow on that Thursday. This is not true because the Russian side submitted five versions of Article 12 on Friday. We agreed then, on Thursday, that we would continue working on the text. Thus, the remark by Mr. Isakov printed today does not correspond with the truth. It is a pity that it sounds in some publications as if Mr. Isakov is the righteous side in the negotiations, and the Lithuanian side is not righteous.

"I wish, without disclosing the content of our proposals, to say that the Lithuanian side submitted interesting proposals to Russia on Monday."

Gylys says he thinks these proposals would be acceptable to Lithuania in many respects.

Gylys says that some people,including those from the negotiating delegation, regarded this as treason.

He says: "Treason is when documents are handed over to the third side. The two aides negotiating exchanged arguments, however. We received Russian proposals on Friday—five versions of them. We also submitted our proposals, several versions of them.

"Therefore, I think that the talk that the minister, having not consulted anyone, cannot send versions—that he is not constitutionally authorized—is rather incorrect. I think it weakens our stand in the negotiations with Russia. I will limit myself to this and will reply to questions."

The journalists then ask questions. To the first question, regarding on whose initiative Gylys paid a visit to Moscow, Brazauskas replies: "The visit by Mr. Gylys to Moscow took place on my initiative. I do not see anything bad in it if the president asks the foreign

minister to go and coordinate issues. As you see, this game of exchanging faxes and telegrams between Moscow and Vilnius is not effective. Direct contacts are essential."

Brazauskas continues: "I do not see anything bad, and I think that this is normal when the foreign minister, instructed by the president, goes to a state and meets with the acting foreign minister."

Gylys then adds: "Information at that time was rather scarce because intensive negotiations were taking place." He says: "Since there were no solutions, there was not much information."

A Voice of America correspondent then asks the leaders about the results of the meeting with Yeltsin. Brazauskas replies: "I do not know how you arrived at the conclusion that the work of the negotiating delegations had stopped. I never used this word. I said that it was insufficiently effective and that the contacts of the foreign ministries were essential."

He says: "No special authorizations for the minister were needed. He has his authorizations as a member of the government and foreign minister."

Gylys then adds: "The talks were very frank. We exchanged arguments and understood each other's stand. We succeeded in achieving a great deal."

He goes on to say: "But the main Article 12 remained open after our negotiations in Moscow."

Replying to questions, Brazauskas asks journalists not to ask what could have happened. Replying to a question on when a meeting with Yeltsin could take place, he says: "I had a very friendly conversation with Yeltsin." He goes on to note: "I hope that tomorrow morning the delegation will be able to go by air to Moscow. It will work as long as necessary. We are to be in contact and will discuss the date. I expect that we will be able to do this next week."

A RESPUBLIKA correspondent asks: "Usually such consultations, discussions, or whatever are attended by the ambassador of a country when some event will take place. This discussion was attended by Mr. Kuris, and not by Mr. Kozyrovicius. Perhaps Mr. Kuris will be the new foreign minister?"

Brazauskas says: "About Mr. Kuris. He is a professor, an expert in international law. Before his appointment to the post of ambassador to Belgium, he took an active part in making proposals and in the negotiations with Russia. He was here at the time and we asked him to give advice on how we should deal with the issue of compensation."

Asked about the secrecy in the negotiations, Brazauskas replies: "I assure you once again that there is no secrecy in these negotiations.

After a variety of other questions, a correspondent presents one last query: "My question would be somewhat rhetorical. Is the German chancellor, Helmut Kohl, to be regarded as a traitor, a traitor to Germany's interests, because he had secret talks in a hunting lodge with Gorbachev on Germany's unification and the elimination of the occupation of East Germany, without informing anyone about this. Is he regarded as a traitor or not?"

Gylys says: "In Lithuania he would be called a traitor."

Brazauskas May Postpone Moscow Visit

WS0408151293 Tallinn BNS in English 1016 GMT 4 Aug 93

[Text] VILNIUS, Aug 04, BNS—Lithuania's President Algirdas Brazauskas makes his final decision today on whether to postpone a visit to Moscow Thursday [5 August], said Virgilijus Bulovas, leader of the Lithuanian delegation for talks with Russia.

Bulovas said the situation at talks with Russia was discussed during Brazauskas' meeting with four delegation members earlier Tuesday. The meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys, parliament Chairman Ceslovas Jursenas, and Ambassador Pranas Kuris.

Participants of the meeting also discussed a new version of the agreement on army withdrawal, drafted by the delegation.

Bulovas said the new version underlines that the withdrawal is not a matter of agreement, but Russia's obligation as the legal successor of the former Soviet Union. The proposed text provides for further talks on compensations to Lithuania. Lithuania does not insist that Russia start talks on compensations exactly after a month's time.

Bulovas said alternate versions of different paragraphs are ready.

Lithuanian negotiators suggested the president put off his visit to Russia and refuse to sign the latest text prepared by a Russian delegation.

Bulovas says the version proposed by Russia was initialed by his Russian counterpart Viktor Isakov. The step was made without coordinating the document with Lithuania. The Russian version obliges Russia to compensate only for the damage caused after January 1992.

Bulovas said the Lithuanian foreign minister's sudden visit to Moscow came after the new Russian draft reached Lithuania.

Members of the Lithuanian delegation also urged Brazauskas not to sign the version prepared by Lithuania in May. Lithuanian negotiators think an additional round of talks is needed before the two country's settle the withdrawal treaty. "The Lithuanian delegation is ready to leave for Moscow tomorrow," Bulovas said.

He said Brazauskas will have to make up his mind before Wednesday. Either the delegation goes to Moscow or the president. Lithuania plans to tell Russia about the Lithuanian president's plans as soon as he decides.